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ABSTRACT
This study seeks to explore and interrogate the “viral reality” of the 1990s, in which the
virus, heavily indebted to representations of AIDS for its metaphorical power, emerged
as a prominent agent in science and popular culture. What becomes apparent in both
fictional and non-fictional texts of this era, however, is that the designation of “virus”
transcends specific and material viral phenomena, making the virus itself a touchstone
for modern preoccupations with self and other. As constituted by the human body’s
interaction with pathogenic agents, the binary of self and other may be deconstructed by
an interrogation of the virus itself, a permeable and mutable body that lends itself to any
number of interpretive possibilities. A uniquely liminal agent, the virus refuses
categorization as either life or non-life. However, it is not the liminality of the pathogen
that allows for this deconstruction, which serves to frustrate such boundaries in the first
place. Rather, the notion that viruses are (always) already a part of who we are as
human beings, and that “self” is not necessarily a self-enclosed autonomous entity,
suggests that the binary cannot hold. A virus is unique; an insider/outsider that crosses
artificial boundaries, it destabilizes the boundaries themselves, and thus the traditional
framework of self and other. Examining viral accounts in popular science writings, film,
television, advertisements, philosophy, science fiction, and naturalistic fiction, this study
examines the ways in which science and popular culture have characterized both the
virus and its psychological and material effects, and suggests that the pathogen-assignifier may be read in ways that point to the virus’s utopian potential as a theoretical
category.

iii

CHAPTER ONE
THE REPLICATION OF THE VIRUS:
FROM BIOMEDICAL SCIENCES TO POPULAR CULTURE
“Biological science relentlessly pushes the level of its analysis down to a scale below the level of lived human
experience, to the microscopic level of microbes, cells, or genes.”
–Emily Martin, Flexible Bodies
“All the amazement that’s left in the world is microscopic.”
–Don DeLillo, White Noise

“Today is the day of the virus” (9), proclaims Ann Giudici Fettner in Viruses: Agents of
Change, according the pathogen a hyped status that is echoed not only in scientific circles, but
also in popular culture. “Viral discourse” permeates contemporary American culture, suddenly
ubiquitous in the age of AIDS and replete with metaphors from virology. The virus, as Susan
Sontag suggests in “AIDS and Its Metaphors,” has largely replaced cancer as an agent of
debilitating spread.1 “This is a cultural virus,” declares Colorado Governor Bill Owens in
response to the Columbine High shooting. “We are a virus with shoes,” comments comedian
Bill Hicks, referring to Americans’ greed and uncontrolled breeding habits. And Seinfeld, the
much-loved cultural signpost, features an irritated Elaine utilizing viral metaphors to disparage
George: “He's like a virus. He attaches himself to a healthy host company, and the next thing you
know, the entire staff's infected” (“The Little Kicks”). Metaphors and analogies such as these
stem from concrete depictions of viruses, which may be found in numerous fictional and nonfictional texts, films, and even the local newscast that spotlights the latest Ebola outbreak. Far
from metaphorical, smallpox, or rather the threat of smallpox, currently dominates the popular
press, shoving Ebola and other life-threatening viruses out of the limelight and displacing other,
more immediate concerns. And yet the smallpox virus itself is a locus for metaphorical
1

attachments; as I illustrate, smallpox is associated in the public imagination with Soviet
manufacture, Arab deployment, and, possibly, domestic terrorism. More than merely
representative of these things, the virus is figured as an agent of them; it is constructed as a
pathogen with intent. Thus, simply by interrogating the smallpox virus we gain an insight into
our current fears and preoccupations.
If we are not being regaled with tales of “killer viruses” that drastically alter the state of
the human body, then we are being reminded to inoculate the nervous system of the human
body’s most precious extension, the computer, against its artificial counterpart. And while
popular viral accounts may be distinguished in many ways from scientific accounts, the lines of
influence from science to popular culture may not be as clear-cut as we might suppose. As Paula
Treichler argues, “boundaries among popular culture, science, policy, and media are fairly
permeable, each offering discursive archives–linguistic or semantic reservoirs–that furnish
resources (and perhaps legitimacy) to the others. Popular culture borrows elements from
science, while science borrows elements from popular culture” (321). That the virus assumes
such prominence in science and popular culture is perhaps due to its own permeability as a
signifier. It has been persuasively argued by philosophers of science that objects of scientific
knowledge are unavoidably theory-laden, and the virus is no exception. That is, the virus is
colored by the values of the scientists who study it, who imbue it with qualities (phallic,
feminine, nuclear) that are not inherent.2 As I illustrate in this study, a profusion of “others” are
manifested through the locus of the virus, which is frequently gendered, historicized, and
nationalized in texts ranging from popular fiction to science writings.
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As illustrated by Governor Owens’ appropriation of the term to describe violence in
schools, the virus has been used to describe any number of cultural phenomena. Usually, it is a
metaphor for simple replication, suggesting that such replication has a diseased, and hence
negative, quality. In many of the texts I examine, certain economic systems are likened to
viruses–for example, the term is used both as a metaphor for capitalism and communism (or
collectivism), suggesting that these systems “infect” the denizens of societies that employ them.
Terrorism, violence, fashion, feminism, illiteracy–these have all been referred to as viruses, and
the term is often used uncritically to describe anything that spreads quickly and successfully.
The connotations are not always negative, as I illustrate, but by and large the association with
disease is tacitly acknowledged. One difference between cancer as an agent of debilitating
spread and the virus as a similar kind of agent is that we tend to imagine the virus as a single
entity that replicates itself. As a disease, cancer is amorphous, with many tendrils snaking out to
generate tumors in the body. Magazines may feature cancer cells on their covers, but the virus is
frequently featured by itself, particularly in the early days when HIV was first isolated. HIV
itself had a pretty high wattage of star power, no doubt owing, in some part, to the Hollywood
star power that backed AIDS research in the 1980s. This emphasis on the “individuality” of the
virus contributes significantly to its personification in texts, both fictional and non-fictional.
That is not to say that the virus is the first such agent to be personified, but it can be perceived as
the contemporary successor to other such agents, such as Death. Death itself, however, is less an
individual entity than it is a state of being (or non-being) and thus is individualized in the sense
that it becomes a character in fictional texts and lore. The virus, however, is a character–an
individual with intent–that appears in texts ranging from novels to scientific journal articles.
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Both a construction of scientific discourse and a material object, the virus is also an
historical subject that invites numerous attachments and connotations, some of which are
contradictory: “A virus–any virus–is a constructed entity, a representation, whose legitimacy is
established and legitimized through a whole series of operations and representations, all highly
stylized” (Treichler 159). One might argue that bacteria or cells or genes invite similar
investments, but the virus is unique in that its very existence has been characterized as liminal,
affording it an even greater permeability. For many scientists, the virus–defined by biologist and
Nobel laureate Peter Medawar as a piece of nucleic acid surrounded by bad news–straddles the
fence between the living and non-living. It cannot reproduce on its own, relying on a host cell to
produce viral “copies” once the pathogen has integrated its genetic material into the host cell: “it
enters a cell and, with the help of a the cell itself, synthesizes what it needs and reassembles
these elements into new virus particles” (Gallo 49). Most other animal cells and microorganisms
reproduce by division, so the fact that the virus does not calls into question its status as a living
entity. Tellingly, after years of debate, scientists have mostly resigned themselves to the virus’s
liminal state. Posing the question “Are viruses alive?” virologist and co-discoverer of HIV Luc
Montaigner answers with, “Not exactly, since they only exist as parasites inside cells” (86),
while his partner Robert Gallo seems content to let go of the whole matter: “We do not know the
origin of viruses, but happily the old arguments that tried to settle whether they are living or
nonliving must have grown tedious because we no longer hear them” (52). The suggestion here
is that the virus cannot be categorized in terms of binaries, and scientists are only now beginning
to feel comfortable with that notion. As The Hot Zone, Richard Preston’s popular account of the
Ebola virus illustrates, the notion has filtered into popular culture:
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Some biologists classify viruses as “life forms,” because they are not strictly
known to be alive. Viruses are ambiguously alive, neither alive nor dead. They
carry on their existence on the borderlands between life and nonlife. Viruses that
are outside cells merely sit there; nothing happens. They are dead . . . . Virus
particles that lie around in blood or mucus may seem dead, but the particles are
waiting for something to come along. . . . Viruses may seem alive when they
multiply, but in another sense they are obviously dead, are only machines, subtle
ones to be sure, but strictly mechanical, no more alive than a jackhammer. (83-85)
“Viruses are ambiguously alive,” “They are dead,” “Viruses may seem alive,” “they are
obviously dead”–Preston here explores the ambiguity that he argues is the defining characteristic
of the virus. Central to the very “nature” of virus, then, is a paradox, and it is one that I argue is
a starting point for rethinking traditionally held assumptions about certain binaries that circulate
in contemporary American culture.
In particular, I examine how the binary of self and other, as constituted by the human
body’s interaction with pathogenic agents, may be deconstructed by an interrogation of the virus
itself, a permeable and mutable body that lends itself to any number of interpretive possibilities.
It is not the liminality of the pathogen that allows for this deconstruction, which serves to
frustrate such boundaries in the first place; rather, as I illustrate, the notion that viruses are
(always) already a part of who we are as human beings, and that “self” is not necessarily a selfenclosed autonomous entity, suggests that the binary cannot hold. A virus is unique; an
insider/outsider that crosses artificial boundaries, it destabilizes the boundaries themselves, and
thus the traditional framework of self and other.
While I discuss at length the “constructed” nature of the virus, I do not wish to minimize
the virus as a material object that has discernible, material effects upon those who may be
infected by it. In other words, real people become ill or die as a result of being infected with real
viruses. It must be said, however, that the vast majority of viruses don’t affect humans one way
5

or another–only the particularly “virulent” get our attention. And it is only at the extreme ends
of the viral spectrum, where we find Ebola, HIV, and other life-threatening viruses, that we get
narratives that imbue these viruses with malevolent intent. For the most part, we exist in
harmony with viruses, a balance that goes unrecorded in much of popular literature.
My goal here is to examine the ways in which science and popular culture have
characterized both the virus and its psychological and material effects, and to suggest that the
pathogen-as-signifier may be read in ways that do not simply reinforce the central binary of self
and other, but rather point to the virus’s utopian potential as a theoretical category. The virus
may be the tool by which we begin to negotiate what Donna Haraway calls “the problematic
multiplicities of postmodern selves” (225). In its potential for blurring boundaries by
emphasizing the permeability of all boundaries and thus exposing the lie of unitary subjectivity,
and in its capacity for mutation, the virus invites a multiplicity of interpretations that illuminate a
particular cultural moment. That “moment,” I suggest, is the decade of the 1990s, in which the
virus was such a popular and pervasive figure in American culture. However much the pathogen
may be dismissed as just one element in the larger narrative of disease, we cannot deny the “viral
reality” of the 1990s, in which the virus was ubiquitous. A touchstone for postmodern
preoccupations with self and other, the post-AIDS discovery virus both affirms and challenges
the cultural narrative of the viral invader that must be prevented from rupturing the integrity of
the human body at all costs.
For over fifty years, immunologists have held that the fundamental purpose of the
immune system is to distinguish between self and non-self, and to defend the body against nonself.3 The self/non-self model is the central orthodoxy of immune systems discourse, and while
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it has been challenged–most recently by the work of immunologist Polly Matzinger, to which I
will return–it is still the defining model of contemporary immunology. Tellingly, the model
gained ascendancy following World War II, at a time when Cold War tensions were beginning to
mount. Certainly the descriptions of the model tend to employ military, defensive imagery,
depicting a “body at war” that critics ranging from Emily Martin, Susan Sontag, Donna
Haraway, Stephen Kruger, and Paula Treichler trace in scientific, medical, and popular
literature.4 The body, or military defense system, marshals its “troops” against the invading
hordes, which, in the case of the virus, are figured as bombs, tanks, missiles, or simply phallic
invaders that level attacks against the host. Once a virus has effectively invaded a host cell, it
then sets about the process of pillaging, in which it usurps the cell’s “old commanding general . .
. and issues new orders” (Radetsky 9).5
While such conventional battle imagery can be found in a wide variety of texts, Treichler,
using Haraway’s work, suggests that AIDS narratives also employ more current images of war
that are culled from disciplines as diverse as information theory, cybernetics, systems analysis,
and computer science. Her characterization of modern immunology is that it “moved into the
realm of high science when it reworked the military combat metaphors of World War II (battle,
struggle, territory, enemy, truce) into the language of postmodern warfare: communication
command control (coding, transmission, messages), interceptions, spies, lies” (31). The body is
no longer simply a fortress; it is instead “conceived as a strategic system, highly militarized in
key arenas of imagery and practice” in which disease may be seen as “a subspecies of
information malfunction or communications pathology . . . a process of misrecognition or
transgression of the boundaries of a strategic assemblage called self” (Haraway 211-213).
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Even as the imagery evolves, however, the distinction between self and non-self remains
the same; Emily Martin notes that the basis for choosing military metaphors is quite simply to
maintain a clear demarcation against that which must be kept in and that which must be kept out
(100). At the same time, however, modern immunology suggested a more fluid relationship
between the body and its environment. The “enemy” had moved inside, but it was still described
in terms of a non-self that must be dealt with by the body’s troops: “Increasing concern with
domestic unrest and lingering Cold War paranoia demanded that our immune systems should
conform to a policing and confessional ideology which suggested, not that the Commies had
gotten through the door, but rather that there was a more general weakness within the body
politic” (Patton Inventing 60). To maintain selfhood, surveillance and regulation were a
necessity. Thus, although the fundamental principles of immunology endured, the rules of the
game had changed with the shifting of borders: “Immunology was not so much about the Other
as about the marginally different that had already been admitted to close proximity” (Patton
Inventing 60). We see this attitude mirrored in our own postmodern state; Congress recently
passed measures that grant certain government agencies extraordinary powers to utilize what
many consider to be questionable policing techniques, as well as permission to conduct
surveillance on the body politic in an effort to prevent and combat terrorism. The “marginally
different,” in this case, are Arab-Americans. That immunology should reflect these attitudes is
further testament to the value-laden nature of scientific knowledge.
In contrast to Patton’s view, Martin argues that older models of the body, which depict
the body as a tightly sealed fortress, re-emerged in response to the threat that HIV poses to the
integrity of the body. Thus do both models appear side by side in the literature about AIDS, each
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relying on a version of the self/non-self model. To drive home the rigidity of this model, Martin
includes a passage from a 1935 paper written by Ludwik Fleck, an early Polish immunologist. It
is important to note that at the time Fleck wrote the paper, the self/non-self model upon which
the foundation of modern immunology rests had not yet been formulated:
The concept of infectious disease is based on the notion of the organism as a
closed unit and of hostile causative agents invading it. The causative agent
produces a bad effect (attack). The organism responds with a reaction (defense).
This results in a conflict, which is taken to be the essence of disease. The whole
of immunology is permeated with such primitive images of war. . . . But not a
single experimental proof exists that could force an unbiased observer to adopt
such an idea . . . . An organism can no longer be construed as a self-contained,
independent unit with fixed boundaries . . . . In the light of this concept [the
harmonious life unit], man appears as a complex to whose harmonious well-being
many bacteria, for instance, are absolutely essential . . . . It is very doubtful
whether an invasion in the old sense is possible, involving as it does an
interference by completely foreign organisms in natural conditions. A completely
foreign organism could find no receptors capable of reaction and thus could not
generate a biological process. (Qtd. in Martin 108-109).
With this passage, Fleck emphasizes the “self’s” interconnectedness with “other,” and in doing
so he deals a death blow to the idea of the autonomous self-enclosed liberal subject that
postmodern theory has so diligently attempted to dismantle. For deconstructive critics in
particular, the subject is an unstable product of language that is continually in the process of
creation. Among many Marxists and feminists, it is the product of ongoing social interactions
with other subjects. And yet here we have Fleck challenging the notion of the liberal humanist
subject–as organism–long before Derrida, Foucault, Lacan, Kristeva, or other critics within the
humanities and social sciences, with the exception of Mikhail Bakhtin. What this suggests is
that science, or those who hold a standard science view, has a vested interest at stake in retaining
the self/non-self model, even in the face of opposing evidence, as we will see. For Haraway the
vested interest involves the necessity of viewing the living world as one monumental arms race:
9

“Is this postmodern body, this construct of always vulnerable and contingent individuality,
necessarily an automated Star Wars battlefield in the now extra-terrestrial space of the late
twentieth-century Western scientific body’s intimate interior?” (221). That the biohazard suit,
an immediately recognizable image, should have replaced the spacesuit as a cultural icon is
representative of the shift in scientific frontiers; with a foundering space program and the
absence (before September 11th) of any major enemies, we turned our gaze inward, re-working
militaristic and imperialistic metaphors to suit the postmodern age.
Both Martin and Haraway complicate the current perceptions of the immune system,
pointing to contemporary interpretations of the immune system that do not embrace the self/nonself model–these may stem from students, housewives, handymen, science fiction writers, and
scientists who perceive “self” and “other” in ways that suggest a complex interaction (and
integration) between the two. In other words, like Fleck, there are more and more people
unwilling to accept the imagery and ideology of the “body at war.” Chief among these is
immunologist Polly Matzinger, whose immune system model serves as the most recent answer to
the questions that Martin and Haraway raise in their texts. For Matzinger, the fact that the
immune system does not automatically reject a mother’s fetus, or her lactating breasts that
generate new proteins, suggests that it is not quite the military defense system it has been made
out to be. In this view, it is not a militarized zone equipped with bombs and alarms, but rather a
cooperative entity whose boundaries are fluid. Here the immune system is associated with
traditionally feminine characteristics, emphasizing nurturing, cooperation, and a diffuse sense of
self, whereas the rigidity of the other model connotes a typically masculinist world view. Martin
reminds us that work in feminist theory suggests that “there is a masculinist bias to views that
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divide the world into sharply opposed, hostile categories, such that the options are to conquer, be
conquered, or magnanimously tolerate the other” (60). Matzinger takes a different view of the
immune system, pointing out that the body does not eject the bacterial organisms that live inside
us, some of which synthesize the vitamin K that helps our blood clot. In addition, as Matzinger’s
colleague Ephraim Fuchs argues, “infection is not always a bad thing; a virus, for instance, might
provide us with helpful genes that we would otherwise never acquire” (qtd. in Richardson 84).
Clearly the self/non-self model does not explain the immune system’s tolerance to non-self in
these situations, which calls the validity of the entire model into question.
What Matzinger contends is that in fact the immune system does not discriminate
between self and non-self, but rather that it responds to “danger”–anything that causes tissue
injury or death by means other than programmed cell death. That is, the immune system
responds only when an antigen is associated with causing harm. Matzinger also suggests that
tissues play a far greater role in their own defense than previously supposed; they signal the
presence of danger, alerting white blood cells. She argues, “The immune system is every tissue .
. . . This is not an army patrolling a territory. It’s a family” (qtd. in Strange 66). This extended
version of the immune system has affinities with the body as “an engineered communications
system, ordered by a fluid and dispersed command-control-intelligence network” (211) that
Haraway describes, but it points to a more sophisticated concept of tolerance that that construct
and the “body at war” image simply lack. In this scenario, too, the virus’s reputation as phallic,
foreign invader gets something of a make over. As Barbara Browning observes, responding to
the idea of the new “flexible” immune system that Martin describes, “Viruses, then, are not
‘alien’ to the body, but an integrated element that must then be accommodated by the immune
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system” (156).6 And Treichler acknowledges that “Ultimately, we cannot distinguish self from
non-self: ‘plague is life’ and each of us has the plague within us” (40). We will see this
sentiment echoed in numerous fictional texts, and we will even see a hint of it in non-fictional
viral narratives. As the self/non-self distinction is called into question in the field of
immunology, so too is the central binary of self and other.
What, then, constitutes the self in the self/non-self model? For Matzinger, who notes that
our bodies acquire tolerance to our own proteins as cells dies out and new cells replace them, it
may be a moot point: “The self, in other words, is constantly being defined anew–which is
another way of saying that it doesn’t really exist at all” (Richardson 86). Norbert Wiener, the
progenitor of cybernetics, made a similar observation in The Human Use of Human Beings
(1954), arguing that human beings may be seen as patterns of organization that consistently
renew themselves (Hayles 104). In other words, Wiener thought the human body could be
understood as constituted of information, a key term that contributes to our current
understanding of the body as “coded text,” as Haraway puts it. Wiener employed the notion of
the body as informational pattern in his design of cybernetic machines, influenced by Claude
Shannon’s concept of information, which was developed in the early 1950s. The story of how
information–which can be mathematically measured and is independent of meaning or
function–influenced molecular biology has been explored in great depth, so I will not fully
recount it here. However, as I think it necessary in an examination of viruses and viral
metaphors to historicize the contemporary perception of the body as informational code, I want
to provide here at least a brief sketch of the exchanges between information theory and
molecular biology.
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The information metaphor was adopted by J.D. Watson and Francis Crick, who are
credited, in the standard science view, with introducing the discourse of information theory into
biological discourse at large. Since Watson and Crick are also recognized for originally
mapping the structure of DNA, we would do well to remember that other scientists might have
been involved in this introduction but are uncredited.7 These two scientists used the concept of
information metaphorically–most geneticists realized that the technical definition of information
could not apply to biological information, despite the seeming suitability of DNA, which appears
to function like a linear code.8 Lily E. Kay notes that “information came to serve as a potent
metaphor–a metaphor of a metaphor, to be precise–usually exchanged with concepts of
biological and chemical specificity . . . . It became constitutive of theories and practices of
molecular biology in the 1950s, providing discursive, epistemic, and technical frameworks for
work on the genetic code” (90). The information metaphor has endured, maturing as
communications sciences have developed.
With the body (self) and the virus (other)–that pathogen made up almost entirely of
nucleic acid–regarded as reducible to code, the subject in biomedical discourse suffers a death
similar to the one that poststructuralists have assigned to the liberal humanist subject.9 The
human body has become what Katherine Hayles would call “denatured,” or revealed as a
construct, much like its viral counterpart. The temptation to regard the body as superfluous, or
immaterial, perhaps stems from this intense focus on its component parts, which are accorded a
greater significance than the body as a whole. My epigraph by Martin bears repeating here:
“Biological science relentlessly pushes the level of its analysis down to a scale below the level of
lived human experience, to the microscopic level of microbes, cells, or genes.” And it is

13

arguable that it is in part because of this tendency to see humans as their component parts that
the virus has become a premier signifier; it is the malevolent counterpart to the gene. It is the
premier contemporary indicator of non-self, just as the gene is the premier indicator of self. The
virus, then, is inscribed with competing discourses–that of the postmodern theories of
communications sciences and that of older militaristic ideologies. HIV, as noted earlier, is a case
in point of this phenomenon.10 And the human body, as I have illustrated here, is similarly
inscribed. These discourses cannot be separated, and their fusion provides us with the
postmodern version of self vs. other: heavily mediated and yet still intact. The same might be
said about the postmodern state. What will become increasingly necessary to remind ourselves
of is the fact that however much we may illustrate the extent to which the human body and the
virus are denatured, they are both material “realities”:
Perhaps our hopes for accountability in the techno-biopolitics in postmodern
frames turn on revisioning the world as coding trickster with whom we must learn
to converse. Like a protein subjected to stress, the world for us may be
thoroughly denatured, but it is not any less consequential. So while the late
twentieth-century immune system is a construct of an elaborate apparatus of
bodily production, neither the immune system nor any other of biomedicine’s
world-changing bodies–like a virus–is a ghostly fantasy. Coyote is not a ghost,
merely a protean trickster. (Haraway 209)
A mutable, world-changing body, the virus can in some cases transfer genetic material from one
host to the next. According to molecular geneticist and Nobel laureate Joshua Lederberg, “the
very essence of the virus is its fundamental entanglement with the genetic and metabolic
machinery of the host” (qtd. in Garrett 227). Thus the virus is something of a bricoleur, a
postmodern pathogen that may be responsible for stimulating the evolution of the species
through a kind of genetic bricolage. I am here bestowing upon the virus an agency, or
intentionality, that is common to both popular and scientific accounts of the virus. And that is
14

due, arguably, to the dominant metaphors in molecular biology. Kruger, who notes that
molecular biology metaphorizes its subject matter as language, asserts that “Because of the
simplicity of their structure, viruses are especially susceptible to being understood in terms of the
linguistic metaphors of molecular genetics” (11). In other words, it is tempting to view the virus
in terms of “coding” and “information” because it is primarily composed of genetic material,
which itself is heavily metaphorized: “How can we not see as somehow possessing intelligence
the organism or cell described as a repository of ‘information,’ in which various processes
‘regulate’ or ‘control’ what is to be ‘expressed’ by allowing or ‘repressing’ the ‘transcription’
and ‘translation’ of certain parts of a ‘genetic code’”? (Kruger 10). The virus, then, is perceived
as an intentional entity, “capable of ‘developing strategies’ for its survival and replication”
(Kruger 11). That intention is generally seen as malevolent, and it is a quality that makes the
virus particularly suitable for other metaphorical attachments that emphasize its malevolence. In
one sense, the virus is still very much a “primitive,” playing the role of the invader, alien, Other,
and mirroring its outward manifestations with an equally “primitive” structure. In another sense,
however, the virus is the ultimate postmodern spy, able to change guises and strategies at a
breathtaking rate in order to infiltrate and commandeer its host. For Treichler, who views AIDS
as an “epidemic of signification,” HIV is portrayed as “so shifting and uncertain that we might
even acknowledge our own historical moment more specifically by giving the AIDS virus a
postmodern metaphor: a terrorist’s terrorist, an Abu Nidal of viruses” (33). Such an association
is actualized in the accounts of biowarfare I will be examining, which feature the virus as a
hybridized infiltrator of American borders and bodies.11
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What I will suggest is that the “primitive” virus and the “evolved” postmodern virus coexist in
the texts I will examine–that is, the virus is invested with both of these discourses, embodying
the binary of self/other as well as the multiple, fragmented, ever-shifting postmodern state.
Like that of the immune system, the narrative of viral infection can often be a gendered
one, with the virus portrayed as a penetrative agent similar to sperm.12 Certainly the military
metaphors employed to describe viruses point to that reading, and the violence associated with
combat reinforces the sexual violence of the virus’s penetration of the cell. Thus, as Kruger
argues with regard to AIDS, the body depicted in this scenario is gendered feminine: “The
language of the undefended body . . . evokes not just medical and military but also sexual realm,
reminding us that women’s bodies, in Western culture, have typically been depicted as more
permeable, open, undefended, ‘disarmed,’ than male bodies” (Kruger 44-45).13 And if they are
not already disarmed, it is a small matter to do so: “Viruses are the ultimate agents provocateurs
of biology, for they appear to be welcomed into the trusting arms of the cell” (Gallo 46). And
yet one could also argue that the human body is–by default–gendered male. One only has to cite
the statistics of human male subjects used in medical research versus those of female subjects to
argue that the perception of what we consider to be “human” is primarily male.14 And the virus
can be very threatening to the stability and integrity of that body, particularly in the case of
hemorrhagic viruses that can partially liquefy organs:
The effects of these viruses upon the body . . . resonate with dominant cultural
fears about the disappearance of difference, the collapse of the binary oppositions
of gender. Arguably, the reduction of the body’s interior into a visceral stew,
encased in a porous membrane, and leaking vast quantities of blood and tissue,
may provoke a fear of feminization. It may do violence to the culturallysanctioned notion of the controlled and ordered male body, uncontaminated by
feminine similarity or association. (Hatty and Hatty 242).
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Simply put, the virus can deconstruct as well as reinforce the binary opposition of
self/other and masculine/feminine. As we will see, however, the depiction of viruses are more
likely to reinforce binaries than to deconstruct them. Indeed, while descriptions of the virus
using military rhetoric are common, reinforcing patriarchal views of the “enemy,” the virus is
also associated with traditional depictions of a rather voracious femininity. For example,
Richard Preston depicts the filovirus that causes outbreaks of hemorrhagic fever in The Hot Zone
as explicitly female, an insidious and mysterious force that must be dominated in order to
preserve life as we know it. What is more, the virus is an African female, as Preston repeatedly
emphasizes its putative African origin. And Preston’s Africa is a very primitive place, teeming
with contagion. Thus is the danger associated with the African other and the female other fused
in the filovirus: “He saw virus particles shaped like snakes . . . . They were white cobras tangled
among themselves, like the hair of Medusa. They were the face of Nature herself, the obscene
goddess revealed naked. (197). The “gendering” of the virus is representative, clearly, of deeply
entrenched cultural ideologies, but what is common to both masculine and feminine depictions is
an anxiety about the transgression of boundaries–about the inability of humans to contain a
dangerous pathogen. The virus does not respect borders, something that became clear in the
early days of the AIDS epidemic, when the only people considered to be susceptible to HIV were
those who belonged to marginal “risk groups.” As the disease spread, the “boundaries” between
the “risk groups” and the population at large began to dissolve. And while it may be argued that
AIDS as the agent of apocalypse is somewhat lower on the domestic radar these days, in part
because of the success of protease inhibitors, the fear of AIDS itself has been translated into a
more generalized anxiety about the virus.
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Smallpox, then, is only the latest in a parade of viruses that has garnered a lot of attention in the
popular press.
As in non-fiction, traditional binaries tend to stay in place in most fictional
representations of the virus, except perhaps in the case of speculative fiction, in which the virus
takes on characteristics not (yet) possible according to the convention of realism that naturalistic
fictions employs. Speculative fiction also tends to engage more directly with the complexity of
the virus itself, elevating it to the status of a character instead of employing it as a mere plot
device. Indeed, the very “nature” of the virus is itself speculative, so it is particularly susceptible
to theorization, as I have illustrated. And as Heather Schell observes, “Virologists not only
support the creation of epidemic science fiction, they also indulge in it themselves as a
brainstorming tool” (100). What some science fiction writers “speculate” about the virus is the
possibility that infection can enliven the subject rather than debilitate it. Transformation of the
human subject through viral infection in these texts often leads not to death or debilitation, but to
a different kind of humanity, which we might call, for lack of a better term, posthumanity.15
This may represent not only an answer to the very real and debilitating phenomenon of a disease
like AIDS, but it could also represent an offshoot of the scientific viewpoint–which, compared to
virus-as-malevolent-force, gets very little press–that viruses may in some way be beneficial to
the body. I refer here not to gene therapy, which utilizes genetically engineered viruses in order
to deliver much-needed genes, but rather to the notion that the virus’s natural cutting and pasting
of genes may in fact be beneficial to the body and may even stimulate evolution. Certainly the
representation of viruses that I examine in a number of the speculative fiction texts suggest that
the new posthuman is an evolutionary improvement upon homo sapiens. I focus on this
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exchange between science and popular culture, both of which suggest a more utopian vision of
the virus than the “killer virus” narratives would seem to indicate. My plan is not to rescue the
virus entirely from its bad press, but simply to emphasize that as a theoretical category, the virus
can in fact help us to negotiate “the problematic multiplicities of postmodern selves,” as it is
itself invested with multiplicity and inscribed with competing discourses. The virus, then, is a
mirror of our own postmodern moment. Both as a metaphor and as a liminal agent, it can lead us
to deconstruct the central binary of self and other in ways that other “speculative” postmodern
metaphors, such as Haraway’s cyborg, cannot. And that is primarily due, I would argue, to its
ubiquitousness.
The cyborg is indeed perhaps the most significant construct, or “ironic political myth,” of
the late twentieth century, serving as a key to navigate the contradictions between self and other.
But the cyborg imagery that Haraway calls for has not yet delivered us from our “maze of
dualisms.” Offspring of militarism and patriarchal capitalism, the cyborg is a hybrid of machine
and organism that a number of critics have embraced as a figure that promises utopian
possibilities, in part because of its ability to pick up the tools that have marked it as Other and
mark the world in its turn. The cyborg is also capable of erasing disparities between gender, or
even re-gendering, as it has no “essential” origins. Haraway’s myth is a celebration of
contradictions; she warns against the totalizing resolution of contradiction and notes that the
“partial” and the “monstrous” are both necessary to the new identities which are to be found in
(for the most part) late twentieth century writing. The cyborg is a being that is structured around
contradictions, and those contradictions allow for “transgressed boundaries, potent fusions, and
dangerous possibilities.” And yet apart from professional academics in the field of cultural
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studies, the cyborg has yet to catch on as a powerful metaphor for our times. The virus, on the
other hand, as both a material object and a construction, is already more widely recognizable as a
locus for a dizzying array of metaphorical attachments and connotations. The virus is also, in
our contemporary moment, a uniquely “postmodern” agent, one that embodies contradictions of
self and other within its own structure, and one which inhabits a liminality that enables us, like
Haraway’s cyborg, to imagine potent fusions and dangerous possibilities. The task at hand,
however, is to seize these possibilities; aside from a few representations, which I will examine in
this study, the virus has not been appropriated in ways that allow for the traditional collapse of
binaries. It is still far more likely for the virus to be cast as the typical other. We should
recognize, too, that our “othering” is a projection of what is dangerous and unpleasant about
ourselves. Our depiction of the virus as foreign is a typical strategy in order to deal with our
deeply entrenched fears of the other, which, despite the shrinking of the global stage, remain
very much in evidence. We might take a cue from Julia Kristeva, who writes in “Strangers to
Ourselves” that it is necessary to acknowledge that we are all in some sense “foreigners”:
The foreigner is within us. And when we flee from or struggle against the
foreigner, we are fighting our unconscious . . . . To discover our disturbing
otherness, for that indeed is what bursts in to confront that “demon,” that threat,
that apprehension generated by the projective apparition of the other at the heart
of what we persist in maintaining as a proper, solid “us.” By recognizing our
uncanny strangeness we shall neither suffer from it nor enjoy it from the outside.
The foreigner is within me, hence we are all foreigners. If I am a foreigner, there
are no foreigners. (290).
Chapter Two of this study takes as its focus viral narratives–both fiction and nonfiction–that feature the virus as the premier signifier of apocalypse in contemporary American
culture. Both AIDS and nuclear weapons take a backseat to the more general, all-encompassing
figure of the virus. I argue that these narratives, which feature “killer viruses” and viral
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biological weapons, not only represent displaced anxieties about AIDS, but also actively
incorporate AIDS myths, metaphorical power, and imagery. Beginning with the film Outbreak
and The Hot Zone, Richard Preston’s popular non-fiction account of an Ebola outbreak in the
United Sates, my discussion examines the ways in which HIV is evoked in these texts, and, in
the case of Preston’s book, how the two are explicitly compared. I also look at how the viruses
are nationalized, gendered, and historicized, and how their “defeat” may be read as an answer to
the failure of medical science’s absolute triumphalism in dealing with the AIDS crisis. I note
here the avowedly imperialistic tactics used to reinforce the binary of self and other, and I
compare the rhetoric of war being waged against viruses to the war being waged with viruses.
Other key texts I examine include Richard Preston’s The Cobra Event, a novel about biological
terrorism in the United States, and Preston’s statement to a Senate subcommittee on
bioterrorism. I find that Preston’s texts, which are commercially successful, effectively delineate
the transition from popular fascination with emerging viruses to the fascination with
bioweapons. In exploring current anxieties about biowarfare and the fiction that highlights and
even buttresses those anxieties, it becomes clear that these anxieties are indicative of the shift in
what we perceive as the “enemy.” In the minds of the public the threat of the nuclear is now
merely negligible beside the threat of the biological. It is my goal in locating this shift in the
discourse concerning warfare to speculate as to why the biological, and in particular the viral,
has claimed center stage in contemporary American culture.
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If Chapter Two illustrates how these texts embrace the traditional self/non-self model,
constructing the virus as humanity’s greatest enemy/weapon, Chapter Three argues that the
boundaries between human and virus are more complicated than the model suggests. Using
Greg Bear’s Darwin’s Radio, a novel that uses existing science on retroviruses (and AIDS tales)
to pose the evolution of human beings beyond the level of homo sapiens sapiens, and The XFiles, both the television series and the 1998 movie by that name, I illustrate that the virus is
inseparable from who we are as human beings. As these works demonstrate, both of which mine
the ambiguity implied in the construct of the virus, the traditional immunological self/non-self
model cannot account for the complex interaction between human and virus. And, while the
virus is indeed the premier signifier of apocalypse in these works, it is also a potentially utopian
agent. Chapter Three offers a fictional counterargument to “postmodern plague” thrillers that
tend to play on cultural anxieties about the virus, following a formula in which the annihilation
of the human race is forestalled by the efforts of a unique and brilliant band of individuals who
are often depicted in a race against the clock in order to contain the virus–or else to defeat it
through the invention of a “cure” (vaccine). In those books, as Chapter Two illustrates, the
severe debilitation of the virus’s victims is heavily emphasized, illustrating the frailty of the
human body and the possible dissolution of the human subject. Darwin’s Radio and The X-Files
also emphasize this frailty through the agency of the virus, but in these works dissolution leads
to a transformation of the human subject that frequently represents a gain rather than a loss. The
posthuman that emerges by virtue of infection, however, is a complicated figure, engendering a
fear (of the Other) in humans that prevents them from fully embracing their new status.
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Like the two previous chapters, Chapter Four portrays the virus as an apocalyptic
signifier, and, like Chapter Three, it emphasizes the utopian possibilities of the virus. These
utopian possibilities, however, are primarily reserved for women. In these works, all the women
are privileged by infection–in contrast, many men die from it. For example, characters may find
that they are endowed with new strength, greater mental agility, and new “senses,” all bestowed
by the virus. Thus the humans in these texts become posthuman, and because many of them are
marginalized, they assume a newly empowered position that is in effect a reversal of the status
quo. The virus is not portrayed here as a malevolent invader, as it is even in Darwin’s Radio and
The X-Files, but rather as an agent that facilitates posthumanism and potential utopia for its
hosts. I discuss the ways in which the characters’ gender may be complicated by the virus in
ways that point of the liberatory possibilities of the posthuman; I also discuss the way that the
“gendering” of the virus may be inverted in ways that point to a similar liberation. I answer, too,
if the virus can enable in these texts a depiction of gender that eschews essentialist notions of
womanhood. The texts I examine span four decades: Katherine MacLean's "Contagion," (1950),
Joanna Russ's "When It Changed" (1972) and The Female Man (1975), Octavia Butler's Clay's
Ark (1984), and Nicola Griffith's Ammonite (1992). I also include an examination of Mary
Shelley’s brilliant precursor to these contemporary viral fictions, The Last Man (1826), which
goes so far as to pose the extinction of the entire human race by plague. Shelley’s novel has
been called the first English example of apocalyptic fiction, and I have included it here in order
to historicize its fictional descendants, which are also speculative, composed by women, and
feature an agent of bodily dissolution.
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It is a text that clearly illustrates the long-standing association of the feminine and the primitive
with disease, associations Shelley’s descendants appropriate through the agency of the virus in
an attempt to construct new meanings that empowers women.
Chapter Five explores the intersections between scientific constructions of the virus,
computer science, and what is touted as the new science of memetics. According to William
Burroughs, “Language is a virus from outer space,” and, while no one can say for sure that
viruses have extraterrestrial origins (a popular theory among some scientists), the notion that
language acts in decidedly viral ways is surely actualized in the emergence of computer viruses,
which are themselves composed of a very specific kind of language. Computer viruses are
modeled after biological ones; it is perhaps suggestive that the emergence of HIV into the
popular imagination and the appearance of the computer virus are almost exactly
contemporaneous. Similarly, “memes,” or those units of information that pass from mind to
mind in a replicative strategy akin to viral propagation, adopt the rhetoric of both emerging and
computer viruses. The discourse of computer viruses and memes, then, is epidemiological in
nature. This discourse is joined with the language of information theory, which as I argue has the
effect of rendering human and viruses as only so much code. Thus it is little wonder that humans
are made to seem more like computers, with computer viruses and memes made to seem more
like biological viruses. The figure of the virus is the locus for these exchanges, and it is one that
I explore as it appears metaphorically in the discourse of memetics and both metaphorically and
“literally” in the discourse of computer science. In some science fiction, the discursive
boundaries transgressed become literal, as characters grapple with viruses that somehow escape
the confines of the computer. Unleashed, these viruses infect not only computers, but also those
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who use them, as in Neal Stephenson’s Snow Crash. And in Pat Cadigan’s Synners, computers
can also become the medium for dangerous memes that manifest both as computer viruses and as
very real strokes. The inorganic and organic in these two texts come together in a horrifying
fusion that threatens apocalypse, or in Stephenson’s terminology, “infocalypse.” Debates about
the virus’s liminal status play out nicely here in the fictional confrontation of the biological
versus the electronic, and the two viruses depicted in these texts fall in line with the descriptions
of the “primitive” and “evolved” viruses I have identified in this introduction. I argue in this
chapter that, despite their privileging of the liberal humanist subject, these two novels utilize the
virus to complicate the binaries of organic/inorganic, human/machine, and self/other. Perhaps
more so than any other texts, they illustrate the startling mutability of the virus (“This Snow
Crash thing–is it a virus, a drug, or a religion?”), that quality that allows for its interpretation as
both a utopian signifier and as perhaps the premier deconstructive term of the 1990s. This study
concludes with a final contemplation of the “nature” of the virus and its human host, and
speculates about the virus’s future as a utopian signifier.
NOTES
1. Sontag examines the notion of plague in relation to cancer and AIDS: “‘Plague’ is the
principal metaphor by which the AIDS epidemic is understood. And because of AIDS, the
popular misidentification of cancer as an epidemic, even a plague, seems to be receding: AIDS
has banalized cancer . . . . So far as ‘plague’ still has a future as a metaphor, it is through the
ever more familiar notion of the virus” (132-157).
2. Evelyn Fox Keller summarizes the basic argument involving the values of scientific
knowledge:
Since “nature” is only accessible to us through representations, and since
representations are necessarily structured by language (and hence, culture) no
representation can ever ‘correspond’ to reality. At the same time, however, some
representations are clearly better (more effective) than others. The question that
has plagued much recent philosophy of science is how to make sense of this latter
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statement in the absence of a copy theory of truth. But the difficulty dissolves if
we search for the meaning of ‘better’ in a comparison of the uses to which
different representations can be put, that is, in the practices they facilitate. From
such a perspective, scientific knowledge is value-laden (and inescapably so) just
because it is shaped by our choices–first, of what to seek representations of, and
second, what to seek representations for. (Secrets 5)
3. The self/non-self model was formulated by Australian virologist F. Macfarlane Burnet, and
supported by the experiments of British biologists Peter B. Medawar, both of whom received the
Nobel prize for medicine in 1960. It is their work that eventually paved the way for
transplantation biology.
4. See Martin, Flexible Bodies: The Role of Immunity in American Culture from the Days of
Polio to the Age of AIDS (1994); Sontag, Illness as Metaphor and AIDS and Its Metaphors
(1990); Haraway, “The Biopolitics of Postmodern Bodies: Constitutions of Self in Immune
Systems Discourse” in Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (1991);
Kruger, AIDS Narratives: Gender and Sexuality, Fiction and Science (1996); and Treichler, How
to Have a Theory in an Epidemic: Cultural Chronicles of AIDS (1999).
5. Military metaphors are not unique to viruses, however: “In the microbial world warfare is a
constant . . . . If microbes had elbows, one imagines they would forever be jabbing neighbors in
an endless battle for biological turf” (Garrett 618).
6. Martin argues that a key concept in systems theory–flexibility–is also now a key term in
scientific immunological discourse and that of the economy: “I learned later that the discovery of
the flexibility of the antibody was a galvanizing moment in the development of immunology . . .
. In my mind, this language crashed into contemporary descriptions of the economy of the late
twentieth century . . . with a focus of flexible specialization, flexible production, and flexible,
rapid response to an ever-changing market with specific, tailor-made products” (93).
7. The example of Rosalind Franklin, who went unrecognized by the Nobel Committee in 1962
to for her invaluable work in elucidating the basic helical structure of the DNA molecule,
illustrates that the “standard” science view is sometimes suspect.
8. Evelyn Fox Keller notes that the technical definition of information would “assign the same
amount of information to the DNA of a functioning organism as to a mutant form, however
disabling that mutation was” (Refiguring 19). I am indebted to Keller’s overview in Refiguring
Life: Metaphors of Twentieth-Century Biology (1995) of the use of the information metaphor in
biological discourse, as well as to Katherine Hayles’s How We Became Posthuman: Virtual
Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics (1999) and Lily E. Kay’s “Cybernetics,
Information, Life: The Emergence of Scriptural Representations of Heredity” Configurations 5
(Winter 1997): 23-92. Haraway notes that the information metaphor extends beyond genetics,
arguing that “communications sciences and modern biologies are constructed by a common
move–the translation of the world into a problem of coding, a search for a common language in
which all resistance to instrumental control disappears and all heterogeneity can be submitted to
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disassembly, reassembly, investment, and exchange . . . . In a sense, organisms have ceased to
exist as objects of knowledge, giving way to biotic components, i.e., special kinds of
information-processing devices. Immunobiology and associated medical practices are rich
exemplars of the privilege of coding and recognition systems as objects of knowledge, as
constructions of bodily reality for us. Biology here is a kind of cryptography” (Simians 164).
9. Kay notes the early association of viruses and information processing in the work of
mathematician John von Neumann, who in the late 1940s postulated looking to viruses in order
to learn about protein self-replication: “Clearly, in linking viruses to information processing, von
Neumann, like most researchers (especially in the United States), operated within the dominant
paradigm in life science” (69).
10. Using examples of the information metaphor in AIDS narratives, Kruger examines linguistic
metaphors in AIDS narratives:
Given the centrality of molecular genetics to contemporary biology, and more
specifically to areas of study important in basic AIDS research, it is not surprising
that the language of this field should especially pervade the scientific discourse on
AIDS. Central to that language is a complex of metaphors that . . . has been
particularly important in shaping the understanding of HIV and AIDS, and that
has a broad influence beyond the strict realm of the biological sciences. Put most
succinctly, at the core of molecular genetics stands a series of linguistic
metaphors in which the processes of life are explained in terms of the functioning
of language. (5-6)
11. It is important to remember, however, that on the whole I am examining Western
representations of viruses. Non-Western constructions of HIV, for example, can be very
different from Western ones.
12. In “The Egg and the Sperm: How Science Has Constructed a Romance Based on
Stereotypical Male-Female Roles,” Emily Martin rather famously challenged the gendered
narrative of the sperm and egg that pervaded scientific discourse, which depicted the egg as a
passive receptor to the active male sperm. Along the same lines, Keller notes that cytoplasm and
the nucleus are assigned similar roles: “in the conventional discourse about nucleus and
cytoplasm, cytoplasm is routinely taken to be synonymous with egg. Furthermore–by an all too
familiar twist of logic–the nucleus was often taken as a stand-in for sperm” (Refiguring 39).
And Martin argues that even the cells of the immune system are similarly gendered, with the
macrophages portrayed as the “housekeepers” of the body, and the T-cells as the masculine
strategists.
13. Kruger also notes that gay men’s bodies are associated with the feminine, so that “The body
of the person living with HIV or AIDS . . . becomes the body of a ‘victim,’ a body . . . that has
lost control over its internal systems of signification and of gender hierarchy, and that, in
sustaining such losses, is consolidated to a misogynistically imagined female body and a
homophobically imagined queer one” (45).
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14. Similarly, the early American medical response to the AIDS epidemic tended to exclude
women:
The exclusion of women from the ground upon which the AIDS crisis is imagined
to occur has had enormous practical consequences in both health care and medical
research: until recently, the official (Centers for Disease Control) definition of
AIDS, because it was based largely on early studies of gay men, excluded many
women with HIV illness, with awful practical consequences . . . . This of course
also meant that women were much less likely to be selected for research projects
and experimental drug protocols than were men whose syndromes more easily fit
the definition of AIDS. (Kruger 57-58)
15. My use of the term should be differentiated from Katherine Hayles’, who in her book How
We Became Posthuman (1999), employs it to describe the intimate relationship of humans to
machines.
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CHAPTER TWO
“YOU DROPPED A BOMB ON ME, BABY”: THE VIRUS IN ACTION
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the current prominence of the virus
through the examination of narratives that we might call “spin-offs” of the central AIDS
story, or those featuring postmodern plagues and biological warfare. The key texts that I
examine here include Richard Preston’s The Hot Zone (1994), a non-fictional account of
an outbreak of Ebola in the United States; Michael Crichton’s novel The Andromeda
Strain (1969); the film Outbreak (1995); and Preston’s The Cobra Event (1997), a novel
about biological terrorism in the United States. What links the depictions of the viruses
in these texts, with the exception of The Andromeda Strain, which serves as a fictional
precursor to the other works and features an extraterrestrial organism instead of a virus,
is AIDS–AIDS the harbinger of apocalypse, AIDS the African, AIDS the weapon, and
AIDS the “revenge of the rain forest” (Preston Hot Zone 409). Underlying these viral
narratives is a response to the failure of medical science to cure the disease; in The Hot
Zone, Outbreak, and The Cobra Event, the potential agents of destruction are contained
or neutralized, mostly by human effort. At the same time, however, each of these texts
emphasizes the role of humans in the postmodern “trafficking” of viruses across the
globe. And while these offshoots of the AIDS story are heavily indebted to
contemporary representations of AIDS for their metaphorical power, they also suggest
that the designation of “virus” transcends specific and material viral phenomena,
making the virus itself a touchstone for modern preoccupations with self and other. In
these texts, a profusion of “others” are manifested through the locus of the virus, which
is variously depicted as having feminine, African, communistic, militaristic, and
29

terroristic traits. Despite these different cultural and political attachments, however, the
virus serves much the same function in each of the texts–it is the enemy of the human
self. We will see in later chapters how this depiction is complicated to suggest an
integration of virus/other and human/self, but this chapter deals with texts in which the
human and the virus are clearly at odds, with the virus threatening not just individual
human lives, but all human lives: apocalypse.
Numerous critics of biomedical discourse assert that AIDS, particularly during
the hysterical heyday of its emergence in the United States, largely supplanted nuclear
catastrophe in the public imagination as the agent of apocalypse. Arguably the most
influential essay addressing this new prominence is Susan Sontag’s “AIDS and Its
Metaphors” (1989), which examines the ways in which perceptions of the virus, and
HIV in particular, are indicative of the fears and desires of a culture obsessed with
visions of apocalypse: “AIDS occupies such a large part of our awareness because of
what it has been taken to represent. It seems the very model of all the catastrophes
privileged populations feel await them” (172). What Sontag notes about contemporary
apocalyptic thinking, however, is that apocalypse is felt to be something that both occurs
and does not occur. In other words, apocalypse of the nuclear holocaust variety is everlooming, a perpetual threat that never follows through, while at the same time other
events–like the irrevocable destruction of the environment–have perhaps already
happened, but we have yet to feel the most feared consequences of such catastrophes.
We tend to privilege what we consider to be the more immediate threat of nuclear
holocaust over that of the gradual devastation of the earth’s environment. And while
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Sontag suggests that the very ordinariness of apocalyptic thinking “constitutes an
unparalleled violence that is being done to our sense of reality” (181), she argues that it
is highly desirable, and even likely, for an illness as rife with metaphorical meaning as
AIDS to come to seem ordinary. Eleven years later, at the dawn of the new millennium,
Sontag’s predictions both have and have not been fulfilled, a development that seems
particularly apt in the light of her characterization of modern apocalypse.
Due in large part to the success of protease inhibitors, the new class of anti-HIV
drugs introduced in 1996, many Americans began to believe that it was indeed possible
to “live with AIDS,”1 effectively nullifying the diagnosis of the disease as a death
sentence. In fact, some members of the gay community, reassured by the success of
protease inhibitors and the decline of AIDS cases, have abandoned safe sex altogether in
favor of the high-risk practice called “barebacking.” Despite evidence to the contrary,
many of these men labor under the belief that AIDS is not difficult to treat and that the
chances of contracting HIV are low. The Advocate’s Michelangelo Signorile attributes
this phenomenon in part to a “culture of hope” that AIDS activists fostered among those
infected with HIV in order to preserve their self-esteem and self-respect:
We built a culture of hope, and protease inhibitors have, in a way, been
the culmination of that culture. But we weren't counting on the downside
to that victory. Because we've had some successes in both public
relations and medicine, the reality of sickness and death has become
abstract and removed for a whole new generation of young adults. It's not
gone, but it is hidden: The culture of hope has completely overtaken the
fear, pushed it out of sight, below the surface. (51)
These attitudes, which are admittedly representative of the more marginal views of the
public at large, suggest the growing “ordinariness” of AIDS as a serious disease that
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may be treated like any other. At the same time, however, they also suggest that such
attitudes are merely poses, masking the deep fear that AIDS does, in fact, still carry the
weight of the death sentence. How else can one explain the growing trend of debunking
the “myth” of AIDS, propagated by figures as diverse as the American virologist Peter
Duesberg, South African President Thabo Mbeki, the rock band Foo Fighters, and the
American activist Connie Maggiore? All deny the causal relationship between HIV and
AIDS, asserting that “other factors” are responsible for AIDS and that HIV itself is
harmless.2 By itself, this notion is not particularly radical; the relationship between HIV
and AIDS is a complex one, and challenges to what many consider to be the monolith of
science are common, often serving to point out the privileged position of scientific
discourse and its silencing effect on alternative medicine. In fact, many virologists and
immunologists now concede that the reigning AIDS paradigm, which holds that the
disease is caused by a single disease agent, must be re-evaluated, as there are enough
anomalies to call the paradigm into question. The suggestion, however, that the
connection between HIV and AIDS may be discounted on grounds of what has been
heretofore rather scanty evidence, and that HIV itself is harmless, is difficult to accept.
In the face of the vast numbers of people who have succumbed to AIDS in Africa and
around the world, such repudiation is astounding, and a measure of the need to render
HIV infection not simply as ordinary, but harmless.
As the number of AIDS cases decline in the U.S. so, too, does media coverage.
And, despite the recent press blitz on “AIDS in Africa,” Americans show a remarkable
lack of interest in those suffering with the disease half a world away. That does not
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mean, however, that Americans are any less fearful of a viral apocalypse; clearly the
aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the subsequent anthrax
attacks by persons unknown has generated the fear of continuing biowarfare, with
smallpox ranking at the top of everyone’s list as potentially the most deadly bioweapon.
However, the fear of AIDS is in many ways the precursor to recent anxieties about
biological warfare and bioterrorism, as well as to those about killer viruses that “travel”
to America from remote (read: underdeveloped) parts of the globe. Invasive, silent, and
utterly effective, the virus is the post-Cold War generation’s answer to the atom bomb.
And with the perceived decline of the threat of nuclear holocaust, the virus has become
the preeminent signifier of apocalypse in contemporary American culture.
HOT ZONES AND THE WESTERN WORLD
“In the race for supremacy, microbes are sprinting ahead.”
–World Health Organization, 1996

In March of 1999, over the weeks preceding the men’s college basketball NCAA
tournament on March 29th, Nike aired a series of commercials carrying the tag line,
“March Madness. It’s spreading.” The spots served to promote the tournament season,
popularly known as “March Madness.” In one, entitled “Quarantine,” a team of
biohazard-suited scientists led by veteran SF character actor John Saxon storms the
Duke University campus, past seemingly oblivious students who socialize beneath
makeshift tents (presumably in anticipation of the “Final Four,” or the games in which
the nation’s top four basketball teams compete). As the team surveys the scene with
flashlights and electronic tracking devices, Saxon announces, “We’ve got a level nine.
Quarantine it all.” Making their way to the locker rooms, the crew first scans the
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contents of the lockers–Nike athletic wear and shoes–and then proceeds to put the
presumably toxic materials into biohazard waste bags under Saxon’s direction: “It’s all
hot. Take it away.” Loaded into big, industrial trucks, along with materials from other
high profile schools, including Stanford and the University of Kentucky, the bags are
transported to the NRI Biohazard Treatment Center and emptied out. In the final scene,
a lone, fully suited figure torches a mountain of Nike sneakers emptied behind the center
with a flame-thrower. The camera zooms in for a close-up of the Nike swoosh atop the
burning shoes, and then cuts finally to a white screen in which a magnified oval
translucent organism that contains within its center a tiny imprint of the NCAA
tournament bracket,3 expands rather suddenly. Above the organism is the Nike swoosh;
below, the tag line. Thus ends the spot, with the organism–perhaps understood to be the
infectious particle–as the central image on the screen.
What this commercial and the others in the series demands of its viewers is a
certain receptiveness not simply to the idea of contagion as a metaphor for a cultural
phenomenon, but more specifically to the idea of “disease hunters” or “disease
cowboys,” as science writer Laurie Garrett refers to them, who successfully track down
and contain disease-causing agents. March Madness is a highly infectious disease, so
the spot suggests–it belongs in the same camp as Ebola, Lassa, or any of the other socalled “emerging” infectious diseases that are explored in a large number of popular
texts published in the mid to late 1990s.4 From Richard Preston’s The Hot Zone (1994)
to the movie Outbreak (1995) to Virus Hunter: Thirty Years of Battling Hot Viruses
Around the World (1997), penned by “disease cowboy” C. J. Peters, the disease-causing
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agents are viewed as both predator and prey, and their lethality is heavily emphasized.
Nike’s commercial spoofs both the lethality and the disease hunter motif, illustrating the
extent to which these modern plague narratives have permeated our national
consciousness. Many viewers may find the content of the commercials
incomprehensible, but the iconography may be familiar to them, as they recall such
films as The Andromeda Strain, Outbreak, And the Band Played On, and Close
Encounters of the Third Kind, as well as the television show The X-Files. The
biohazard symbol certainly competes with the Nike swoosh as an immediately
recognizable icon, now more than ever. And in the minds of the public, the image of
the biohazard suit signifies anthrax attacks. But even before the attacks, the biohazard
suit had replaced the more run-of-the-mill space suit in terms of cultural cachet. Our
scientific frontiers were no longer outward, but inward. Biohazard suits were chic, virus
hunters were cool, and pandemic disease was quite possibly the answer to all our
problems: “No one wants a plague, of course. But, yes, it would be a chance to begin
again. And beginning again–that is very modern, very American, too” (Sontag 175).
Here Sontag describes the cultural attitude that she believes stems from anxieties about
AIDS, arguing that “The taste for worst-case scenarios reflects the need to master fear of
what is felt to be uncontrollable . . . . The sense of cultural distress or failure gives rise
to the desire for a clean sweep, a tabula rasa” (175). That these commercials aired in
1999 is particularly appropriate.
Of course, pandemic disease in the form of AIDS is what these popular
narratives of emerging infectious diseases tend to counter; Ebola may be deadly and
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incurable, but it can and has been contained through the agency of humans. Never mind
that human practices are in a large part responsible for the new patterns of the spread of
infection–the point is that the medical and scientific establishment has, until the
outbreak of anthrax, been very successful at containing infectious agents that appear to
be far more virulent that HIV, and much more rapid in their spread.5 What the focus on
emerging diseases represents, then, is the failure of the absolute triumphalism of medical
science in dealing with the AIDS crisis. AIDS research is rife with widely varying
theories of the disease’s transmission and progression, suggesting that the disease itself
is a murky, protean thing that cannot be explained or contained by conventional
scientific methods. Ebola, on the other hand, presents an easier, less ambiguous target
for medical science.
Michael Crichton’s The Andromeda Strain (1969) would appear to be the
forerunner to the Nike spots, as well as to Outbreak, The X-Files, and other popular
texts that fall into this particular medical thriller/SF genre of biological disaster. In
Crichton’s novel, which was adapted to film in 1971 and reissued in 1993, an American
satellite designed to capture particles in the upper atmosphere in the hopes of ensnaring
some organism that is extraterrestrial (and that may possibly be of use as a biological
weapon) lands in a desert town in Nevada, which results in the death of all but two of
the town’s inhabitants. Assuming that an extraterrestrial organism must indeed be the
culprit, the army activates Project Wildfire, an emergency operation headed and
designed by civilian scientists to deal with this just this kind of situation. The organism,
labeled the Andromeda Strain, eventually mutates into a form that is not harmful to
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humans or animals, but not before the scientists perform extensive experiments in a race
to find a “cure” for it. To handle the Andromeda Strain, they must first undergo
extensive decontamination procedures, during which, among other things, they are
probed by “body analyzers” and deprived of their first layer of skin. The entire process
takes sixteen hours, in which they progress through four levels (“each level is
biomedically cleaner than the next”) until finally they end in Level five, where the main
labs that contain the samples of the Andromeda Strain are located. Inevitably, the
organism escapes, eating through the material that constitutes the seals of the labs, but
its mutated form no longer affects humans negatively. The scientists, trained for just this
kind of emergency, can do little more than marvel at Andromeda’s adaptive abilities.6
And while human foibles and weaknesses are highlighted throughout the novel, it is
clear that no amount of human ingenuity–scientific training, decontamination
procedures, containment fields, etc.–could have prevented the organism from
annihilating most of life on the planet if it had remained pathogenic. Good old
American know-how is a bit out of its depth in The Andromeda Strain, as is the cuttingedge science bankrolled by the military. Within the context of the pre-AIDS era, a time
when medical science was still optimistic about eliminating most of the major illnesses
that threatened humans across the globe, the scenario depicted in The Andromeda Strain
would have been particularly ominous, suggesting that there are some things that science
cannot contain and neutralize. What we will see, however, is that the fictional
descendants of Crichton’s protagonists do manage to temporarily put the bug-du-jour in
its place, thus responding to contemporary anxieties about diseases that seem well
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beyond medical science’s ability to cure or contain. The collective sigh of relief that
issues from the audience when “disease cowboys” dispatch the virus is the assurance
that diseases can be conquered, if only we put our faith in science and those who
practice it. In these post-Crichton texts, however, is the weaknesses of humans that
cause them to come precariously close to annihilation. Much like the theories that fault
“other factors” (i.e. so-called depraved practices) for causing AIDS, so do these
narratives suggest that the blame for the spread of the disease does not lie squarely on
the “shoulders” of the virus itself. There is the sense that humans are responsible for
their own demise. The number of human mistakes, for example, are exponentially
greater in the film Outbreak than in The Andromeda Strain.
Outbreak tracks the movement of a hemorrhagic virus with a one hundred
percent mortality rate from a village in Zaire to Boston, and then to a small town in
California. The film’s narrative makes clear, however, that the havoc that the virus
wreaks would have been much less severe if it were not for a chain of events tantamount
to a slap in the face of Western scientific protocols. Beginning with the African host
monkey, who after its capture in Zaire was not quarantined because of two employees’
disregard of the American animal holding facility’s regulations, and ending with the
refusal of American military officials to provide vaccinations that had been developed
for the same virus years earlier, the narrative suggests that outbreaks happen for a
clearly identifiable (human) reason. Even the initial present-day outbreak of the virus,
which occurs in the Motaba River Valley in Zaire, is assumed by a local witch doctor to
have been caused because humans have gone “where no man should be”–into the jungle

38

to cut down trees. The resulting disease, according to him, is the punishment of the
gods. The narrative’s messages are somewhat mixed here. On the one hand, deviance
from scientific protocol as well as the withholding of vital information results in the
rapid spread of the Motaba virus. What this suggests is that science itself is
unimpeachable, but that its human practitioners are flawed. On the other hand,
deviance from the laws of Mother Nature is also presented as an explanation for the
virus’s emergence.7 The monkey’s removal from its natural habitat would also constitute
such a violation. It is obvious, however, that the military scientists’ narrative is
privileged, with the local witch doctor portrayed as a stereotypically “primitive”
inhabitant of Africa. As the Western helicopters take off from the village ravaged by
Motaba, the camera first cuts to a scene of several (presumably host) monkeys in trees,
and then to the grave face of the witch doctor atop a cliff above the village. And if the
juxtapositioning of the monkeys with the witch doctor is not sufficient to reinforce
Western stereotypes about African “otherness,” the accompanying jungle music cements
the tableau. This depiction of Africa as the origin point for killer viruses is common; a
number of critics have commented not only on how Africa is depicted in the literature of
emerging diseases as a reservoir for viruses as diverse as HIV and Ebola, but also how
these infectious agents are “Africanized,” or aligned with characteristics that would not
be out of place in Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness (1899).
In Conrad’s text, Africa and its inhabitants are depicted as primordial,
mysterious, and savage, while Europeans are depicted as rational, superior creatures
who are nevertheless vulnerable to the “darkness” that Africa represents. The
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Europeans become, in fact, more “savage” than the “savages.” Nigerian novelist Chinua
Achebe rather famously criticized the book as profoundly racist and informed by the
European propensity to “set Africa up as a foil to Europe, as a place of negations at once
remote and vaguely familiar, in comparison with which Europe’s own spiritual grace
will be manifest” (Achebe 251-252). 8 Similarly, the virus serves as a foil to
enlightened, Western scientists, whose task it is to subdue this exotic foe that threatens
the populace of the West. The rhetoric of the origin of emerging viruses tends to be
very much in keeping with that of AIDS, an idea to which I will return. However, both
rely on a depiction of African “otherness” that owes much more to 19th century
perceptions of Africa than to modern ones.9
Perhaps the most self-conscious Conradian depiction of Africa is Richard
Preston’s non-fictional work The Hot Zone, to which Outbreak owes much of its
storyline and imagery. In fact, Preston may be seen as something as a linchpin figure in
the narrative of emerging diseases. Although Robin Cook’s popular novel Outbreak,
which features an Ebola outbreak but has no relation to the movie, was published in
1987, it was not until Preston’s 1992 New Yorker non-fiction article “Crisis in the Hot
Zone” appeared that Ebola began to achieve most favored pathogen status. It is perhaps
no coincidence, then, that The Andromeda Strain was reissued the following year. In
1994, Preston published the book-length expansion of his article, The Hot Zone, which
enjoyed a lengthy period at the top of the New York Times bestseller list. Detailing the
efforts of the CDC and USAMRIID (United States Army Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases) to cope with an Ebola outbreak among monkeys at the Hazleton
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Corporation’s Reston Primate Quarantine Unit in Reston, Virginia, The Hot Zone reads
like detective (crossed with horror) fiction, and it profiles–with a little embellishment on
Preston’s part–a number of real-life “virus hunters.” Like The Andromeda Strain,
however, the organism turns out not to be harmful to humans.10 However, Preston
devotes much attention to those viruses that do affect humans, in gruesome detail.
Laurie Garrett’s less garish bestseller The Coming Plague came out in the same year,
covering over fifty years of science’s efforts to isolate and contain emerging diseases,
while focusing on key figures that also appear in Preston’s book. In it, Garrett
emphasizes the role she believes environmental destruction and its corollary of
increasing urbanization plays in facilitating the emergence of modern infectious
diseases. And while the film rights to The Hot Zone were purchased by Twentieth
Century Fox, it was Garrett’s book that was actually adapted for the screen–as a TBS
documentary in 1998. Outbreak, released in 1995, was a Warner Brothers Production,
and as such could only pilfer from Preston’s work.11 The mid to late 1990's proved to be
good years for emerging viruses in terms of exposure, as they popped up not only in
film, fiction, and non-fiction, but also in reality, as we shall see. In the last year, their
popularity dropped sharply, as it became clear that Americans were less concerned with
the exotic than with the perceived threat of an old enemy, smallpox. Ebola reports in
2001 barely merited a blip in the news services, as America focused on a more
immediate threat within its own borders.
In the wake of The Hot Zone, which spawned a number of imitators, the stage
had been set for the disease cowboys to regale the public with their own stories, as is the

41

case with Joseph McCormick and Susan Fisher-Hoch’s Level 4: Virus Hunters of the
CDC (1996) and C.J. Peters’ Virus Hunter: Thirty Years of Battling Hot Viruses Around
the World (1997).12 Both McCormick and Peters are featured prominently in Preston’s
book, as the representative rivals of the army and the civilian CDC. Peters led the
Reston biohazard operation in December 1989, and McCormick was at that time the
chief of the Special Pathogens Branch of the CDC. What added even more to the interest
in the heretofore unsexy field of public health was the real-life 1995 outbreak of Ebola
hemorrhagic fever in Kikwit, Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo). That
the fascination with hot agents could be spoofed so thoroughly in a series of Nike
commercials a scant four years later, however, is a measure of how unlikely Americans
considered the possibility of “natural” microbial disaster, domestic or otherwise. Primed
by tales of Ebola and flesh-eating bacteria, in the late 1990's the public’s anxieties had
largely been supplanted by those about bioterrorism, a bandwagon that Preston and
others jumped aboard with fervor and one that I explore in the next section of this
chapter. As with emerging virus tales, the focus on bioterrorism was primarily outside
the West; rogue nations that threatened American security with bioweapons took the
place of the Africanized viral menace.
As for the concept of March Madness as an infection, it owes much to the
current vogue surrounding “memes” (aka mind viruses), or those units of information
that pass from mind to mind in a replicative strategy akin to viral propagation. I will
return to this idea in Chapter 5, illustrating how these “mind” viruses adopt the rhetoric
of both emerging and computer viruses. Obviously, the memetic condition of March
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Madness is in no way an approximation for the lived reality of Ebola hemorrhagic fever,
but the discourse of meme transmission is also epidemiological in nature. For that brief
period in the mid 1990s, however, the filovirus–that thread-like virus that caused
outbreaks of Ebola, Marburg, and the fictional Motaba–reigned supreme.
As if cementing the “spin-off”status of postmodern plague narratives, Preston
admits that the filovirus initially played second-fiddle to HIV:
The Hot Zone began one day in 1992 when I was looking for an idea for
a magazine article for The New Yorker. I wanted to write about viruses.
At first the AIDS virus seemed the natural choice, but a lot had been
written about AIDS. Then on that interesting day in 1992 I was doing a
background interview with a virologist, Professor Joshua Lederberg at
the Rockefeller University in New York, and I asked him if he knew of
any interesting viruses. He mentioned Ebola. (amazon.com)
Throughout the book, discussions of Ebola and AIDS are intertwined, sometimes pitted
against one another in a competition of Preston’s devising: “unlike the creeping onset of
HIV, the attack by Ebola is explosive”(66); “Ebola does in ten days what it takes AIDS
ten years to accomplish” (66); “AIDS is arguably the worst disaster of the twentieth
century” (407); “AIDS is the revenge of the rain forest. It may be only the beginning”
(409). In the end, however, he believes the two have similar escapist “motives”: “The
AIDS virus and other emerging viruses are surviving the wreck of the tropical biosphere
because they can mutate faster than any changes taking place in their ecosystems. They
must be good at escaping trouble . . . . I tend to think of rats leaving a sinking ship”
(408-409). In his association of the filoviruses with HIV, Preston adopts much of the
popular rhetoric used to describe HIV. Ebola, or “the replicative Other” (71) is a
uniquely African predator that “hides” in “secret,”–as sneaky an invader as the other
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virus that presumably originates from the “silent heart of darkness.” The pathogen, for
Preston, cannot be separated from its surroundings, as he illustrates in a statement that
fairly howls of Conradian influence: “When a human being is fed upon and consumed
by one of them [predators], especially in Africa, the event is telescoped against horizons
of space and time, taking on a feeling of immense antiquity” (136-137). And while he
characterizes the virus as “a motive without a mind,” Preston asserts virtually in the
same breath that it is just the opposite of that: “compact, hard, logical, totally selfish”
(85). In other words, Preston bestows Ebola with agency and intention, similar to the
way in which people ranging from pundits to scientists have ascribed a certain agency to
HIV.
Not only does Preston endow Ebola with African nationality (when, in terms of
the Ebola outbreak in Reston, he might just as easily have imparted it with Asian
characteristics), but he also confers gender upon it.13 Explicitly female, the filoviruses
are portrayed as females of differing temperament: “The filoviruses look alike, as if they
are sisters . . . . The Ebolas were named Ebola Zaire and Ebola Sudan. Marburg was
the mildest of the three filovirus sisters. The worst of them was Ebola Zaire” (38). And
like the Fates, to whom Preston alludes, they are completely arbitrary. Ever voracious,
these sisters do not acknowledge the boundaries of the human body, transforming
“virtually every part of the body,” as is the case with Ebola Zaire, “into a digested slime
of virus particles” (105). As for the “gentler” Marburg, “It did not know what humans
are; or perhaps you could say that it knew only too well what humans are: it knew that
humans are meat” (139). To put it another way, the filovirus sisters are man-eaters.
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That is not to say that the viruses do not infect their share of women, but it is clear that
for Preston, the filovirus is a particularly nasty vagina dentata. In the passages below,
each mention of a filovirus as having feminine characteristics is either directly preceded
or followed by a description of the male genitalia as afflicted by disease:
Marburg was the mildest of the three sisters . . . . Some of the men suffered from blown
up, inflamed, semirotten testicles. (38)
No one knew why Marburg had such a special affinity for the testicles and the eyes. (39)
the testicles of the males [guinea pigs] swelled up to the size of golf balls and turned
purple. The Cardinal Strain was a sophisticated organism that knew what it wanted . . . .
It was an invasive life form, devastating and promiscuous. It showed a kind of
obscenity you only see in nature, an obscenity so extreme that it dissolves imperceptibly
into beauty. (138-139; my emphasis)
A foul feeling washed over him, a sudden awareness of male reproductive glands
hanging on the exterior of the body between the legs . . . testicles the size of pears, black
and putrid, the skin peeling off them. (196)
He saw virus particles shaped like snakes . . . . They were white cobras tangled among
themselves, like the hair of Medusa. They were the face of Nature herself, the obscene
goddess revealed naked. (197)
Targeting both testicles and eyes, the filovirus threatens to annihilate the symbolic
centers of male power, as well as the literal source of male reproductivity. Preston toys
with both castration fears and Oedipal anxiety here. That the virus is consistently
figured in terms of sexual anxiety is further evidence of its close association–in
Preston’s mind–with HIV. But where HIV has traditionally been gendered as male in
Western depictions, and sometimes as a homosexual male, the filovirus appears to be
predominantly female, despite a penchant for making cells “pregnant”(198). In The Hot
Zone it functions as an extension of a Mother Nature who views humanity itself as a
virus: “the earth is mounting an immune response against the human species. It is
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beginning to react to the human parasite, the flooding infection of people” (407).14
However, as it becomes clear that Ebola Reston is harmless to humans (but not to
monkeys and their testicles, as he underscores), Preston handles the spin upon the
Mother-Nature-with-a-vengeance theme by tempering it with that of the age-old
question “what do women want?”: “Nature had seemed to be closing in on us for a kill,
when she suddenly turned her face away and smiled. It was a Mona Lisa smile, the
meaning of which no one could figure out” (355). Since Nature is consistently figured
in hostile (to humans) terms throughout the book, Preston finds himself at a loss to
explain this relatively “benign” behavior, at last relying on the enigma that is Woman.
Haraway reminds us that “science as heroic quest and as erotic technique applied
to the body of nature are utterly conventional figures” (205), and so it might be said that
Preston’s “utterly conventional” characterization of the scientists and their viral foes
owes much to its precursors, most notably Paul de Kruif’s popular Microbe Hunters,
first published in 1926. But Preston updates his heroic quest for a different age; his redblooded American virus hunters tame “the virus queen” by nuking her. The virus may
have largely replaced nuclear weaponry in the popular imagination as the agent of
apocalypse, but nuclear imagery still retains much of its original power, and Preston
takes full advantage of that fact in his various descriptions of the virus.15 In the context
of The Hot Zone, “nuke” is military slang for rendering a place completely sterile–i.e.
ridding it of infected hosts and then deploying chemicals that eradicate all forms of life,
as per the procedure that the army follows at the Reston Primate Quarantine Unit. And
while not all of the scientists involved in the operation are portrayed as macho virus
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hunters, the book as a whole tends to encourage comparisons with big-game hunters and
cowboys, with chapter titles such as “The Most Dangerous Strain” and “Shoot-Out.”
Preston adds layer after layer of threatening “otherness” to the virus, inscribing it with
the African, the feminine, the nuclear, and the bestial. Primitive, savage, devouring, and
apocalyptic, it is indeed a force to be reckoned with, challenging the bastion of
enlightened Western science to prevent it from escaping its exotic confines and making
contact with the uncorrupted Western body.
When confronted with the image of Ebola Reston in his electron microscope,
Tom Geisbert–deer hunter, fisherman and co-discoverer of the virus–laments, “Too bad
he couldn’t bring it down with a clean shot from a rifle” (197). Here, the virus is figured
as big game, but we might also read it as a feminine force that cannot simply be subdued
with a phallus. Preston notes that Peter Jahrling, Geisbert’s co-discoverer and hunter of
viruses abroad, sports a vanity plate that says “Lassa,” the name of a highly infectious
virus discovered in West Africa and a favorite quarry of Jahrling’s. C.J. Peters, Eugene
Johnson, and Karl Johnson are variously referred to as hunters, all having spent time in
Africa “stalking” Ebola. Karl Johnson, one of the discoverers of the Ebola virus,
consents to speak with Preston about Ebola under the condition that he may do so while
fly-fishing. In true Hemingway fashion, the two men conduct their heart-to-heart as
they fish, with Johnson confiding his admiration for the virus: “Looking at Ebola under
an electron microscope is like looking at a gorgeously wrought ice castle. The thing is
so cold. So totally pure” (122). Finally, Preston himself hires a professional (white)
hunter and safari guide to take him to Kitum Cave in Africa, the place he believes may
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be the reservoir for the Ebola virus. Schell, who notes the association of big-game
hunting and viruses not only in relation to scientific virus hunters, but also in relation to
the popular science writers like Preston who emulate them, argues that this hearkening
back to imperialist imagery reinforces boundaries between the West and the “primitive”
that threatens to dissolve in the wake of a hot virus: “Those writers who seek solutions
or at least comfort in colonial fantasies have chosen one era when the West felt it had
attained some authority in the world of the primitive” (115). In this view, a “clean shot
from a rifle” represents a (mythical) ease of dispatch no longer afforded to Westerners.
The fact is, in the era of AIDS, the great white hunter cannot expect to subdue
the virus queen without the help of the physical barrier of the condom–in this case, a
biohazard space suit. As Semmler observes, “The concern for tears and other chinks in
the armor provided by the delicate fabric that allows the worker to be protected, yet still
move effectively, is analogous, as well, to the fear of the loss of the protection of the
thin membrane that shields the condom’s wearer, while still permitting him to enjoy
sexual pleasure” (10).16 The necessity for the biohazard suit suggests that the
comforting rigidity of boundaries between the West and the world of the “primitive”
established in imperialist narratives is very much a myth. Almost frighteningly
vulnerable to penetration, the suit is the only thing that separates the Western scientist
from the African “predator,” and, by extension, Africa. As Preston describes it, “The
main principle is that the interior of the space suit is a cocoon housing of the normal
world, which you bring with you into the hot area. If there were a break in the suit, the
normal world would vanish, merging with the hot world, and you would be exposed”
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(294). The normal world, presumably, is the Western world. Isolation from the hot
world, then, must be preserved at all costs.17 Rents in the suit can be patched with the
aid of the relatively low-tech sticky tape, but there are no guarantees. The suit offers
little protection for human mistakes–i.e. sticking yourself with a hypodermic needle full
of infected blood, as is the case with the CDC scientist in Outbreak (played by Rene
Russo) who comes down with Motaba but is rescued in the nick of time by the efforts of
her ex-husband (played by Dustin Hoffman). Nancy Jaax, the character’s real-life
counterpart and chief of pathology at USAMRIID during the Reston outbreak, survives
her encounter with Ebola Zaire, which enters through a small hole in her suit’s outer
glove. It does not, however, penetrate her inner glove.18
Earlier I noted the almost fetishistic attention that popular infectious disease
narratives lavish upon the imagery of biocontainment, i.e. biohazard suit chic and its
attendant images. But, as The Andromeda Strain shows us, such images are not unique
to the era of AIDS. One difference in representation between the fairly substantiallooking suits of that film and the soft and pliable suits of the later era is, quite simply,
the anxiety concerning penetration. The scientists in The Andromeda Strain are not
exposed to the organism because of any vulnerability on the part of the suit; they are
exposed as a result of the organism’s ability to penetrate a less personal barrier: that of
the plastic gaskets that separate the laboratories from the outside sterility of the
biosafety level that the scientists inhabit. In the later era, however, the fear of
penetration is much more focused, concentrated on the individual body’s chinks and
fissures. This narrowing of focus is evocative of the vigilance concerning HIV
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infection, particularly in the early discourse of AIDS, when it was believed that
surveying the body for any kind of fissure–sores, bleeding gums–could mean the
difference between life and death.
While Preston’s Ebola assumes any number of the characteristics of the other, or
that which does not inhabit the “normal” world that the biohazard suit attempts to
preserve, it also appears to have a few tools of the postmodern at its disposal. Preston
implies, for example, that Ebola cannibalizes other viruses in order to become even
more devastating, creating a kind of bricolage of infection:
It kills humans with swift efficiency and with a devastating range of
effects. Ebola is distantly related to measles, mumps, and rabies. It is
also related to certain pneumonia viruses . . . . In its own evolution
through unknown hosts and hidden pathways in the rain forest, Ebola
seems to have developed the worst elements of all of the above viruses.
Like measles, it triggers a rash all over the body. Some of its effects
resemble rabies–psychosis, madness. Other of its effects look like a bad
cold. (65)
This particular concept of hybridity may have inspired the virus that appears in
Preston’s novel The Cobra Event, a pathogen that is actually composed of different
viruses in order to approximate the “explosive” effect of the naturally occurring Ebola
and other emerging viruses.
Hybridity in this context is very dangerous, and gives further credence to the
notion that isolation, coupled with surveillance, is the best policy. How else to keep an
eye on the world that threatens to contaminate the West? The virus, a trickster figure,
requires constant surveillance; even as we speak it is “cycling and cycling in some
unknown host, able to shift its shape, able to mutate and become a new thing, with the
potential to enter the human species in a new form” (100). Indeed, for all its affinities
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with the feminine, with Africa, and with HIV, Preston’s Ebola sounds for all the world
like a residual element from the Cold War: an unusually talented communist infiltrator.
It is the virus’s mutability that Preston and others utilize to emphasize its position of
non-self in the immunological self/non-self model; one of the central features of the
texts in this chapter is their devotion to distinguishing self from non-self. One might ask
that if such a distinction truly exists, then why do they need to insist upon it? That in
itself suggests a tension inherent in the model, one that many of the writers in the
following chapters recognize as a starting point for deconstructive practice.
CHIMERAS AND THE (POST-) COLD WAR
"Biological weapons combine the potential destructiveness of the atom with relative ease of use
and acquisition"–Richard Betts, Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University

Having perhaps milked emerging virus scares for all they are worth, Preston
shifts his emphasis, forging ahead into the realm of biological warfare. In fact, much as
he may be credited with instigating the national “Ebola Fever,” so is he instrumental in
setting the popular interest in bioweapons ablaze. Gone are the Africanized germs in his
novel The Cobra Event (1997), and in their place is a souped-up virus courtesy of a Cold
War legacy that, released by a typically “mad” scientist, threatens to annihilate the
inhabitants of New York City and Washington D.C. Produced by a shady multinational
company with Iraqi, Russian, and American ties, the Cobra virus is an improbable
chimera:19 one part common cold, one part insect virus, and one part smallpox. Such an
amalgamation implies that globalization has even more frightening consequences than
the uncontrollable and rapid spread of disease featured in emerging virus narratives–it
can also effect a monstrous hybridity, concretizing the fears of a populace that already
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distrusts genetic engineering. The unnatural offspring of bricoleur virologists, Cobra
challenges notions of organic autonomy, which in turn challenges notions of liberal
subjectivity. If the smallest form of life can be manipulated and pieced together in ways
reminiscent of the monster’s assemblage in Shelley’s Frankenstein, then what is to
prevent the fragile human subject from eventually undergoing a similar kind of
transformation? That future, to a large extent, is already here–organ and even limb
transplants are routinely performed, and organs and tissues from other animals are
sometimes used in these procedures In such scenarios, traditional distinctions between
self and other are called into question, as the other is integrated into self, and self into
other. Chimeric viruses parallel such integration on a much smaller scale, also resulting
in increased survivability on the part of the virus, but also thereby posing a greater threat
to their hosts. Their very hybridity, as Preston continually drives home, is emblematic
of their increased pathogenicity, both in their structure and in their cultural function
within the novel.
The novel’s virus is both old and new, representative of Cold War research into
“black biology”20 and of contemporary scientific and cultural exchange: “This Cobra
virus is so beautiful and so new that it has to be American engineering . . . . Looking at
that virus is like looking at a starship. But the smallpox in it–that’s ancient and old and
smells like Russia” (284). Here Mark Littleberry, a former American bioweaponeer,
speculates about the origin of Cobra, and decides that it must indeed be the joint effort
of American and Russian science. Note, of course, that national stereotypes are firmly
in place, with America cast as the innovative partner to the traditionally Russian
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backwater one. The Cobra virus’s hybridity is made possible by the hybridity of the
multinational corporation that spawns it. Called Bio-Ark and conveniently
headquartered in Geneva with branches in the U.S. and in Iraq, it is a shadowy
biotechnology concern that works “both sides of the street,” as one of its employees puts
it, manufacturing both medicines and biological weapons. That such a company can
exist, Preston implies, is the result of the global dispersal of “free agents”: those
scientists once employed by the Soviet biotechnology organization called Biopreparat
who now sell their bioweapons technology and services to the highest bidders in the
world, including Iraq. “Welcome to the global village,” comments Littleberry, after
learning of Bio-Ark’s existence. It would seem, particularly in light of the recent
evidence pointing to the sale of bioweapons abroad and possibly even in this country,
that the collapse of the Soviet Union has even scarier implications for Americans than
its continued existence.21 At least in the days of the Cold War, we had a clearly
identifiable and immovable enemy; now we must cast our net wide in order to identify
foes. While losing Russia as a reliable villain, we have in the aftermath of the Soviet
Union’s collapse even more insidious–because far less controllable–enemies. Not only
must we closely monitor crumbling nuclear facilities and the exchange of nuclear
weapons and technology, but we must now be vigilant, Preston warns, against biological
attacks. And it is up to the cardboard heroes of the novel, which include Littleberry, the
former bioweaponeer; Alice Austen, a savvy red-headed CDC pathologist; and Will
Hopkins, a mildly nerdy FBI biological hazards expert, to prevent and contain such
attacks.22

53

Preston manages to invest Cobra with so many cultural anxieties that the virus
surely vies with the Ebola strain in The Hot Zone for best contemporary villain. The
main difference between the two is that Ebola is depicted as a natural elemental force,
associated with “African” primitivism and the devouring energy of the feminine, while
genetically engineered Cobra is depicted as a more sophisticated, hybridized enemy that
taps into both elemental and well-worn political fears such as communism and terrorism.
In The Cobra Event, Preston not only renews the status of an enemy as comfortable to
Americans as an old shoe, but he also reinforces anxieties about Iraqi bioterrorism,
globalization, and the notion that it takes only one person to spearhead a biological
disaster. As if that weren’t enough, we also have the simple malice of the virus itself
with which to contend. At one point, Preston describes it as “alive and aching to find
blood” (385). This description is very similar to that of Ebola virus in The Hot Zone:
“Having destroyed its host, the hot agent is now coming out of every orifice, and is
‘trying’ to find a new host” (24). That Preston emphasizes “trying” perhaps shows that
he is conscious of his enlivening of the virus with intention. In his novel, however, the
scare quotes disappear, and the virus is endowed with naked blood lust. The agency that
he ascribes to his non-fictional virus in The Hot Zone is magnified in his fictional
description of Cobra, elevating the status of the virus from a plot device to a character.
And the virus is quite literally demonized, with one overtly religious autopsy attendant
remarking of Cobra’s victims, “It’s almost like there was a demon inside them” (60).23
Even the boxes, or “dust-dispersion devices,” that the scientist Archimedes uses to
disseminate dry virus particles in the air are ominous toys; wooden hooded cobras spring
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out and “strike” at the person who opens them. With each strike by the snake, more dust
emerges from the box–hence the christening of the virus “Cobra.”24
President Clinton, no doubt reacting to the voraciousness of Cobra’s attack of
humans, went so far as to have intelligence experts investigate the novel’s plausibility,
according to a 1998 New York Times article. That a work of fiction should have such a
profound effect upon the nation’s leader is no doubt due to Preston’s presentation of the
historical background of Soviet and American bioweapons research, as well as scientific
breakthroughs in “rogue nations” that suggest the ease with which such weapons could
now be deployed. The Times article goes on to describe the President’s growing concern
about possible bioweapons attacks in the United States and his role in increasing funds
to defend the nation from such threats. It also details the perceived failure of a number
of Federal agencies to handle a terrorist bioweapons attack in a simulation that was
staged for the purpose of testing the nation’s bioweapons defenses. Surely the reception
of Preston’s novel alone cannot be blamed for what Stephen Hall called the United
States’ late 1990s “science fiction policy” on bioterrorism,25 but Preston’s invitation to
testify before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and
Government Information and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence about
chemical and biological threats to the U.S. no doubt resulted in part from the novel’s
ability to touch a chord with key government officials. In his statement for the record,
delivered on April 22, 1998, Preston opens his remarks by calling attention to the fact
that his novel had been “read with interest” by President Clinton, Defense Secretary
William Cohen, and Speaker Newt Gingrich. The only journalist amid a rather august
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gathering,26 Preston nevertheless holds his own, making full use of shock tactics and
assuring the senators of his expertise with a rather glib statement: “In the course of
learning from a wide range of experts, I have become an expert myself.”
Expert or no, in his testimony Preston paints a grim portrait of a Cold War past
in which the Soviets blithely ignored the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention (BWC), which expressly forbade the production and stockpiling of such
weapons. While Americans apparently obeyed Nixon’s 1969 directive to dismantle
their biological weapons program, Soviet scientists were developing weaponized strains
of the Marburg and smallpox viruses, as well as anthrax and bubonic plague. As a
result, Preston argues, American scientists were reluctant to believe that the Soviets had
developed such a highly sophisticated bioweapons technology, even as they were
presented with seemingly incontrovertible evidence. As he does in The Cobra Event,
Preston underscores the urgency for increased defense measures by playing into fears of
the unknown and by employing extraordinarily graphic imagery. After describing the
developing and testing of biological warheads by the Soviets, he emphasizes what he
indicates is the United States’ lack of surveillance: “I have no idea where those
biowarheads are now. I don’t even know if they’re still launchable. Are any of them
still targeted on the United States? Who knows. . . . One can wonder if other countries,
such as Iran or Iraq, have obtained examples of the biowarheads, for use as study models
for their own missile programs.” These statements are rather obviously calculated to
galvanize the U.S. government into action, which Preston believes should begin with the
stockpiling of the smallpox vaccine.27 To drive that point home, he provides his
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audience with what he acknowledges are “shocking” photographs of smallpox victims.
Tellingly, he devotes most of his attention to describing and explaining the infectious
process of a rare hemorrhagic form of smallpox called blackpox, using the pictures as a
guide. If it is not quite Cobra’s equal, is it at least very close. Preston’s taste for the
gruesome is apparent both in his statement and in his novel, but we may one day be
grateful that he created a virus infused with such a frightening and varied array of
“others” that it shocked the President into action.
Perhaps Preston felt that the senators were not as likely to be swayed by ordinary
smallpox as they would by a strain that he likens to Ebola, a virus that can always be
counted upon to provoke an extreme reaction, much in the same way that the not-socasual mention of “Iran or Iraq” in regards to biological weaponry can. Here he
manages to combine the primitive, devouring African Ebola with the Russian
engineered smallpox virus, which may or may not be in the hands of rogue nations.
Coupled with the pictures he presents to his audience, Preston performs a rather
theatrical demonstration with baby powder in order to illustrate “what a bioweapon
really looks like in the air–it disperses and becomes invisible and undetectable.” It’s not
enough that we are dealing with the unknown, then; what is particularly frightening is
that our enemies may employ weapons that we cannot identify with any of our senses,
much like a nuclear particle. A natural successor to the figure of the communist, the
virus is also the perfectly constructed spy: “Notions of conspiracy translate well into
metaphors of implacable, insidious, infinitely patient viruses” (Sontag 156). HIV in
particular evolves into a “top-flight secret agent–a James Bond of secret agents, armed
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with ‘a range of strategies’ and licensed to kill” (Treichler 59). A weaponized smallpox
particle is the Red Scare made concrete–its goal is to produce mini-collectivists within
individual American citizens, with the express purpose of undermining autonomy. Now,
in the aftermath of anthrax attacks that many Americans associate with foreign terrorists,
even though the evidence suggests otherwise, lingering anxieties about communist
infiltration merge with current anxieties about terrorism. The terrorist metaphor as
applied to the smallpox is similar to that invoked in discourse about AIDS; Treichler
observes that HIV is portrayed as “so shifting and uncertain that we might even
acknowledge our own historical moment more specifically by giving the AIDS virus a
postmodern metaphor: a terrorist’s terrorist, an Abu Nidal of viruses” (33). Associated
in the public imagination with Soviet manufacture, Arab deployment, and, possibly,
domestic terrorism, the smallpox of 2001 mirrors our current preoccupations.
If Americans were indeed dispatched by the smallpox virus, to which few in the
world are now immune (the vaccines only confer temporary immunity), it would not, of
course, be the first time such a thing has happened. An early documented case of
biological warfare involved the decimation of the indigenous population of America by
British forces through the use of the infamous “smallpox blankets.” In the face of a
smallpox attack, our chances for survival would be very similar to those of the American
Indian victims; the irony would be particularly heavy.
Preston’s statement to the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee reads, in fact, much
like his novel, which also features explanations of how bioweapons work (including a
glossary to aid the uninitiated), their proposed methods of dissemination, the Soviets’
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role in producing them, and their effects on the victims. By including these nonfictional elements, he lends this otherwise rather unremarkable novel the sense of
authenticity that caught the attention of Clinton and other government officials. And,
lest we accuse Preston of dwelling excessively on the gruesome details of the autopsies
performed in the novel, or on the horrible effects of Cobra, which induces in its victims
a rare condition called Lesch-Nyhan syndrome that compels them to chew their lips,
tongues, fingers, and even–in rare cases–to pluck out their eyes, he assures us in the
novel’s introduction that his intentions are noble: “Public awareness can help shape a
constructive response from governments and scientists around the world far more
effectively than the lone warnings of a few experts . . . . To think that the power of the
genetic code is not being bent toward weapons is to ignore the growing body of
evidence, the lessons of history . . . . It makes better sense to be prepared” (xiii-xiv).
Presumably we are meant to believe that his detailed accounts of the ravages of the virus
are all in the service of raising public awareness. Certainly the President took note,
among others; perhaps it may be said one day that Preston’s novel was in its way as
influential to forging new national policies on biowarfare as Harriet Beecher Stowe’s
Uncle Tom’s Cabin was to abolishing slavery. Unlike Stowe’s novel, however, The
Cobra Event motivating factor is fear. And if part of that fear stems from reading about
the virus’s suspiciously collective nature, or its ties with the Soviets, Preston reinforces
those anxieties by his meticulous descriptions of the virus’s transformation of the body.
A viral cocktail of horrors, Cobra turns humans into insects: “Now she was chewing
again. Eating the inside of her mouth, chewing her lips, the insides of her cheeks. The
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movement of her teeth was insectile, like the feeding movements of an insect larva
chewing on its food: intense, greedy, automatic–a kind of repetitive yanking at the
tissues of her mouth” (8). Consumption, too, is a major element, as the virus literally
consumes the body; I will explore the theme of consumption in Chapter Five. Here,
Cobra’s first victim, a teenager named Kate, joins the hive mind of the virus, carrying
out its instructions to mutilate herself against her will. This “sensitive and hip,
somewhat arty” teen–that is, this representation of the typically individualistic
American–is no match for Cobra, which devours the myth of the individual for lunch.28
If on the one hand the Cobra virus plays on fears about collectivity and the
dissolution of the human subject, it also functions as a touchstone for our anxieties about
the individual terrorist, and a very specific kind of terrorist, at that. Archimedes, the
scientist who releases the Cobra virus out into the world, fits the profile of a Ted
Kazcinsky or a Timothy McVeigh–that is, a loner who inhabits the American fringe and
acts on what are considered to be extremist political beliefs. And while Archimedes is a
rather underdeveloped villain,29 perhaps because the real villain of the novel is the virus
itself, Preston manages to endow him with enough of these characteristics to let his
readers know that they are in familiar territory. Preston might be even more prescient
than he already appears to be in his depiction of bioweapons’ attacks; evidence
continues to mount that the anthrax in the 2001 attacks came from a domestic source.
While Preston’s mad scientist is utterly conventional, exhibiting a clichéd misanthropy
that would not be out of place in any “B” SF movie from the 1950's onward, he does
however exhibit what we might call a contemporary concern for the environment, and
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his motives are identical to those of the scientist who releases a lethal virus in 12
Monkeys; he believes that a new disease is needed to thin the population, so as to
prevent the exhaustion of the earth’s remaining natural resources.30 And, while he only
superficially resembles microbiologist Larry Wayne Harris, the ex-Aryan National who
was charged in 1998–a year after Preston’s novel was published–with conspiracy to
possess and possession of a biological material for use as a weapon, the comparison is
bound to arise in the reader’s mind, particularly as Harris’s dabbling with so-called hot
agents was so widely publicized.31
In 1995, Harris allegedly voiced plans to release bubonic plague in the New
York City subway system, which is the method Archimedes uses to release Cobra. It
turns out, however, that all 1998 charges against Harris were dropped, as the material
seized by the FBI was only anthrax vaccine, not the bacillus itself. Nevertheless, that
potentially dangerous biological pathogens are readily accessible to those who know
how to deploy them as weapons is a fear that crops up over and over again in the
literature about emerging infections and biological warfare. “You’ve got a situation here
where any jerk with a hot strain and some understanding of biology can kill a large
number of people” (175), says Mark Littleberry, a sentiment that is altered a bit in
Preston’s own statement for the record: “All you need is a master seed strain and a few
Ph.D. scientists and perhaps $200,000 worth of equipment, which can be bought on the
open market.” Obviously, as Preston’s shift here indicates, it takes a bit more than “any
jerk with . . . some understanding of biology” to construct a bioweapon, but the idea that
the methods of science may be mastered by someone who does not have an advanced
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degree or highly specialized training is a particularly disturbing one, especially to
Americans, who tend to view science as a rather esoteric pursuit removed from common
society. The relative ease with which a bioweapon may be constructed, as opposed to a
nuclear bomb, is unsettling to a population that is increasingly vulnerable to terrorist
attacks. Whether they are developed by nations, terrorist groups, or individuals,
bioweapons represent a cheap and increasingly popular alternative to conventional arms.
The notion that someone like Larry Wayne Harris could obtain, weaponize, and
deploy anthrax fairly easily is one that the federal government takes very seriously,
advising police, fire, and public health officials on how to respond to possible
bioweapons threats. These emergency responses are expensive efforts, requiring
extensive containment and decontamination measures. In 1998 and 1999, the number of
anthrax hoaxes alone shot up, no doubt in direct relation to the inordinate amount of
press time devoted to Harris’s exploits, or to the speculation of “what could have been.”
In other words, the country was in the grip of a full-blown anthrax hoax meme. One
cannot help but wonder if the media were somewhat less hysterical about the Harris
case, might the anthrax attacks never have taken place? What is particularly interesting
about the early accounts of Harris and his friend William Leavitt, Jr.’s misadventures is
the classification–in The New York Times, no less–of the bubonic plague as a virus, not
a bacillus. Other reports conflated anthrax and virus, and even a written anthrax hoax
that Newsweek reprinted in its original form merged “virus” and “bacillus” together:
“You are now the new host of the terminal virus bacillus cutaneous anthracis aka
Anthrax!” (Gegax and Hosenball 36). Such a slippage in terminology, from a respected
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news source to the odd prankster, indicates the extent to which the virus has supplanted
every other agent of infection in the cultural consciousness. Small wonder,
perhaps–from HIV to Ebola to the computer variety, the virus is a media darling,
promising catastrophes that can be endlessly replicated with each new variation. The
virus fuels our apocalyptic fantasies; it is the premier signifier of death and disaster in
contemporary culture.
Of course, like viruses, many bacterial diseases are also easily transmissible, but
there is something about the idea of individual cells being “commandeered” by viruses
and forced to produce viral copies that is both repellant and fascinating to the American
imagination. And, frankly, up until September 2001, viruses tended to push bacterial
diseases out of the limelight. The only other disease that competed with Ebola in the
horror category and garnered even more press, no doubt due to its imminent threat to the
U.S., was “mad cow disease,” which is neither viral nor bacterial. Even now just the
threat of smallpox is scarier than that of anthrax. Certainly Preston devotes little time to
the non-viral, preferring instead to concentrate on the culturing, engineering, and
harvesting of viruses. In his novel he is somewhat dismissive of anthrax as a
bioweapon, in part because it is not easily communicable between people, an
assumption that is now being disputed among scientists: “In the age of molecular
biology, anthrax looks like a black powder cannon” (CE 111). The Cobra virus, on the
other hand, is “beautiful and so new” (284), at least in Mark Littleberry’s eyes.
Somehow, as Preston’s classifications suggest, the virus has attained a strange cultural
cachet that other microbes simply lack.
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Robin Cook, however, harbors no such prejudice against anthrax, which is the
featured agent of infection in his 1999 novel Vector.32 As in Preston’s novel, New York
City is threatened by a madman, in this case a disgruntled Russian emigre cabbie with a
background in Soviet bioweapons. Teaming up with two members of the People’s
Aryan Army (read: Larry Wayne Harris and William Leavitt, Jr.) who plan to avenge
Ruby Ridge by releasing anthrax into the ventilation of the Jacob Javits building, he
formulates his own plan to kill Manhattan Jews by encircling Central Park with the
bioweapon. This time catastrophe is narrowly averted by the combined efforts of
forensic pathologists Jack Stapleton and Laurie Montgomery. Like Preston, Cook casts
Russia in its traditional role as villain, but he seems most interested in emphasizing the
accessibility of bioweapons technology and supplies. Globalization, then, has
dangerous and unforeseeable consequences for the U.S., which has
responded–somewhat hysterically, some have charged–by increasing surveillance and
other defense measures. In a startling (and perhaps predicable) turnaround, government
officials are now accused of not doing enough to combat bioterrorism.
Difficult as it may be to believe, spearheading a successful, wide-ranging
biological attack, is more complicated in practice than current speculation suggests.
Reportedly, Osama bin Laden attempted to attain bioweapons in 1998 (and possibly
earlier) in a bid to use them against Americans and American troops in Saudi Arabia,
but the method that the well-connected Al Qaeda group chose to attack the U.S. was
surprisingly low-tech. Even a relatively well-connected terrorist group like the Japanese
Aum Shinrikyo cult, best known for its 1995 release of the nerve gas sarin into Tokyo’s
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subways, has been unsuccessful in its attempts to deploy bioweapons.33 Apparently the
problems the cult’s scientists encountered involved “technical hurdles associated with
the acquisition of a virulent strain, cultivation of the agent, and efficient delivery”
(Tucker and Sands). The “delivery” of anthrax spores by mail in the U.S. was far more
successful than many scientists had ever expected, but the fact remains that these
outbreaks were isolated and fairly quickly contained.

Also, the probability of a

biological agent infecting those attempting to cultivate and deliver it (known as the
boomerang effect) is quite high–it is a fate that Archimedes suffers in The Cobra Event
after conducting a series of “trials” with the virus in New York City. Even if, for
example, a foreign terrorist were to try to spread smallpox by first infecting himself and
spreading the disease, he would be dead or incapacitated before being exposed to large
numbers of people (especially now that people are becoming more alert to the symptoms
of smallpox). Still, smallpox is perhaps one of the few existing bioweapons that could
have effects comparable to those of a nuclear event. Thus some might say that the
biggest weapons threat facing contemporary America is still nuclear, not biological.
While the primary focus on weapons of mass destruction in the popular press is on
bioweapons, government officials are quietly pouring money into crumbling nuclear
facilities in Russia in an attempt to keep warheads from ending up in the hands of
terrorist groups like Al Qaeda. Increased attention on bioweapons before September
2001 was fueled by media-driven hysteria over Larry Wayne Harris; informed opinions
about the possibilities of bioterrorism by those who manufactured bioweapons, as well
as the revelation that Russia and Iraq had bioweapons;34 and Preston’s Cobra Event,
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which galvanized President Clinton into starting a bioweapons defense program. And
while I don’t want to crudely suggest that the media is any way “responsible” for the
anthrax attacks, I do find the chicken-and-egg question particularly interesting here in
view of the fact that (officials believe) the anthrax came from a domestic source. That
is, were the anthrax attacks simply proof of the “it’s just a matter of time” warning that
Preston and others espoused, or was it this heightened awareness (and hype) of the
possibilities of bioterrorism that contributed, in some small measure, to the deployment
of the weapon? In other words, are we simply in the grip of an anthrax meme? It is a
question that will probably never be answered, but it is one that bears thinking about in
the wake of the attacks.
Preston, as one of the main purveyors of bioterrorism hype, is enjoying its
benefits, as The Cobra Event has occupied a place on the New York Times bestseller list
and at one point promised to make it onto the silver screen. In the current climate,
however, such a movie is unlikely to make it into theaters. American moviegoers
enjoying being confronted with imagined horrors, not real ones. In a typically prescient
move, viral guru William S. Burroughs satirically noted the possibilities for films
featuring biological weapons in his 1985 essay “Beauty and the Bestseller,” where he
laid out a formula for mayhem that even in its absurdity is strikingly similar to Preston’s
own. “Virus B-23's” terminal symptoms are perhaps equally as grotesque as Cobra’s:
“an accelerated putrefaction accompanied by sexual frenzies, the victim rotting and
performing obscene acts before the horrified eyes of his friends and family” (24).35
Burroughs’ formula, which features a biowarfare center operated by scientists with
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suspiciously German surnames, is rejected by the hypothetical “Director” of the piece:
“‘The reading public and the movie-going public know little or nothing about biological
weapons. And they don’t want to know any more. Scrap the whole idea, it’s terrible’”
(25). Oh, how times have changed. Americans now probably believe they know too
much about bioweapons, but, like the Director’s hypothetical audience, they are not
eager to learn more.36 What is perhaps most surprising in the comparison between
Burroughs’ scenario and Preston’s is that Burroughs could easily be satirizing Preston’s
novel, suggesting that the novel itself is simply recycling old fears under a “new” guise.
Viruses, foreigners, and dissolving human bodies that betray themselves–these are the
“others” that make us squirm, and Preston does not have to add much to these central
elements to come up with a convincing horror story.
What more than one reviewer has noted is that the fictional efforts of the novel’s
heroes are the least interesting parts of the novel; rather it is bits of what Preston calls
“invisible history,” interspersed between chapters in which the main action of the novel
takes place, that are ultimately more engrossing. Presented as more or less non-fictional
accounts that detail the American, Russian, and Iraqi involvement with bioweapons
technology,37 these sections appear to be the basis for Preston’s introductory claims to
“authenticity”: “The characters and story developed here are fictional, but the historical
background is real, the government structures are real, and the science is based on what
is real or possible” (xi). As with The Hot Zone, Preston gets to have it both ways; if that
book reads more like a work of lurid fiction than of non-fiction, then The Cobra Event
attempts to furnish a non-fictional credibility to its rather hackneyed storyline. And if
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the introduction of The Hot Zone serves as a justification for Preston’s narrative
choices,38 the same holds true for his novel’s introduction, in which he delineates his
extensive preparatory research. In both works, the first paragraph of the introduction
serves to orient the reader by affixing the text’s generic parameters. Preston, as the
above introductory quote demonstrates, attempts to de-emphasize The Cobra Event’s
fictionality and highlight its non-fictional aspects. In The Hot Zone’s introduction,
however, which the unwary reader scanning Stephen King’s accolades emblazoned
across the back of the text might mistake for a novel, the first sentence–“This book is
non-fiction”–anticipates that assumption and rejects it. Preston’s practice of
“imagining,” or fictionalizing, what the subjects of his narrative were thinking at the
time of the crisis is consequently downplayed. It seems a natural move for Preston to
make the transition to fiction, as the key players in The Hot Zone more closely resemble
fictional characters than they do representations of actual people. But it is his depiction
of the virus in both the novel and the non-fiction text that is most interesting in terms of
this ostensible breakdown of genres, as its treatment is very similar in both; Preston
sensationalizes the virus, bestowing it with agency, malice, and a whole host of
attachments certain to horrify his target audience: white, middle-class, American
readers.
Both Schell and Lynch note the mixing of genres in The Hot Zone, and Semmler,
comparing the text to Robin Cook’s novel Outbreak, argues that “because Preston’s
book is overtly non-fiction, he can allow himself opening descriptions of the landscape
in prose that is showy, sometimes ominous, while the novelist, because he wants to
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clothe his plot in the mantle of reality, takes a more plainly ‘factual’ stance” (159).
Much the same can be said about Preston’s own novel, which dispenses with some of
the more purple prose and mysticism of The Hot Zone. As for his characterization of
the virus itself, Cobra may be described as a “biological rocket” (199), a “biological
missile” (225), and an “opportunist” that knows “how to wait” (394), but it is not subject
to the kind of rhapsodizing to which Ebola and its (African) landscape are. In fact, the
comparison of the Cobra virus to rockets, missiles, or starships seems oddly
conventional–even anachronistic–for a weapon that is so clearly unconventional. Only
the term “stealth virus” is one that does not resonate of 1950's science fiction. Nor does
Preston delve into nuclear imagery, as he does in The Hot Zone, relying instead on the
undifferentiated “bomb” to describe the virus. Perhaps because the Cobra virus is
deliberately deployed as a weapon, unlike its counterpart Ebola, the elaborate war
machine comparisons become superfluous. Cobra is not specifically gendered female;
the goddess/destroyer motifs are absent here. Nevertheless, Preston’s characterization
of the virus was lurid enough to horrify the President. If, as Lynch argues, Preston
suggests in The Hot Zone that Ebola is “the revenge of predatory germs that emanate
from non-Western places” and that “viruses are not only Nature’s revenge on Western
civilization, but are themselves a sentient, vengeful force bent on wreaking havoc on the
civilized West, turning the planet into the chaos that is Africa” (237), then his emphasis
shifts only slightly in The Cobra Event, which continues to voice fears about
globalization, casts Russia as a somewhat primitive villain and Iraq as a devious one,
and endows Cobra with intentionality. What is missing, however, is the African
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“essence” of the Ebola virus; Cobra is clearly hybrid, and Preston’s invisible history
serves as its story of origin, isolating the forces that impelled the virus into existence.39
Beginning with President Nixon’s 1969 announcement to dismantle the
American biological weapons program and the 1972 signing of the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention (BWC), which the Soviet Union and Iraq both signed, Preston
then turns his attention to the continued development of biological weapons in the years
following these events. The history that takes shape is one in which the United States is
featured not only as a dupe, but also as culpable, to a large extent, for the current threat
that bioweapons pose: “the concerns of Western scientists about the hazards of genetic
engineering provided a blueprint for what was to become the Soviet bioweapons
program” (266).40 Repeatedly misled by Russian scientists and continually
attempting–and failing–to gauge the extent of the Iraqi bioweapons program, America as
depicted by Preston had been “caught flat-footed” (268), and has been playing a game of
catch up ever since. The question of whether the United States currently has a
biological weapons program, however, is only rarely broached throughout the novel, and
it is one that Littleberry answers in the negative, arguing that “It would leak pretty
quick. This is the world’s leakiest government, and public opinion would stop it” (282).
Littleberry’s words are presumably supposed to hold weight, as he is a former Naval
commander with top security clearances who participated in the original American
bioweapons program. It seems an oddly naive view for a man who is fully aware of
atrocities committed by the U.S. military in the name of biological research, but it is also
one that allows, by virtue of the government’s inefficient security measures, for a kind
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of paradoxical faith in its non-involvement in biological weaponry. In other words, the
U.S. government, whose hands were decidedly dirty prior to 1969, gets to keep them
clean in Preston’s novel.41 In reality, however, we are beginning to learn that the United
States’s government does indeed dabble in biopweapons, in the form of have a
“research” program headed by the CIA, which came under intense scrutiny as the FBI
investigated it as a possible source for the anthrax used in the letters mailed to the
Senate and news organizations.
In Preston’s novel, however, it becomes clear that Cobra is engendered in part by
the American biotechnology industry, but not by military scientists.42 Global capitalism
comes home to roost; the real villains of the piece are those hybrids who confuse and
collapse borders, as embodied not only by Cobra, but also by characters like Bio-Ark
scientist Maria Vestof, a Russian-born Swiss citizen with whom Littleberry tangles
during a U.N. weapons inspections of an Iraqi biological research facility. When he
later encounters her at Bio-Vek, the American subsidiary of Bio-Ark, it becomes
apparent that bioweapons have breached American borders. If American interests are
involved in bioweapons at all, Preston suggests, it is only through our own inefficiency;
inadequate surveillance leads to the penetration of American borders and American
bodies.43 As for the biotechnology industry, it is clearly tainted by foreign interests;
Bio-Vek is simply another malevolent multinational, and in no way implicated in a
Faustian pact with the U.S. government. In fact, as Bio-Ark had already developed
Cobra, American scientists assumed a secondary role in order to troubleshoot the
problems associated with the virus. Archimedes “merely sharpened the edge of the
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weapon” (320). Thus the United States retains a certain ethical purity in the novel,
unsullied by involvement in the actual creation of contemporary bioweapons.44 In
addition, it retains a kind of purity that while it is not necessarily associated with
whiteness or with maleness–Littleberry is African-American and Austen, the female
pathologist, is arguably the protagonist of the novel–it is one that resists hybridity all the
same, as it emphasizes the essential “American-ness” of our heroes. It is only Cobra
that is indelibly marked by the foreign. In short, Preston’s America is naive, and thus
essentially innocent. Thus, self (America, American bodies) and other (foreigners,
Cobra) assume their traditional roles here, and there is no question about whom readers
should root for. Archimedes is an American, but, after signing a pact with foreign
interests, he is rendered decidedly “un-American.”
The relationship between the human body and the virus in each of these texts is
clear from the outset; the virus is construed as humanity’s greatest enemy/weapon, rife
with political and cultural attachments that only serve to reinforce its deadliness. That is
not to say, however, that the special status of the virus as a liminal figure is not utilized
in these texts, or that the complexity of humanity’s role in relation to the virus is not
explored, but the positions of self and other are almost always fixed. That is, there is
little sense that the traditional self/non-self construction in immune systems discourse is
challenged in these texts. And yet the texts’ absolute “insistence” on differentiating self
from is suspect, reinforcing a model that would apparently need no such support, if
indeed it were fixed. This in itself suggests that the self/non-self construction is just
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that: a construction. And what is constructed may be deconstructed, as the texts in the
following chapters illustrate.
As we have seen, these viral narratives invoke AIDS metaphors, whether
explicitly or implicitly, and the success of human efforts to neutralize or contain the
viruses is thrown into relief by the very real specter of AIDS as a disease for which there
is no cure. And yet, as the texts illustrate, human efforts can also amplify epidemics, or
even cause them, as in The Cobra Event. Sometimes, too, the virus “escapes” human
control, leading Preston, for one, to marvel about the enigma that is Mother Nature.
There is a tension in these works, then, that suggests that viruses are both subject to and
ultimately beyond human control; We might recall Sontag’s comments here on
contemporary apocalyptic thinking in order to interpret this tension, which is certainly
reflective of cultural anxieties about AIDS: “The taste for worst-case scenarios reflects
the need to master fear of what is felt to be uncontrollable . . . . The sense of cultural
distress or failure gives rise to the desire for a clean sweep, a tabula rasa” (175).
Previous to September 2001, it was necessary, in the midst of a global pandemic that
shows no signs of stopping, to construct stories in which Americans are successful in
subduing their biological foes; we might view it as a unique version of post-Cold War
propaganda. The dire warnings issued in these viral narratives about the future of
humanity are by no means perfunctory, as they serve to cement the status of the
enemy–one wonders if we will not develop our own “duck and cover” drills against
biological attacks–but they are relieved by the heroic efforts of the disease cowboys who
manage to trounce the virus again and again.
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What we see in the next chapter, however, is that in some texts, the demarcation
between self (human) and other (virus) is not as clearly delineated as in other texts.
Both The X-Files and Darwin’s Radio present a challenge to the construction of
self/non-self discourse, a construction that has been challenged by Donna Haraway,
Emily Martin, Paula Treichler, and Polly Matzinger, among others. In both of these
texts, what we see is that the virus, though ostensibly Other, is, like the atom bomb,
inseparable from who we are as human beings–it is us.
NOTES
1. Technically, of course, the infected person is living with HIV, as the protease
inhibitors help prevent the onset of AIDS.
2. Those other factors range from toxic prescription drugs to recreational drugs to
promiscuity, variables that–in some corners–have been associated with AIDS since its
emergence.
3. The “bracket” is the visual organizing principle of the NCAA Basketball
Tournament. Each of the 64 schools that reaches the tournament is placed into one of
four 16-team “Regions”; it is these four regions that comprise the bracket.
4. The term “emerging” is credited to American virologist Stephen Morse, who
originally used the designation to describe the virological specialty of newly discovered
viruses.
5. The practice of Western medicine, for example, can actually amplify a blood- or airborne illness like Ebola fever, as the reuse of needles and use of unsterilized equipment
in poorly supplied hospitals ensures transmission. Such was the case at African
hospitals in Yambuku and Maridi, which amplified the 1976 Ebola epidemics in what is
now the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire) and Sudan. In addition, it is now
generally accepted among virologists and epidemiologists that the process of
globalization, with its increased migration and intercontinental travel on the part of
humans, contributes greatly to the rapid spread of disease. As molecular geneticist and
Nobel laureate Joshua Lederberg puts it, “The world is really just one village. Our
tolerance of disease in any place in the world is at out own peril” (qtd. in Garrett 619).
6. Despite the fact that the novel’s scientists rule out the possibility that Andromeda is a
virus, the organism and the virus are still popularly conflated. Even Karl Johnson, a
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virologist for the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) who writes of his experiences
dealing with hemorrhagic viruses, notes, “A real question was: Had we finally run into
the Andromeda strain, like the deadly virus in the novel?” (qtd. in Schell 99). For
Schell, the statement is clearly indicative of the interaction between science fiction and
science, a notion that perhaps accounts for the “disease cowboy” motif in much of the
literature surrounding emerging infectious diseases.
7. When asked what he knows about Patient Zero, or the first person in the village who
comes down with symptoms of the disease, an African physician says that it was a
young man who had recently worked with a white man to build a road into Kinshasa.
Kinshasa is the city from which the major African highway that Richard Preston has
rather notoriously referred to as “the AIDS highway” (The Hot Zone 375) originates.
Here, the narrative suggests that neo-colonialist practices (in the guise of “whiteness”),
which result in increasing African urbanization, are to blame for Motaba’s emergence.
In effect, Westerners have brought the virus upon themselves; such is the punishment
for ignoring the so-called law of the jungle. Not only is the narrative reaffirming the
notion among virologists and epidemiologists that large-scale social change causes
epidemics, but it is also tapping into anxieties about the effects of Western rapacity on
the environment.
8. Sontag argues that AIDS illustrates “the classic script for plague,” as it is perceived
not simply as foreign, but as originating from a primitive place. Like many critics of
AIDS discourse, she notes that much of the speculation concerning the disease’s socalled African origin reinforces racist stereotypes: “The subliminal connection made to
notions about a primitive past and the many hypotheses that have been fielded about
possible transmission from animals . . . cannot help but activate a familiar set of
stereotypes about animality, sexual license, and blacks” (140). For more analysis of the
associations of African stereotypes with AIDS, see Paula Treichler’s How to Have a
Theory in An Epidemic, chapters 3 and 7 (“AIDS and HIV Infection in the Third World:
A First World Chronicle,” “AIDS, Africa, and Cultural Theory”), 99-126, 205-234;
Cindy Patton’s Inventing AIDS, chapter 6 (“Inventing ‘African AIDS’), 77-97; Simon
Watney’s Practices of Freedom: Selected Writings on HIV/AIDS; and Barbara
Browning’s Infectious Rhythm: Metaphors of Contagion and the Spread of African
Culture. Like AIDS, emerging viruses also illustrate a “classic script” for plague,
embodying–in many cases–identical stereotypes. Schell, Lynch, and Semmler all note
the connection between AIDS and emerging virus narratives, with Lynch arguing that
the modern plague tales’ call to globalization (under the guise of disease surveillance)
“becomes a call for the global policing of African people, places, and cultures” (249).
9. As Haraway observes, “The residue of the history of colonial tropical medicine and
natural history in late-twentieth century immune discourse should not be
underestimated” (223).
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10. Preston is explicit about this connection: “It was behaving like the fictional
Andromeda Strain. Just when we thought the world was coming to an end, the virus
slipped away, and we survived” (354).
11. Preston has accused the studio of lifting major elements from The Hot Zone, and
although Warner Brothers has denied this on the grounds that the film was already in
production when the book came out, it may at least be said that there are a number of
similarities between Outbreak and Preston’s New Yorker article, particularly in terms of
imagery. As for the languishing movie rights at Fox, apparently Ridley Scott has
evinced some interest in directing “Crisis in the Hot Zone,” but the project is still in
development.
12. What all these texts have in common is an indebtedness to Paul de Kruif’s popular
Microbe Hunters, first published in 1926. Fictional accounts can look to George
Stewart’s Earth Abides (1949) as a predecessor. The epigraph to Part 1 of that novel
would not be out of place in any current examination attempting to ascribe cause to the
spread of lethal viruses: “If a killing type of virus strain should suddenly arise by
mutation . . . it could, because of the rapid transportation in which we indulge nowadays,
to be carried to the far corners of the earth and cause the deaths of millions of people”
(W. M. Stanley, in Chemical and Engineering News, Dec. 22, 1947)
13. The Reston virus was believed to have originated in the Philippines, not in Africa, a
fact Preston acknowledges.
14. The idea that humans are themselves viruses has worked its way into popular
culture; it serves as the theme for the movie Virus, in which an alien life form takes it
upon itself to purge the earth of the “human virus,” and it has been used to critique
human greed by the late comedian Bill Hicks: “We are a virus with shoes. That’s all we
are” (Rant in E Minor).
15. Throughout the text, the viral is repeatedly associated with the nuclear, with the
effect of inscribing the displaced nuclear bomb upon the text of the virus:
“Marburg virus (the gentle sister) affects humans somewhat like nuclear radiation,
damaging virtually all of the tissues in their bodies” (38).
“What happened in Sudan could be compared to the secret detonation of an atomic
bomb. If the human race came close to a major biological accident, we never knew it”
(99).
“A tiny amount of airborne Ebola could nuke a building full of people if it got into the
air-conditioning system. The stuff could be like plutonium. The stuff could be worse
than plutonium because it could replicate” (224).
“You could no more imagine a season of Ebola flu than you could imagine a nuclear
war” (321).
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16. Preston himself engages in “safe sex” at Kitum Cave–allegedly the home of
Ebola–where he dons a biohazard suit in preparation for his encounter with the virus.
Both Schell and Lynch have pointed out the sexually threatening aspects of this
penetration scene. Terry Gilliam’s post-apocalyptic 12 Monkeys, in which a virus wipes
out most of the earth’s population and forces the survivors underground, spoofs the
ubiquitous biohazard suit. The balloon-like suit that James Cole (Bruce Willis) wears as
he visits the surface of the planet is entirely translucent and strung with tiny lights
encircling the head gear, and appears singularly fragile–as if it would take only one
pinprick to damage it irreparably. The suit is a mockery of the barriers so painstakingly
detailed in The Hot Zone.
17. The implication is that we should encourage isolation in other respects, as well.
“Virus discourse is retelling old imperialist nightmares that, neutralized under cover of
medical common sense, seem to justify exclusionary practices, surveillance, and general
prejudice that we would otherwise find inexcusable as well as politically untenable”
(Schell 97).
18. Jaax, who plays a major role in the handling of the Reston outbreak, is not portrayed
as a virus hunter/cowboy in The Hot Zone. If anything, it is her domesticity which is
emphasized throughout the text; descriptions of her children, her husband, and even her
house in a chapter entitled “A Woman and A Soldier” precede those in the chapter of
her involvement with Eugene Johnson’s Ebola Project at USAMRIID. The implication
is that Jaax is literally a woman first and soldier second. And yet it is Jaax whom we
follow, in the pages mimicking government security clearances that precede the first
chapter, from the “normal” world to Biosafety Level 4, or the hottest of the hot zones.
Perhaps Preston is suggesting that only a woman can do battle with her own kind.
Something similar is suggested in the television movie Runaway Virus, in which a
female virologist works to contain a virus whose main vector is an illegal immigrant
woman from Guatemala. The virologist eventually traces the steps of “Patient Zero”
and becomes her savior–she goes so far as to embrace the sufferer, a rare image in these
emerging virus narratives.
19. In The Cobra Event’s glossary, Preston defines a chimera as “a virus made in the
laboratory by the mixing (recombination) of genetic material from other viruses” (396).
According to Ken Alibek, the former First Deputy Director for the Soviet biological
weapons program who defected to the United States in 1992, a virus altered in this way
could conceivably be used as a multi-disease vaccine. On the flipside, it could also be
used as a weapon that would be resistant to any existing vaccine, as in an Ebolasmallpox combination. Referring to the likelihood of a combination of Venezuelan
Equine Encephalitis and smallpox, Alibek calls such a chimera a “double agent,” and
argues that it would be “a superweapon capable of triggering both diseases at once”
(Biohazard 260). Some American scientists, such as Joshua Lederberg and Peter
Jahrling of USAMRIID, are skeptical about Alibek’s claims that Russian scientists are
currently working on an Ebola-smallpox chimera.
77

20. Preston defines black biology as follows: “The clandestine use of biotechnology and
genetic engineering to create recombinant or chimera weapons with artificially altered
genetic material” (396).
21. As of this writing, there is little evidence that the 2001 anthrax attacks were
spearheaded by foreign terrorists. Officials believe the anthrax comes from a domestic
source, and have already identified the strains in letters sent to Senators Daschle and
Leahy as matching those manufactured by USAMRIID.
22. If Austen and Hopkins’ joint efforts to thwart a viral catastrophe sound more than a
little familiar, that is probably due to their striking resemblance–even down to Austen’s
red hair–to Agents Scully and Mulder of The X-Files. In fact, the novel could translate
quite easily into an episode of the popular show, but it seems that it is destined for
bigger things–20th Century Fox purchased the movie rights for $3 million.
23. Preston’s 1999 New Yorker essay on smallpox, “The Demon in the Freezer,”
hearkens back to this characterization of the virus.
24. Readers might notice that the filoviruses in The Hot Zone were described as
resembling snakes or cobras: “He saw virus particles shaped like snakes . . . . They were
white cobras tangled among themselves, like the hair of Medusa. They were the face of
Nature herself, the obscene goddess revealed naked” (197). Karl Johnson also adopts
the metaphor, likening Ebola to “a waving confrontational cobra” (119).
25. Hall, Stephen S. “Science-fiction Policy.” Technology Review. Nov-Dec 1998
v101 i6 p92 (1).
26. Accompanying Preston’s testimony was that of Attorney General Janet Reno;
Director of the F.B.I. Louis Freeh; Former Director of the C.I.A. James Woolsey;
Defense Science Board Member Donald C. Latham; Professor of Medical Genetics
Christine Gosden; and Naval Commander James K. Campbell, author of Weapons of
Mass Destruction Terrorism.
27. The Clinton administration was of a similar mind, granting the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) $51 million in 1999, part of a $420 million initiative
announced in 1998, both for the purpose of developing a modern smallpox vaccine and
for stockpiling antibiotics and antidotes that could be administered in a biological or
chemical emergency. The CDC’s budget was scheduled to dramatically increase during
the next two years, with $20 million proposed in 2001 to create a national diseasesurveillance network that would provide early warnings of new infections and
bioterrorist attacks. That number increased exponentially, however, in the aftermath of
the anthrax attacks. In addition, the United States’ decision to destroy all its remaining
stocks of the smallpox virus in June 1999, as the World Health Organization (WHO) had
urged, has been delayed indefinitely. The United States is one of two official
repositories around the world–including Russia–but the news that clandestine stocks
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probably exist, and thus may serve as a possible source for bioterrorists, was a
motivating factor in the decision to delay. In October 2001 Secretary of Health and
Human Services Tommy Thompson requested 300 million doses of the smallpox
vaccine, a costly measure that would have been unthinkable prior to the anthrax attacks.
28. In Chapter Five, I demonstrate how this notion of the “hive mind” is intimately
associated with the feminine. In Chapter Four, I illustrate how in Ammonite (1992)
Nicola Griffith takes advantage of the utopian possibilities of the collective mind,
transforming its negative associations into positive ones.
29. It is fitting that Archimedes, or Thomas Cope, should spend most of the novel
referred to by the F.B.I. as the “Unsub,” or Unknown subject. He barely registers as a
character. As for his homage to the third century B.C. mathematician Archimedes, it
presumably stems from his identification with a man who also designed weapons and
who described the principle of the lever and the fulcrum (“Give me only a place to
stand, and I can move the world.”). The lever, in this case, is the Cobra virus, the
deployment of which he hopes will save the earth by reducing the number of its human
inhabitants.
30. The ideology underlying Gilliam’s film, however, is that the insane are actually
sane, and vice versa. The scientist who steals the virus from his employer, the virus’s
creator, and then later releases it makes a compelling argument: “Surely there is very
real and very convincing data that the planet cannot survive the excesses of the human
race: proliferation of atomic devices, uncontrolled breeding habits, the rape of the
environment, the pollution of land, sea, and air. In this context, isn't it obvious that
‘Chicken Little’ represents the sane vision and that Homo Sapiens' motto, ‘Let's go
shopping!’ is the cry of the true lunatic?” The ravings of supposed madman Jeffrey
Goins, son of the virus’s creator, are of a similar vein: “We're consumers. Okay, buy a
lot of stuff, you're a good citizen. But if you don't buy a lot of stuff, you know what?
You're mentally ill! That's a fact!” Unrestrained consumption is the true insanity here,
so it is perhaps fitting that the measure taken against that consumption–the virus–is itself
a particularly voracious consumer.
31. Harris originally made headlines in 1995 when he was arrested for illegally ordering
three vials of freeze-dried bubonic-plague bacteria from a scientific supply house.
32. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the Amazon.com editorial review describes Cook’s plot
as hinging on “the threat of an anthrax virus turned loose in a New York government
building and in Central Park” (emphasis added).
33. These particular attempts took place in Japan in the early 1990's, with one
reportedly aimed at the U.S. base at Yokosuka. Anthrax and botulinum toxins were two
of the agents deployed, but they had no discernible effect on the cult’s projected victims.
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34. Ken Alibek, whose appearance on Prime Time Live in February 1998 introduced the
American public to the reality of bioweapons technology, is certainly a pivotal figure in
the press’s coverage of bioterrorism. His subsequent column in The New York Times in
March 1998, in conjunction with his statement before the Joint Economic Committee in
May 1998 and his account of his experiences at Biopreparat in Biohazard (2000), served
to raise public awareness about bioweapons and the role that the Russians played in
developing them. Alibek was also featured in Preston’s New Yorker article, “The
Bioweaponeers,” a piece which, coupled with Alibek’s Prime Time Live appearance,
provoked a scathing response from The Nation in an article by Peter Pringle entitled
“Bioterrorism: America’s Newest War Game.” Pringle faults Preston for not
introducing views that contradicted Alibek’s until nearly the end of the article, and he
also accuses Diane Sawyer (and by extension the producers of Prime Time Live) of
irresponsible journalism, enumerating various key omissions from Sawyer’s report that
might have provided viewers with a more balanced view of the likelihood of a
bioterrorist attack.
35. Burroughs is describing here plot elements to his 1981 Cities of the Red Night.
Virus B-23 enjoys a kind of preferred pathogen status for the author, recurring
throughout his work and consistently intertwined with the word. “Steinplatz postulates
that the virus of biologic mutation, which he calls Virus B-23, is contained in the word.
Unloosing this virus from the word could be more deadly that loosing the power of the
atom” (“Feedback from Watergate to the Garden of Eden”).
36. Before the anthrax attacks, bioweapons were beginning to displace nuclear arsenals
at the movies. In the recent Mission: Impossible 2 (2000), an extraordinarily lethal virus
takes center stage, developed by an Australian pharmaceutical company and stolen by
terrorists who threaten to deploy it. The name of the virus, however, is perhaps most
interesting in terms of Preston’s (and Alibek’s) influence: “Chimera.” Even MTV’s
Beavis and Butthead get embroiled in a U.S. bioweapons program in their movie debut
Beavis and Butthead Do America (1996).
37. It is only Part III of the “Invisible History” that is filtered through the voice of a
fictional character; Parts I and II are delivered in Preston’s typical journalistic style,
with no intervention by his characters.
38. “At certain moments in the story, I describe the stream of a person’s thoughts. In
such instances, I am basing my narrative on interviews with the subjects in which they
have recalled their thoughts often repeatedly, followed by fact-checking sessions in
which the subjects confirmed their recollections” (“To the Reader”).
39. That is not to say that Preston’s newest virus sheds all associations with Africa; the
boxes that Archimedes uses to disperse dry virus particles for his trial victims are made
in Kenya by a woodcarver who, as the F.B.I. learns, died of AIDS. The expert who
identifies the box’s origin notes that this kind of object is “fundamentally African”
(242), assigning an African essence to it. Kenya, of course, figures prominently in The
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Hot Zone as a kind of “reservoir” for Ebola, and so once again Africa is explicitly linked
with the unleashing of hot agents upon the Western world.
40. Iraq’s strategy, according to Preston, was a little more direct–Iraqi scientists bought
a seed strain of botulism from a non-profit American organization that provided
microorganisms to science and industry. For more on the extent to which Western
companies were instrumental in assisting Iraq to develop a biological and chemical
weapons program, see Leonard Cole’s The Eleventh Plague: The Politics of Biological
and Chemical Warfare and William Blum’s “Anthrax for Export” in Chemical and
Biological Warfare. The ease with which hot agents were once obtained is also
demonstrated by Larry Wayne Harris’s ability to obtain vials of bubonic plague in 1995
from a scientific supply house. When federal agents originally attempted to prosecute
him for possessing potentially lethal pathogens, they discovered that in fact such
possession was not illegal. Congress quickly responded in 1996, passing a law against
the possession of biological weapons ingredients. As for Harris, he pleaded guilty to
mail fraud, but was charged in 1998 with violating the newly enacted law.
41. While the contemporary government is portrayed as more or less ignorant about
biowarfare and thus guiltless, Preston, using Littleberry as a mouthpiece, does highlight
some of the military’s more questionable practices involving the original (pre-1969)
biological weapons program. In one fictionalized incident, Littleberry visits the Pine
Bluff, Arkansas, weapons facility, where he sees unprotected African-American workers
packing dry anthrax into bombs for use on warheads: “It took me a long time to get
through my stubborn head the reality of what was going on in Arkansas. It was
expendable nigger-labor in a disease factory, that’s what it was” (262). Preston does
not, however, mention that the U.S. had been accused of conducting biowarfare in the
Korean War, an allegation that Canadians Stephen Endicott and Edward Hagerman
explore in The United States and Biological Warfare. Amassing newly available
British, U.S., Canadian, and Chinese documents, the authors believe that the evidence
points strongly toward the use of an American biological weapons system in China and
Korea.
42. Outbreak, however, falls back on a military conspiracy to drive its plot–two military
generals store Motaba for use as a bioweapon, having developed antibodies for it well in
advance of the contemporary epidemic. Their slowness to provide relief to the
American sufferers stems from their unwillingness to expose their secret.
43. This sentiment, whether expressed in relation to communism or to bioweapons, is
very effective in convincing the public of the need for increased vigilance/surveillance,
and it is one that Preston expresses in all his writings. For The Cobra Event, in
particular, however, with its explicit evocations of Soviet misdeeds, the sentiment is a
superimposition of anxieties about communist infiltration upon current anxieties about
terrorism, with the effect of investing the virus with both of these.
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44. Preston seems to be the exception rather than the rule on this point; other popular
accounts dealing with bioweapons, such as Stephen King’s The Stand, directly implicate
the U.S. government. In King’s novel, which was adapted for television in 1994, most of
the world’s population is annihilated by a “superflu” virus that leaks out of an American
biowarfare laboratory. Similarly, The Omega Man (1971), which is based on Richard
Matheson’s I am Legend (1954), features the accidental release of a bacteriological
bioweapon that transforms the infected survivors into vampire-like creatures.
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CHAPTER THREE
EXTREME POSSIBILITIES
8. “The product of government research labs developing ‘Andromeda strain’-type mutant viruses for
chemical and biological warfare.”
9. “An extraterrestrial conspiracy to weaken the human immune system and make the earth more
vulnerable to alien invasion.”
–From Paula Treichler’s list of examples detailing ways in which AIDS has been characterized, How To
Have Theory in An Epidemic

As we have seen, many popular depictions of the virus, like depictions of other
catastrophes, follow a formula in which societal norms are suspended, but only briefly.
Eventually, the villainous virus is defeated, and the complete annihilation of humanity is
forestalled by the ingenuity of one or more individuals. Thus, while humanity is marked
by the virus, both literally and figuratively, the promise of truly radical change–and
change for the better–is quickly supplanted by the return of the status quo. The host, if it
survives, is surely transformed in what we might call "radical" ways, but it, like society,
returns to a semblance of normality once the infection runs its course. Generally, the
virus's transformative powers result in the debilitation or death of the host organism;
hence our morbid fascination with this tiny, not-quite-alive organism that is said to be
responsible for most of the illnesses across the globe.
Although ostensibly following in the tradition of viral catastrophes outlined in
the previous chapter, The X-Files and Greg Bear’s Darwin’s Radio are far more
suggestive of the notion that humans are the makers of their own apocalypse; at the
same time, however, they also point to the virus as a potential agent of utopia. In
emerging virus and bioweapons narratives, the severe debilitation of the virus’s victims
is heavily emphasized, illustrating the frailty of the human body and the possible
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dissolution of the human subject. In some speculative fiction, however, a different view
of the virus has been offered by writers who highlight its positive transformative
possibilities for the human subject. Dissolution of the human subject does not
necessarily indicate loss in these works; what is "lost" is often replaced by something
that not only renders the subject posthuman, but posthuman in ways that suggest an
improvement in the human condition. Mining the ambiguity implied in the construct of
the virus, The X-Files and Darwin’s Radio both present viruses as initially terrifying and
as alien to humans as Preston’s Ebola or Cobra, but which in the end turn out to be
integral–and in some cases even beneficial–to the human body. That knowledge is little
comfort, however, as the characters feel a certain ambivalence upon recognizing their
inextricable relationship with what had heretofore been considered “other.” They have
difficulty acknowledging, as Kristeva exhorts, their “uncanny strangeness.” Thus longheld distinctions between self and other collapse through the agency of the virus, even as
humans struggle to retain them; their very bodies undermine those distinctions. There is
a corresponding uncertainty pervading these texts that mirrors the contemporary
uncertainty of a society increasingly unable to recognize clearly demarcated boundaries
or to trust in absolutes. American innocence à la Preston is dead.
The X-Files takes this notion of lost innocence as its starting point, whereas Bear
presents an initially complacent society that falls back on superstition and brutality in
order to cope with the reality of a virus that threatens its very foundations. In this
chapter I illustrate how these two works not only present a very clear challenge to the
traditional self/non-self construction in immune systems discourse by utilizing the figure
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of the virus, but also suggest that seeing the virus only in terms of its debilitating
pathogenicity is short-sighted and even dangerous. In addition, I examine in these works
the significance of conspiracy theories and other narratives surrounding viral outbreaks
that have been repeatedly discredited, as well as ancient rituals. In Darwin’s Radio,
people rely on these to exert control over their increasingly chaotic world; in this
practice we see the parallels to early attitudes and anxieties about AIDS, which give rise
to those theories about the disease that lurk just below the surface of “mainstream”
cultural consciousness, popping up when we least expect it. The X-Files, however, takes
conspiracy theories, urban legends, and tabloid fodder as its subjects, giving voice to
those fears and anxieties which we are reluctant to let out into the light of day. It is not
surprising, then, that at the center of the series’ most insidious, wide-ranging conspiracy
is a particularly nasty virus.
Two “theories” about AIDS preface this chapter in my epigraph by Treichler,
and judging by the success of The X-Files, which offers its viewers versions of both of
these (though not explicitly in relation to AIDS), they clearly strike a chord with popular
audiences. That The X-Files can present conspiracy theories, urban legends, and various
other narratives unique to American culture in such a plausible fashion is a testament to
the series’ brilliance and the key to its success. The implausibility of two F.B.I. agents
applying scientific principles and theories to a weekly ration of aliens, vampires,
demons, mutants, and other creatures from the fantastic and science fiction is undercut
by what we might call the kind of hyperrealism that we see on the small screen, in which
the camera dwells lovingly–almost invasively–on the subject rendered in careful detail.
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What also contributes to the series’ often studied realism is the “mythology” of the XFiles, as creator Chris Carter calls it, which revolves around narratives of alien
abduction that are always subject to interpretation, suggesting a possible human agency
behind the encounters and providing no real answers, either for skeptics like Agent Dana
Scully or for her more credulous partner Fox Mulder.
These alien abduction narratives point toward a vast government conspiracy
involving experiments with alien/human hybridization that Mulder and Scully uncover
in the course of their investigations. For Mulder, who as a child witnesses his sister’s
“abduction,” these investigations take on a decidedly personal cast. Gradually–over the
course of several seasons–the agents discover that the alien/human hybrid experiments
are performed in order to ensure that humanity will survive in some form, as the
extraterrestrials plan to colonize the earth. It seems, in fact, that the aliens are the
original inhabitants of the earth and intend to reclaim it. The primary tool for
(re)colonization? A virus, naturally.1 However “alien” Preston’s Ebola or Cobra might
be, they are outclassed by “Purity” (aka the “black oil” or “black cancer”), which is
literally alien. According to Cassandra Spender, one of the series’ numerous abductees
and a successful human/alien hybrid, the extraterrestrials are plotting “to wipe us off the
planet. They're taking over the universe. They're infecting all other life-forms with a
black substance called Purity. It's their life force. It's what they're made of” (“Two
Fathers”). That “life force” has some unfortunate side effects for humans, who upon
infection develop a black film over their eyes and some very strange behaviors in the
episodes in which the virus first makes its appearance (“Piper Maru,” “Apocrypha”).
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They become, quite simply, the extensions of the alien consciousness, which forces its
hosts to carry out its directives.2
Later, in the X-Files movie, those directives include instructions for inducing
gestation within the human host, resulting in a new alien life form that springs fully
formed from the host’s chest. The homage to, or perhaps pastiche of, films such as
Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956), Alien (1979), and The Andromeda Strain (1971)
is easily discerned here. In a bid to stall colonization in order to develop a vaccine
against the virus, a shadow government called the Syndicate composed of aged white
men of different nationalities–excluding Russians–agrees to collaborate with the aliens
and prepare the world for colonization. Dating back to Roswell, this pact stipulated that
a delivery system would be developed for the virus, and that cloned alien/human hybrids
would serve as a slave race once colonization began. The Syndicate is unaware of the
secondary effect of the virus upon humans–the gestation of an alien within the human
host–believing that massive infection of the human population would only render
humans as hosts controlled by the alien entity. By the time they learn otherwise, they
have already developed a vaccine that seems to significantly weaken the effects of the
virus, if not destroy it altogether. In essentially agreeing to bring about a viral
apocalypse, the Syndicate manages to buy enough time to save the human race, at least
for the time being. At this point in the series, it is clear that the extraterrestrial virus
merely uses the human subject as a host, which quite literally dissolves when the
gestating alien leeches the nutrients it needs to survive.
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The utopian possibilities are certainly nowhere in evidence in this scenario, but as the
series progresses, it turns out that the virus is not quite what the humans believe it to be.
Through Mulder and Scully’s involvement with the X-Files, the F.B.I. unit that
conducts investigations into matters that cannot be resolved through traditional means,
they not only learn about Purity, the Syndicate’s plans to deploy it through the agency of
bees (who pollinate transgeneric corn crops that are polygenically altered to carry the
virus), and the experiments involving the injection of alien DNA into human subjects,
but they themselves fall victim to the virus. Both become infected by it, Scully through
a bee sting and Mulder through deliberate infection by the Russians, who were
attempting to develop a vaccine for the virus in order to beat the Syndicate as survivors
of the coming holocaust.3 In addition, Scully undergoes what appears to be a
government-staged “abduction” in which her ova are extracted; she becomes, in effect, a
mother to at least one alien/human hybrid.4 She is a victim, of sorts, of governmentsanctioned rape. Mulder, however, can count himself lucky; though he is infected with
the black oil, he does not give “birth” to an alien entity. Biohazard suits, such a
powerful presence in The Hot Zone and later in The Cobra Event, are clearly useless
against the seemingly omnipotent invading forces that Mulder and Scully attempt to
combat; it’s almost as if the agents allow themselves to be penetrated and manipulated,
all in the hope of finding that the truth is indeed “out there.” Their bodies are literally
compromised in their search for the truth. What they find, besides “truths” that are
multiple and ever-shifting, is that their own government is every bit as invasive and
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insidious as the virus itself. That analogy, of course, is no accident. America is neither
naive nor innocent in The X-Files, a depiction that owes much to the series’ mining of
1970's conspiracy films, as well as to current attitudes about government and its
officials. Or, as Chris Carter expresses it:
The X-Files proceeds on the idea that the government is not just
withholding from the American public, deceiving it, but that it has the
ability to get inside your life, to invade it, ruin your life, make your life
miserable. In The X-Files we sort of play it out in an extreme way. The
government is sort of the all purpose villain. They have the ability to
shape not just the truth but to shape the future and your lives along with
it. (The X-Files Movie DVD Commentary)
As it is portrayed here, the government sounds suspiciously like the popular
characterization of the virus. Perhaps, too, the ideas played out in The X-Files are not so
extreme, particularly in an age in which genetic manipulation is a reality. The
consequences for the mapping of the human genome are far-ranging, with the
potentiality for producing designer babies à la Brave New World, as well as ethnic
weapons, looming ever larger.5
The X-Files, with its emphasis on the malleability of bodies, and the ease with
which both mind and body may be manipulated by official power, represents what we
might call an evolution of Foucault’s notion of the modern carceral society. Foucault
suggests in his outline of the carceral society in Discipline and Punish that modern
power is more pervasive than in any other era, largely through the subjection of the
typical citizen to perpetual surveillance and to normalizing techniques. Could we
consider the universe of The X-Files, then, even more successful in this respect,
controlling its citizens on the level of DNA? We might view this subjugation of bodies
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as an illustration of what Foucault terms “bio-power,” that which characterizes the shift
from sovereign power to modern disciplinary power: “The old power of death that
symbolized sovereign power was now carefully supplanted by the administration of
bodies and the calculated management of life” (History of Sexuality 140). Foucault
documents the move from physical force to knowledge as the technique through which
official power is exercised (and thus the accompanying shift from the body to the mind
as the object of that power), but what could yield more knowledge–or information, the
contemporary version of knowledge–than the very code of life, DNA? And DNA is
exactly what the government is after in The X-Files, extracting it from its citizens
through blood and tissue samples; it initiates a tagging system for every person
vaccinated against smallpox from 1947 on, a scheme designed to provide the genetic
information needed to create an alien/human hybrid. This is bio-power on a grand scale,
and certainly represents an upgrade of Foucault’s theorization of the carceral society.
The ultimate triumph of the carceral, genetic surveillance requires an “invasion” of the
body: “Although bodies are shredded, stung, burned, impaled, and disintegrated on The
X-Files, the true horrors of violation reside in spectacles of bodies, including Scully’s
and Mulder’s, being genetically invaded, tagged, and manipulated. Invasion occurs on a
microscopic level that the individual cannot directly experience” (Markley 96). Thus
the deployment of power is, on one level, invisible, even as the body itself is a
spectacle.6
Carter’s characterization of the government in The X-Files as a villain that “has
the ability to shape not just the truth but to shape the future and your lives along with it”
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is suggestive of Foucault’s description of the ability of large, invisible structures of
power to control and even to produce individuals. And yet these structures of power are
not invisible to the viewer; rather, they are ubiquitous: often the most tantalizing threads
of the incredibly complex plot line involve Mulder and Scully’s encounters with moles
inside the official government and the shadow government. With appellations like
“Deep Throat” and “X,” these informants pave the way for the agents’ eventual
unraveling of the conspiracy. Members of the Syndicate, too, are ubiquitous in the alien
colonization episodes, the premier being the infamous “Cigarette Smoking Man” (aka
“Cancer Man”), whose shifting loyalties and myriad roles highlight the fundamental
instability of the structures of power. This instability also exists among the alien
colonists, the true shadow government of the series–rebel aliens infiltrate the Syndicate
and thwart plans for colonization for reasons that remain, at this writing, unknown. The
viewer is granted the privilege of access into the back rooms of power, often beyond
what Mulder and Scully are granted. And if it is a rather clichéd vision that we are
granted, complete with aged white men hatching plans to control the world, it is relieved
somewhat by the equally cliched vision of extraterrestrial invasion. What is unique
about these depictions, however, is the emphasis on the vulnerability of both the
Syndicate and the Colonists.7 However much the series taps into the current vogue
about conspiracies–which gives rise to the comforting feeling at least someone is in
control of a world that, rife with AIDS and terrorism, seems increasingly out of
control–it also suggests that that control is a myth. Resistance is a very real possibility
in the universe of The X-Files, despite its carceral nature.
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While the line of division between the U.S. government and its foes in The
Cobra Event is by no means tidy, implicating the American biotechnology industry in
the development and production of bioweapons, there is very little sense that the current
government is in the habit of deceiving the public, at least about a possible bioweapons
program. Past deceptions are noted, but nothing is mentioned about government
sanctioned biowarfare experiments on humans. All in all, the villains are rather easy to
identify in the novel, as they are in The X-Files, but they lack the mutability and shifting
loyalties of the latter. Quite simply, for Preston it’s “us” (military, F.B.I., public health
doctors) against “them” (Russia, Iraq, multinationals). For Mulder and Scully, however,
the lines are not so easily drawn: “Children of the 1970s, they were witnesses to the
collapse of ‘us/them’ thinking: the Evil Empire was not ‘out there,’ it was in the Oval
Office and the Pentagon. The external enemy had moved inside–and is still inside”
(Deny All Knowledge, Graham 61). “Trust no one,” the flipside of the show’s mantra
“the truth is out there,” acknowledges the collapse of this dichotomy, but it is a lesson
that Mulder is slow to learn, relying as he does on individuals operating within the
conspiracy for information. At one point, he is led to believe that the whole conspiracy
involving aliens is really a government ploy to divert attention from the truly horrible
things that the military had been doing during the Cold War–namely, experiments in
biowarfare. If we refer back to this chapter’s epigraph and the series’ appropriation of
thinly veiled AIDS conspiracies, we can see here that conspiracy number 9, involving
extraterrestrials, is neatly replaced by conspiracy number 8, which states that AIDS is
“The product of government research labs developing ‘Andromeda strain’-type mutant
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viruses for chemical and biological warfare” (Treichler 316). The conspiracy described
in The X-Files is reminiscent of the kind of secret experimentation Soviet propaganda
specialists accused the United States of in 1985, alleging that HIV had been engineered
at USAMRIID in Fort Detrick, Maryland, and then spread overseas unwittingly by US
servicemen used as carriers for the virus (Sontag 140-1). This theory and others of its
kind have managed to drop out of the mainstream rhetoric about AIDS, but The X-Files’
depiction of government misdeeds in relation to viruses and biological weapons can be
read in terms of those accounts that quietly undermine the “official” version of the AIDS
story. Unvoiced, except by those on the fringes of society, these theories are still very
much a part of the AIDS chronicle. They are useful not so much in what they say about
AIDS, as what they say about our cultural attitudes and preoccupations with the disease.
In the fifth season episode “Redux,” Michael Kritschgau, an operative within the
Department of Defense, convinces Mulder that the government fabricated evidence of
extraterrestrials and staged abductions in order to promote the belief by the public that
aliens did, in fact, exist, and that the government was covering up that knowledge. In
one fell swoop, Kritschgau manages to debunk many of Mulder’s long-held beliefs and
to implicate the U.S. government as a manufacturer of bioweapons, both pre- and post1969.8 His interpretation of the purpose of government’s collection of its citizens’ DNA
is much simpler than the elaborate ones put forth elsewhere in the series: “This is about
control, of the very elements of life. DNA - yours, mine, everyone's” (“Redux” 5x02).
In fact, Kritschgau’s account of the government’s misdeeds is perhaps more believable
than anything that Mulder and Scully had in five years of investigating surmised–but
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never with any certainty–as truth. As Douglas Kellner observes, “In The X-Files, [truth]
is often inaccessible, always challenged, and is thus a highly elusive Holy Grail” (173).
At the same time that Mulder undergoes a crisis of faith, Scully, who is initially
assigned to the X-Files because of her skepticism and her reliance on scientific
rationality, becomes increasingly convinced of the validity of her own discoveries–i.e.
discoveries that, while not always grounded in scientific rationality, point to the
existence of extraterrestrials. Throughout the fifth season, she finds herself in the
unique position of attempting to convince a now staunchly skeptical Mulder that her
abduction was in some way involved with the extraterrestrial colonists, and not
something simply staged by the government. Mulder, once so open to the possibilities
of extraterrestrial life–frequently to Scully’s exasperation–finds himself believing the
more “rational” explanation that Kritschgau puts forth. And, while this explanation is
not necessarily borne out in later episodes, it is further evidence of the way in which
“more than any other program in television history, The X-Files at least alludes to
government crimes and conspiracies and puts in question the institutions and morality of
the National Security state with its covert apparatuses and shadowy operations” (Kellner
173). In effect, the series, like The Cobra Event, taps into public anxieties about
bioweapons, but unlike that novel, it refuses to let the U.S. government off the hook,
even in these post-Biowarfare Convention days.9 “What other show,” asks a rather
disparaging Peter Bart of Variety, “would depict, as its ultimate heavy, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency–those ‘dangerous’ folk who turn up in times of
disaster?” (Bart and Hontz 2). Now, we could argue, the United States has a very
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convenient enemy, and thus we do not feel the need to make enemies of our own
government agencies. The enemy may be within our borders, as the FBI continually
warns us, but it is still clearly a foreign enemy. Thus we revert to a comfortable
self/non-self model, with the US as the “body at war” who must also patrol its own
borders, ferreting out the aliens that live among us. At the same time, however, as
evidence continues to mount that the anthrax attacks were engineered by a person or
persons within the US who had access to government laboratories, there is a suggestion
that one of the United States’ greatest foes is its own citizens. This notion of self versus
self, while played out in novels and movie theaters, does not sit easily with the
American public, the majority of whom would prefer to focus on an easily identifiable
enemy. We might take a cue from The X-Files and remember that there are no simple
truths, even if it is possible to find the truth “out there.”
If the collapse of “us/them” thinking is a hallmark of the universe of The XFiles, that collapse is also mirrored–writ small–in the show’s depiction of the inner
spaces of the human body. Here, as in Graham’s characterization of the U.S. and its
foes, “The external enemy had moved inside–and is still inside” (61). That is, the
extraterrestrial virus, as Mulder and Scully eventually discover, is not only inside us, but
it is us. In the sixth season opener “The Beginning,” a link between the alien conspiracy
and the human genome is presented in the form of Gibson Praise, a small boy who can
read minds. While most humans have genomes that are composed of about 95 percent
inactive “junk DNA,” or DNA that scientists believe has little effect on the body,
Gibson’s “junk DNA” is active, which is presumably the cause of his telepathic powers.
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More importantly, the extraterrestrial virus DNA is active in his genome, meaning that
its genes have been switched on:
Mulder: I don’t understand. He’s infected with the virus?
Scully: No. It’s a part of his DNA. In fact, it’s a part of all our DNA.
It’s called a genetic remnant. Inactive junk DNA. Except in Gibson’s
it’s turned on.
Mulder: If that’s true, it’d mean the boy is in some part extraterrestrial.
Scully: It would mean we all are. (“The Beginning”)
Far from merely witnessing the collapse of “us/them” thinking, Mulder and
Scully are faced with the task of abandoning long-held distinctions between self and
other. Mulder’s own DNA is activated at one point, rendering him for a short time what
had earlier been called an alien/human hybrid, with abilities similar to Gibson’s.10 In
Cancer Man’s words, “He is what he sought” (“Sixth Extinction II: Amor Fati”). Scully,
too, having been infected at least once with what we will now refer to as the alien
retrovirus,11 has the potential to develop abilities like Gibson’s. Thus, in perhaps the
ultimate irony, Mulder and Scully are the X-Files. While the heroes of The Cobra Event
set themselves up as the foes of hybridity and the keepers of an unsullied America with
only the biohazard suit’s illusory barrier to protect them from the chimeric virus, Mulder
and Scully actually become hybrid in their search for the truth. Even as their bodies
visibly revert to more or less normal states, we are continually reminded of their
compromised condition. A (retro)virus is forever. Here we see a glimpse of the virus’s
potential as a utopian signifier, as it can endow the infected with extrasensory perception
and other, less apparent powers, all of which may be considered advantageous from an
evolutionary standpoint. Suddenly, the virus gets a make-over–it is no longer the
frightening oil that gives people black eyes, makes them do inexplicable things, and
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knocks them up. Rather, it is now something that is and has always been a part of us.
What Mulder and Scully’s experiences show us is that we are already posthuman.
Hybridity in The X-Files, however, does not lead to mutual understanding and
sympathy between human and alien. Rather, as in Preston, the very prospect of
hybridity is horrifying, as it links humans with aliens that have been depicted throughout
the series as both vicious and unfathomable. The alien within us is still that which will
destroy us. In other words, that scary enduring Other is still firmly in place, despite the
show’s challenges to human/alien identity. The very notion that hybridity is the result of
a kind of viral infection, for instance, has the effect of emphasizing such difference.
Haraway, writing of the alienation that results from viewing components of the body’s
immune system in electron micrographs, remarks that “We seem invaded not just by the
threatening ‘non-selves’ that the immune system guards against, but more fundamentally
by our own strange parts” (Simians 223). In much the same way do the humans in The
X-Files find themselves “alienated” from their “own strange parts.” As for the alien
retrovirus, it can bestow upon humans superhuman powers, or, as in the case of the alien
births, render them obsolete. Either way, humans are expendable vessels, and they are
portrayed not only as victim of a kind of intergalactic rape, but also to a particularly
nasty sexually transmitted disease. In line with conspiracy number 9, HIV is a virus
from outer space, it seems.12
Infused in the ubiquitous black oil of The X-Files are anxieties about AIDS,
emerging viruses, cancer, bioweapons, and genetic manipulation, all of which are
superimposed over the traditional narrative of alien invasion.13 At the heart of these
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anxieties is the notion that humanity is responsible not only for the horrors of biowarfare
and the “ungodly” science of genetic manipulation, but also for the unleashing of socalled exotic killer viruses and AIDS. It is no wonder, then, that much of the discourse
surrounding the alien retrovirus is couched in the epidemiology of autoimmune disease.
However much The X-Files alien embodies that idea of the dangerous, unknowable
Other, mirrored in the malicious gleam of its large, ovoid eye is the knowledge that we
have only ourselves to blame. The alien represents the making of our own apocalypse.
In The X-Files, the balance between invader and self is precariously preserved,
even as biological evidence points to its collapse. The “viral” government is portrayed
in much the same way, with the explicit demarcation between friend and foe
complicated by the fact that the two are in some senses interchangeable. As in The XFiles, humans in Greg Bear’s Darwin’s Radio have trouble coming to terms with the
idea that something within their own genome, in this case a renegade human endogenous
retrovirus (HERV), could be suddenly “activated” and consequently effect an
evolutionary transformation that renders “self,” or homo sapiens sapiens, obsolete.
Most people are resistant to the idea that SHEVA, the aptly named infectious HERV, is
“not a disease, but an upgrade” (196). Here we are truly within the realm of the
posthuman. As with The X-Files alien, SHEVA represents the making of our own
apocalypse. But while The X-Files is clearly ambivalent about the transformation of
humans through the agency of a virus capable of effecting both utter annihilation and
evolution, Bear suggests that the end of humanity as we know it is not necessarily a bad
thing, and that what rises to take its place is in many ways superior in terms of
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communication and social adaptability. Indeed, it is the threat of imminent apocalypse,
in Sontag’s sense of the term, that spurs the evolutionary change in the first place, as
molecular biologist Kaye Lang theorizes: “Too much stress could be a sign of
impending catastrophe. The twentieth century has been one long, frenetic catastrophe.
Let loose with a major change, something stored up in the genome, before the human
race fails” (196). What results is that SHEVA, or “Darwin’s Radio,” puts out a
frequency that changes humanity’s genetic channel, affecting women by seemingly
making them “spontaneously” pregnant. The women miscarry these fetuses, which have
severe genetic defects but serve to stimulate the formation of a second embryo by
ovulating before being miscarried. It is this second fetus that the mothers may carry to
term, an infant who can talk at birth and employs highly powerful pheromones in order
to communicate in a way far superior to that of her parents. However, the mothers and
their male partners (SHEVA only affects women who have steady male partners)
develop melanophores, or skin cells that change color, on their faces as well as other,
less obvious markers that equip them to communicate with these new children.
Bear’s novel owes much to the ideas posited in such science fiction as Arthur C.
Clarke’s Childhood’s End and Theodore Sturgeon’s More Than Human, which both
feature a new evolutionary stage for humans, leaving the majority of humanity in the
evolutionary lurch. At the same time, however, Darwin’s Radio could easily fall into
the category of “biological thriller,” made popular by Crichton, Cook, and others. In a
tongue-in-cheek acknowledgment of these influences, Bear has Director of the CDC
Mark Augustine–in the midst of the SHEVA crisis–reading a novel by Robin Cook
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“about the outbreak of a major and unexplained disease by a new kind of organism,
possibly from space” (349). Bear’s novel features the usual players–there are virus
hunters, research scientists, biotechnology corporations, the CDC, the NIH, and the
WHO, as well as the rather confused fumblings of foreign governments that try to
contain and cover up their knowledge of SHEVA. One major difference between the
U.S. government portrayed in Bear’s novel and that in The X-Files is that the reactions
of the government to the SHEVA crisis are often muddled, hasty, and clearly not
orchestrated by a shadowy, tightly controlled Syndicate that operates behind the scenes.
The depiction is more similar to the way our government seems to work in reality, in
other words. Nevertheless, there are a number of vocal special interest groups that exert
pressure on the government. SHEVA represents unparalleled funding opportunities for
biotechnology corporations and agencies such as the CDC and the NIH, and the
scramble to convince Congress to allocate funds illustrates that not everyone is doing it
out of a sincere wish to cure the “disease.”14 Early in Bear’s novel, Augustine laments
the lack of American interest in world health: “There haven’t been any devastating
worldwide plagues, and Joe Sixpack never signed on to the whole Third World guilt
trip. People are getting bored with apocalypse” (70). Later, when it becomes clear that
SHEVA is a politically defensible crisis, he says that it’s “Better than polio, and
politically it’s a slam dunk, unlike AIDS” (111). Indeed, it is unlike AIDS, in that it is a
highly selective sexually transmitted disease; men are the primary vectors, but
homosexual men do not pass it to their partners. It is only transmitted from men to
women, and only over a long exposure. The subtext here is that homosexuals don’t
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evolve. The disease is also “unlike AIDS” in another sense: Africa has far fewer cases
than Asia or Europe or North America. Thus Bear gets to escape dealing with both
homosexuality and Africa, both uncomfortable topics for “Joe Sixpack.” Perhaps Bear
simply wanted to avoid casting Africa in the role of the reservoir for disease, but there is
an uncomfortable suggestion that since SHEVA stimulates human evolution, it certainly
would not originate in such a “primitive” place as Africa.
Exploited in The X-Files as laboratories for alien/human hybrids and then later
riddled with cancers as a result of these experiments, women’s bodies are also especially
vulnerable in Darwin’s Radio, as they bear the brunt of SHEVA, or “Herod’s flu.”
Aware that males serve as vectors, Kaye remarks pointedly to a male researcher, “You
make it, we get it, we suffer” (155). Herod’s flu for men is a “quick, forty-eight hour
sort of thing, when it happens at all” (171), whereas women are almost universally open
to infection. Tensions between women and men mount throughout the novel, as men
refuse to believe that their partners can become spontaneously pregnant. Violence
against women escalates, and thousands perish at their partners’ hands. In response,
women band together and force a separation of the sexes in hopes of preventing the
virus from spreading; they also resort to killing men, but their murders generally come
in the form of ritual sacrifice, in which a lone male is killed in order to atone for the
“sins” of his brothers. As fear among the population mounts, the religious right gains
ascendancy, much as it did in the early days of AIDS. The unborn children are
proclaimed to be the devil’s spawn, SHEVA itself is thought to be the hallmark of a kind
of “original sin,” and those who have SHEVA are required to register with the
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government, much like Jews in Nazi Germany.15 Paranoia, bigotry, and violence all
increase as the virus spreads: “We are falling apart into scared and unhappy tribes”
(308). In fact, the response of the U.S. government to the SHEVA outbreak differs little
from that of its counterparts in Eastern Europe and Russia: martial law is established,
pregnant women are sequestered, and their babies are taken away from them (ostensibly
for testing). At one point, the fervently Christian governor of Alabama assassinates the
president in order to prevent the announcement of the decision to allow all American
women a complete range of abortion measures. Bear makes it clear that in a biological
crisis, and despite the “hard science” approach of the CDC and the NIH to SHEVA, the
U.S. is crippled with old bigotries and suspicions, and only marginally better at taking
care of its own than the Eastern European governments that simply slaughter those with
SHEVA and consign them to mass graves. The hysterical response to the disease,
particularly in terms of the religious associations, is very clearly an echo of AIDS panic.
Women, in this case, bear the brunt of that response.
In the face of such uncertainty–nobody really knows how the babies will turn
out, as the only information available is considered to be rumor–and the passing of an
old world in which change on any scale could scarcely be considered fundamental,
people resort to comfortable absolutes to help them navigate the crisis. We see this
paralleled, of course, in the American public’s response to both the September 11th
terrorist attacks and the subsequent anthrax outbreaks. Religious fundamentalism,
Christian or otherwise, relies on rituals, which because of their antiquity and moral
content suggest the comforting continuity of the human experience that comes into
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question with the emergence of SHEVA. Distrustful of science’s ability to pose a
solution to what the majority of the population believes is a disease, Americans take
matters into their own hands, the chief result of which is a polarization of the sexes.
Kaye Lang, who is one of the few scientists who believes that SHEVA is not a disease,
but rather a “promoter” of evolution, takes the opposite tack; she does not try to avoid
her lover, but instead actively tries to induce the “spontaneous” pregnancy that other
women are trying to prevent. Like Scully, who attempts to find answers by analyzing
the effects of her “abduction” on her own body (and also examines the effects of the
alien virus on her immune system), Kaye also carefully monitors and studies her body,
believing that she can prove to the world that SHEVA is not a disease and that the birth
of these new children is, evolutionarily speaking, a natural event. Unlike Scully,
however, Kaye bridges the divide between work and family that often confronts the
woman scientist: “I once worried that work and family wouldn’t fit together. Now,
there’s no conflict. I am my own laboratory” (284). She believes that as a specialist in
retroviruses, she has the unique expertise that will be necessary to help bring the baby to
term. Even she, however, is daunted by the malformed and dead infants that women
around the world are giving birth to. What she and others discover is that while these
babies are ostensibly superior to their parents, they are also particularly vulnerable to
herpes infections, as well as to drugs administered during labor: “So delicate, these new
ones” (392).
Such startling vulnerability on the part of these “posthumans” allows us a more
complex perspective on humanity’s upgrade–it is clear that those who replace us are not
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exactly superhumans. And there are, initially, very few of them as a result of their
fragility: about 100,000 in the United States. Nor does evolution come without a price.
In some cases, the activation of SHEVA causes other recurrences of old retroviruses,
some of which are fatal to humans. Bear’s Mother Nature resembles Preston’s
enigmatic one: “Nature was never other than two-faced about her gifts” (414). Shifty,
indecisive feminine stereotypes aside, the picture of human evolution that Bear presents
is perhaps more believable because it is not presented as an unparalleled good, but is
instead a rather messy process in which our genes struggle to find the right “channel”
that will enable them to make the leap from human to posthuman.
Far from seeking to distance herself from the Other, which the new children and
their transformed parents represent, Kaye charges full steam ahead, nearly overriding
her lover’s wishes in her quest to prove SHEVA’s true purpose. When their baby Stella
is born, Mitch cannot help but be repelled by the baby’s alienness, especially after she
speaks to him: “The hair rose on the back of his neck . . . . He shivered. The infant
resting on Kaye’s breast seemed for a moment more than he could stand; not just
unexpected, but wrong. He wanted to run” (394). He is also unsettled by his own
“otherness,” as he begins to develop the facial mask that is a hallmark of SHEVA: “
‘I’m not sure how I see things anymore. . . . Having your body jerked around by nature
is sobering. Women experience it more directly, but this has got to be a first for men’ ”
(372). Perhaps, indeed, women are so accustomed to the idea that their bodies become,
in a sense, alien to them when they undergo pregnancy that they are in a position to
accept the new evolutionary changes in a way that men are not. On the other hand,

104

many women are terrified of the “other” that resides in their uterus, especially after they
see the malformed “sister” that precedes the second fetus. What guarantee is there, after
all, that an alien baby won’t leap out from their wombs, murdering their mothers in the
process? It is only Kaye, with faith in her own belief of SHEVA as an evolutionary
mechanism, who is determined enough to face the fear of the unknown.
Kaye’s determination perhaps stems in part from her understanding of other
“friendly” viruses called bacteriophages. That we hear about her work with
bacteriophages relatively early in the novel sets the stage for her later perspective on
SHEVA, a virus that is not simply pathogenic. In the first few chapters, we find Kaye
at the Eliava Institute of Bacteriophage, Microbiology, and Virology in the Republic of
Georgia studying these viruses that attack and kill bacteria, which she and other
scientists believe could provide a solution to the U.S.’s losing war against strains of
bacteria resistant to antibiotics: “Half the pharmaceutical and medical companies in the
United States are making pilgrimages here. Georgia’s expertise could save millions”
(29). If a certain strain of bacteria does mutate, then so does the phage designed to kill
it. Further antibiotics are not necessary. Indeed, it is surprising that the United States
has not taken advantage of the phage therapy that scientists in Georgia were
administering as early as the 1920s. Phage therapy in the United States is in the nascent
stage, and no doubt pharmaceutical companies that manufacture antibiotics will not be
so eager to see that entire industry become obsolete. In its place, however, a new
industry devoted to generating phages (or the enzymes produced by phages) for
consumption could arise. Bear seems optimistic about this “new” therapy becoming
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widely adopted in the US, but the fact remains that the general population is not familiar
with phage therapy, much less bacteriophages. Although the idea is alien to us,
Georgian and Russian troops, as Bear recounts, actually carried vials filled with phages:
“They swallowed them if they were going into battle, or sprayed them on wounds or
burns before they could get to hospital” (30). Americans consider theirs the most
medically advanced society in the world, and yet a country commonly considered to be a
backwater and tainted with Soviet influence has for decades used a “medicine” far more
effective than any antibiotic currently on the market. Today, physicians in Russia
commonly use phages to treat patients. Bear’s reminder that lethal bioweapons and
leaky nuclear plants are not Russia’s only legacy to the world is a timely one, but it is
likely that phage therapy will have to take a backseat to the scientific establishment’s
response to bioweapons, just as Kaye shelves her work on phages once the SHEVA
crisis hits. But what Bear posits in Darwin’s Radio is significant in terms of viewing
the virus as a positive force–i.e. phage therapy really does exist and it really does
work–and as a transformative agent that can effect changes in the human body that are
not outside the realm of possibility.
In the previous chapter, the works under examination posit the virus as an
unambiguous enemy; the notion of hybridity is explored, but only in relation to the
addition of a special perniciousness to the virus, as with the chimeric Cobra. Human
foes are equally unambiguous, ranging from the Iraquis in The Cobra Event to the
power-hungry military generals in Outbreak.16 And in The Hot Zone, the Ebola virus
itself stars as the antagonist, a deadly pathogen that nevertheless incites rhapsodizing by
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scientists who speak of its “purity” and “coldness.” There are no utopian aspects to the
viruses or to viral outbreaks; all of these works focus on individuals valiantly attempting
to restore the status quo. In the universe of The X-Files, the status quo includes the
acknowledgment that humans will be subjected to alien invasion and domination, and
that the government is simultaneously working with and against these aliens. Mulder,
Scully, the Syndicate, and a host of other characters work to fight against the
inevitability of human subjugation; hence the movie’s motto “Fight the Future.” If they
choose to do nothing, the aliens will win. And yet, for all their efforts to avoid the
various entrapments set for them, Mulder and Scully both fall prey to the alien
retrovirus, which may or may not be lethal. What the two do learn is that while the virus
is the representative of the Other in the form of some rather unfriendly aliens, it is also
inseparable from who they are as human beings. There is no clear demarcation between
self and non-self, just as there is no way to interpret the virus–paradoxically called
“Purity”–as either inherently destructive or potentially utopian. The X-Files confounds
any reading that tries to impose the “end-all, be-all” interpretation of what the “truth”
really is.
In Darwin’s Radio, the utopian aspects of the virus are more clearly highlighted,
and the virus is not complicated with an alien, or extraterrestrial, association. However,
humans do react with horror to the radical change that their species undergoes; like
Mulder and Scully, they find themselves alienated from their “own strange parts.” And
like Purity, the effects of SHEVA are unpredictable, but it is clear that this change is
meant to benefit the species as a whole, something that cannot be said of the mercurial
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virus of The X-Files. What is comforting for the denizens of Bear’s world, which is
very much like our own, is the fact that there is a precedent for this kind of sudden
evolution: scientists find evidence of SHEVA in the remains of a Neanderthal couple
who apparently gave birth to a Cro-Magnon child. SHEVA, like Purity, is ancient, and
an integral part of the human genome. In Bear and in The X-Files, the self/non-self
construction cannot hold, suggesting both the integration of body and pathogen that
Matzinger and others posit, and pointing toward an understanding of the virus as a
necessary, and even beneficial, part of “self.”
If science fiction writers utilize viral metaphors in potentially liberating ways,
then perhaps it is not surprising that the virus figures so powerfully in science fiction
written by women, particularly those women writers who see their goal as
problematizing traditional notions of gender. In these texts the characters' gender may
be complicated by the virus in ways that point to the liberatory possibilities of the
posthuman, but the gendering of the virus itself may be inverted in ways that point to a
similar liberation. For instance, the virus's invader status can be rewritten in ways that
do not imply the typical rape of the body, but rather an empowerment of the human
(woman) host. As we have seen in The X-Files and in Darwin’s Radio, women
characters like Scully and Kaye Lang succumb to viruses–both of whom become
mothers following infection–but while many women can see no way out of their
predicament, neither of these women allow themselves to become “victims.” Rather, as
good scientists, they try to learn as much as possible about the virus by observing its
effects on their bodies and conducting experiments, Kaye even admitting “I am my own
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laboratory” (284). This knowledge, of course, affords them a certain power. The texts
that I examine in the next chapter go one step further in empowering their women
characters: they suggest that empowerment is the direct result of viral infection, not
simply the knowledge that allows them to understand it. As Schell observes, the
frequently marginalized characters populate science fiction often benefit from viral
infection, which allows them to assume a newly empowered position that is in effect a
reversal of the status quo. The women writers in Chapter Four take this notion as their
starting point, utilizing the virus as a utopian agent: “Infection becomes instead a door
opening onto a possible new future of community and inclusion" (Schell 123). Of
course, as we will see, community and inclusion in these texts sometimes comes at a
very steep price–namely the obliteration of the human male.
NOTES
1. Perhaps it will come as no surprise that at the time that Chris Carter was developing
the show’s mythology, he consulted virologist Anne Simon, who went on to advise him
about matters of biology throughout the series’ run. Simon has since written about her
experiences in The Real Science Behind The X-Files (1999).
2. To Jeanne Cavelos, author of The Science of The X-Files (1998), the behavior of the
virus more closely resembles that of a wormlike parasite than of any known virus: “Yet
as far as we have been shown, the black cancer does not act like a virus at all. While a
virus is a parasite of a cell, invading it and using it to reproduce, the black cancer is a
parasite of the body, traveling through it, feeding off it, and creating widespread effects”
(145).
3. It should be pointed out that the bees used for delivery of the virus are “Africanized”
honeybees, matching the Africanization of the vehicle for dissemination of the Cobra
virus. As with Cobra, the Russians are intimately involved with Purity, and it is they
who ultimately create the vaccine for it. The Syndicate, like Archimedes, “merely
sharpened the edge of the weapon.” The true origin of the virus–extraterrestrials–simply
adds another layer of “othering” upon it.
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4. During Scully’s abduction, she is apparently exposed to an extraterrestrial virus,
though perhaps not the same virus that she later contracts through the bee sting. This
virus, which matches the virus in (chimeric hybrid) cells extracted from ice cores which
allegedly entombed extraterrestrial bodies, is believed by Scully to be the cause of the
nasopharyngeal cancer that she develops after her abduction (“Redux”).
5. It is believed that, using gene-mapping technology, future weapons will be designed
to target characteristics specific to a particular race or ethnicity by.
6. In “The Rebirth of the Clinic,” Linda Bradley draws on Foucault’s analysis of the
modern medical perspective in The Birth of the Clinic to examine what she sees as the
alienation of the subject from the body, which produces a view of the body as fantastic:
“Remythologized, biological innerspace has become thoroughly fantastic . . . . The XFiles projects a vision of the body ‘opened up’ since the birth of the clinic, a new ‘inner’
fantasy space in which a new myth, at once vitalistic and necrophilic, is trying to be
born”(155-157). The alien, Bradley asserts, “is found in or relation to the body” (148),
an observation that is reminiscent of Emily Martin’s analysis of electron micrographs,
which depict the various “invaders” and “defenders” of the body writ large in high
gloss: “As depictions of the body, micrographs show microscopic entities radically
decontextualized from the context of the body . . . . The depictions in micrographs are
so decontextualized that they could be anything at all, from jellyfish in the ocean deep,
to star wars in outer space” (Flexible Bodies 179). And yet, as Haraway notes, we are
compelled to acknowledge that, “The blasted scenes, sumptuous textures, evocative
colours, and ET monsters of the immune landscape are simply there, inside us” (Simians
222). The truth, as Bradley states so simply, is “in there”–within the body.
7. “In most popular manifestations, aliens arrive on earth with their superior
technology, as though they possess some absolute knowledge; but on The X-Files, as in
numerous novels and movies, their abductions, intrusive physical exams, artificial
impregnations, and apocalyptic attacks suggests that they are either fumbling their way
through inductive experiments (which have little point except as projections of human
fears and desires), or, like juvenile delinquents, simply trashing the place” (Markley 94).
8. Kritschgau: The U.S. Military saw a good thing in '47 when the Roswell story broke.
The more we denied it, the more people thought it was true. A made-to-order cover story
for generals looking to develop the national war chest. They opened official
investigations with names like Grudge, Twinkle, Project Blue Book, Majestic 12. They
brought in college professors and Congressmen and fed them enough bogus facts and
fuzzy pictures and eyewitness accounts that they believed it, too. . . . I can't tell you
how fortuitous it was. Do you know when the first supersonic flight was, Agent Mulder?
1947. Soon every experimental aircraft being flown was a UFO sighting. When the
abduction stories started up, it was too perfect. We almost got caught in Korea, an
ambitious misstep. China and the Soviets knew it. . . . It was developmental then,
nothing like what we and the Russians have now. The bio-weapons used in the Gulf War
were so ingenious as to be almost undetectable (“Redux”).
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9. For Kellner, however, it is not clear whether the series as a whole actually
undermines or subverts dominant ideologies and institutions: “the use of the occult and
the paranormal may promote irrationalism and deflect critical attention from the actual
events, structures, and personalities of history, substituting paranoia and conspiracy for
real crimes carried out by the ruling elite and reducing history to the production of
cartoon-like conspiratorial figures” (173).
10. It is not clear, however, why the virus can induce gestation in some instances, and
extrasensory perception in others. Mutation is the explanation put forth by members of
the Syndicate for the reason why the virus’s behavior had changed (X-Files: The
Movie).
11. Retroviruses are capable not only of residing within human DNA for years, but also
of chemically manipulating the human immune system to their advantage.
12. Not surprisingly, perhaps, this was just one of many theories proposed on the
virus’s origin in the mid-80s: In 1986, British astronomers Sir Fred Hoyle and Chandra
Wickramasinghe announced that the AIDS virus came from outer space (Garrett 383).
13. These anxieties are not always presented in relation to extraterrestrials. “The Pine
Bluff Variant,” for example, features Mulder and Scully’s investigations into a militia
group that tests the effects of a bioweaponized strain of the streptococcus bacterium
(better known as the “flesh-eating bacteria”) on random people. The episode is clearly
responding to post-Cold War fears about domestic terrorism, airing just months after the
anthrax scare involving Larry Wayne Harris. The alien conspiracy episodes, however,
are far and away the series’ most popular installments. Markley reads anxieties about
alien invasion in terms of fears about the mushrooming effects of ecological damage:
“Rather than the clumsy plastic parasites of the 1950's, The X-Files traffics in genetic
subversion, the recodings of DNA that are conflated with the metastasizing corruptions
of manmade toxins, pollutants, and waste. If the alien is a projection of human
rapaciousness that must be controlled in order for civilization to survive, the threat
posed by the efforts to breed alien-human hybrids . . . incarcerates anxieties about the
dissolution of embodied identity as a consequence of the ecological devastation caused
by competition for scarce resources” (96).
14. One can see parallels between the response to SHEVA and the anthrax attacks, the
latter of which snowballed into a frenzy of government spending on vaccinations for
both anthrax and smallpox.
15. We might remember here what now seems a bizarre response to the AIDS crisis:
William F. Buckley’s suggestion that those with HIV be tattooed so that they might be
easily identified by the masses.
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16. Outbreak, like The X-Files, relies on a conspiracy involving military misdeeds, but
those who perpetrate these deeds are exposed and punished by “good”Americans who
buck the system.
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CHAPTER FOUR
TO DEVOUR AND TRANSFORM:
VIRAL METAPHORS IN SCENCE FICTION BY WOMEN1
Once it was so: now is man lord of the creation? Look at him–ha! I see plague! She has invested his
form, is incarnate in his flesh, has entwined herself with his being, and blinds his heaven-seeking eyes.
–Mary Shelley, The Last Man
So far as the “plague” still has a future as a metaphor, it is through the ever more familiar notion of the
virus.
–Susan Sontag, AIDS and Its Metaphors

The X-Files and Darwin’s Radio suggest that we cannot view ourselves as
separate from the virus, challenging the central orthodoxy of the self/non-self
immunological model; these works mirror the efforts of contemporary immunologists to
challenge the model, and they go one step further, calling humanity itself into question.
Viruses change our perception of who we are, The X-Files and Darwin’s Radio claim,
but these works also illustrate that the very real changes that viruses effect in us are,
though unsolicited, no more alien to us than our own bodies. The problem, of course, is
that we are alienated from “our own strange parts”; however, this alienated position may
serve as a strategy for calling into question traditionally held notions about humanity.
The virus, then, allows us a unique, perhaps even defamilarizing perspective on our
subject position. In the texts that I examine in this chapter, the challenge to our ideas
about what it means to be human is itself a strategy for calling into question our notions
about gender.
Like those in the previous chapter, these texts also embrace an apocalyptic
vision which, in the end, results in a posthumanity that is only possible in the wake of
the destruction and transformation that the virus brings about. For these writers,

1
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however, the utopian promise of the virus is figured primarily in terms of gender.
Infection affords female characters benefits ranging from an alternative to the
(patriarchal) status quo to greater mental agility. In other words, women in particular
are privileged and empowered by viral infection; their male counterparts don’t always
fare as well. The empowerment of women in these texts, however, is not wholly
unproblematic–the terms of empowerment sometimes bring with them consequences
that link women even more firmly with their reproductive capabilities, reinforcing an
essential femininity. If one of the goals of this fiction is to problematize our notions of
the human subject, which has been prefigured as male, then to equate "woman"–even a
posthuman one–with her sexual or reproductive functions reinscribes the same gender
binary that these ideologically fissured texts presumably attempt to disrupt. We might
simply see essentialism as the result of the deliberate attempt to appropriate the
voracious, destructive femininity associated with the virus that we see in works like The
Hot Zone, but to appropriate the virus in hopes of both draining away the negativity of
these metaphorical attachments and employing it to construct new meanings is a dubious
undertaking, as it runs the risk of perpetuating a stereotypical femininity. The virus
may enable posthumanism and potential utopia, but can it enable a depiction of gender
that eschews essentialist notions of womanhood? To answer this question, I trace here a
genealogy of science fiction texts by women that feature both viruses and virus-like
forms and women whose lives are transformed by them. Spanning four decades, the
following works depict these pathogens as agents of permanent change: Katherine
MacLean's "Contagion," (1950), Joanna Russ's "When It Changed" (1972) and The
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Female Man (1975), Octavia Butler's Clay's Ark (1984), and Nicola Griffith's Ammonite
(1992). Preceding my analysis of these texts, however, is an examination of what is
arguably the first text in this tradition, Mary Shelley’s The Last Man (1826). I include it
here not only to historicize its fictional descendants, which, like the novel, are
speculative, composed by women, and feature an agent of bodily dissolution, but also to
illustrate the long-standing association of the feminine and the primitive with disease.
Shelley’s “Plague,” which, like Preston’s Ebola and Cobra, is personified, would not be
out of place in a contemporary viral narrative; indeed, the Plague surpasses even Ebola
in terms of pure voracity.
Long before Richard Preston gendered the Ebola virus female, Mary Shelley
imbued the futuristic Plague in her novel The Last Man (1826) with feminine
characteristics. Like Preston’s Ebola, Shelley’s Plague is African and snake-like: “This
enemy to the human race had begun early in June to raise its serpent-head on the shores
of the Nile” (127). The Plague is as lethal as Ebola Zaire, ravaging the earth’s
population and leaving only the English narrator, Lionel Verney, alive to tell his story in
the “last year of the world,” 2100. There is, of course, no one left to read it in Verney’s
time, but in the present-day of the 19th century, an unnamed and ambiguously gendered
“author” who visits the cave of the Cumaean Sibyl in Rome finds Verney’s tale among
the leaves of a prophecy, and sets about trying to piece it together. The manuscript is
the result of these efforts. Thus the narrative does find an audience, suggesting that
humanity’s bleak fate might possibly be avoided.1 Unlike most contemporary plague
narratives, however, Shelley’s novel is not timid in envisioning the end of the human
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species–no heroic measures save the victims of the “Queen of the World” (252). As Lee
Sterrenberg observes, “Utopian hopes prove futile in The Last Man because nature is
impervious to human will and human rationality” (335). Shelley thus presents a much
more radical account of the plague than even the most frightening Ebola scenarios; she
poses an end to everything. Her apocalyptic vision extends beyond Bear’s in Darwin’s
Radio and even Chris Carter’s in The X-Files, both of whom suggest humanity will
continue in some form. And Shelley’s “Mother Nature” is arguably even more cruel and
unforgiving than Preston’s. One wonders if contemporary authors are reluctant to
envision the end of humanity simply because apocalyptic thinking, as Sontag points out,
has come to be ordinary and unremarkable; we, as denizens of the nuclear, AIDS, and
biowarfare era, can only too well imagine an apocalypse that Shelley herself might have
found fantastic. It is much safer, though still thrilling, to teeter on the edge than it is to
topple over, as Shelley does.
Anne Mellor, who claims that The Last Man is the first English example of
apocalyptic fiction, notes that the novel is very much in line with current attitudes about
apocalypse, particularly in the wake of millennial anxiety. She credits Shelley with
introducing “a powerful image that in recent years has increasingly dominated our
cultural consciousness: the image of history as a narrative that reaches an abrupt and
final conclusion, whether by biological epidemic (cancer, AIDS), chemical warfare,
invasion from outer space, or nuclear holocaust” (Mellor xxii). And yet, as we have
seen, while this image is evoked in numerous contemporary viral narratives, it is
exceedingly rare to find a text in which humanity is completely obliterated.
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In Shelley’s future, there can not only be no return to the status quo, as in many
contemporary narratives, but there can be no such thing as the concept of status quo,
once human agency and identity die with Verney.
Like the virus, the Plague is perceived as a mysterious and insidious force.
Constructed by Verney as Other in terms of race, geography, and gender, its cause
cannot be divined, nor its mode of transmission. For critics, it is a particularly fruitful
symbol, lending itself to a variety of interpretations. It has been read variously as a form
of literary revenge, “an allegory that enacts Shelley’s sublimated indignation at the
patriarchal formations of self, gender, and language” (Goldsmith 154); an instance of
“the return of the repressed” as “the eruption of pent-up female discontents” (Aaron 17);
and as a deconstructive practice. The use of “sublimated” and “repressed” here suggests
that Shelley, who championed the structure of the traditional family in many of her
writings–perhaps in response to her own family’s unconventionality–somehow
unconsciously subverts the patriarchal tradition of her day. The novel itself has been
read as a roman à clef, representing Shelley’s attempt to come to terms with both Percy
Shelley and Lord Byron in the characters of Adrian, Earl of Windsor, and of Lord
Raymond. Neither of these characters dies of Plague; nevertheless it is tempting to read
in their deaths and the effects of the Plague a kind of exorcism on Shelley’s part, in
which she dismantles the patriarchy through the agency of the female Plague and of the
novel, a genre considered at the time to be most suited to women, as poetry was to men.
Indeed, feminist critics tend to read The Last Man as a critique of the bourgeois family
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and the 19th century reception of the female artist. Shelley’s literary heirs, who are also
concerned with issuing a challenge to patriarchy, frequently go one step beyond
dismantling it. Employing the virus for creative/transformative ends in addition to
destructive ends, they suggest that something beneficial can arise out of the ruins of the
patriarchy. Often the bourgeois family is indeed destroyed, but it is replaced by
something considered to be superior in the context of these works: a community.
In assigning the Plague a gender, Shelley appropriates a certain voracious
femininity associated with destroyer/goddess figures. And it is not only the narrating
Verney who perceives it as female; Adrian also attributes a kind of goddess-like stature
to it: “I have hung on the wheel of the chariot of plague; but she drags me along with it,
while, like Juggernaut, she proceeds crushing out the being of all who strew the high
road of life” (289). Interestingly, the Juggernaut, traditionally figured as the incarnation
of Vishnu, is here identified in the feminine; it would seem that Vishnu has ceded his
place to Kali as lord of the world. For Verney, however, the Plague is the ultimate ice
queen: “She abdicated her throne, and despoiled herself of her imperial sceptre among
the ice rocks that surrounded us. She left solitude and silence co-heirs of her kingdom”
(310). We find the echo of these remarks in The Hot Zone, where Karl Johnson claims
that looking at Ebola in The Hot Zone is “like looking at a gorgeously wrought ice
castle. The thing is so cold. So totally pure” (122). Maligned, voiceless, and
destructive, the characteristics of the Plague are evidence of its Other status.
Anticipating the rhetoric of the virus, Shelley “recognized that the medical
characterization of disease is always based on prior and deeply entrenched cultural
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ideologies” (Mellor xxii). Unlike the virus, however, it cannot be subjugated by the
methods of Western medical science.
It is remarkable, in fact, how closely the rhetoric of emerging viruses or AIDS
resembles that of the Plague. Audrey Fisch reads the novel within the context of AIDS,
noting Verney’s tendency to rhapsodize about Europe’s relative safety from the foreign
invader in terms of its moral and cultural superiority: “Child of the sun and nursling of
the tropics, it would expire in these climes. It drinks the dark blood of the inhabitant of
the south, but it never feasts on the pale-faced Celt” (169); “The cleanliness, habits of
order, and the manner in which our cities were built, were all in our favour” (178). In
other words, savages may become the victims of the Plague, but civilized Christians
may not. This is suggestive of early American attitudes about HIV’s “infiltration” of the
U.S., which contend that the country succumbed to the virus because it had grown
“soft,” or morally lax. In The Last Man, this notion is borne out; as Kate Ellis observes,
“on the political level, Constantinople and Greece, the cradle of civilization as the
characters in the novel understand it, is now ‘infected’ with Turkish infidels while the
domain of personal life has been equally ‘infected’ by the extramarital liaisons of
Raymond, England’s Lord Protector” (225). In this reading, Lord Raymond, leader of
the Greek revolution and presumably based on Lord Byron, is a man who cannot control
his passions, and consequently all of Europe suffers for it.2 Similarly, those who cannot
control their unseemly or even ‘unnatural’ passions–i.e. homosexuals–are perceived as
particularly susceptible to AIDS.
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Primitives, too, are dangerous in this respect–because they are non-Christian
savages, chastity and restraint cannot be expected of them. Africa offers an attractive
scapegoat in this regard: “Africa as the imaginary locus of both the origins of life and
the endemic primitive could easily serve as the ideal metaphoric source of dangerous
predators” (Schell 102). Indeed, Verney himself contracts the Plague from what we
might call a “representative” of Africa, in a passage that bears quoting at length:
It was quite dark; but, as I stept within, a pernicious scent assailed my
senses, producing sickening qualms, which made their way to my very
heart, while I felt my leg clasped, and a groan repeated by the person who
held me. I lowered my lamp, and saw a negro half clad, writhing under
the agony of disease, while he held me in a convulsive grasp. With
mixed horror and impatience I strove to disengage myself, and fell on the
sufferer; he wound his naked festering arms around me, his face was
close to mine, and his breath, death-laden, entered my vitals. (245)
Such a close embrace with the Other would seem to spell doom for Verney, but he is in
fact the only character who contracts, recovers, and becomes immune to the Plague.
Mellor sees this episode as a possible alternative to the novel’s narrative of universal
destruction. She asks, “Can we see in this episode a suggestion that if one were forced
to embrace the Other rather than be permitted to define it exclusively as ‘foreign’ and
‘diseased,’ one might escape this socially constructed plague?” (Mellor xxiv). She
notes, too, that the fact that Verney’s tale finds an audience might lend support to this
notion, as humans might be able to avoid their own fate by ceasing to see the “foreign”
as maleficent. Here again, Kristeva’s words on what we define as the foreign are
particularly apt: “By recognizing our uncanny strangeness we shall neither suffer from it
nor enjoy it from the outside” (290). In the end, Verney leaves Europe in hopes of
finding a companion, setting sail for Africa and India. At last, he finally seems willing
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to get beyond the bubble that is Europe by venturing into the lands of the Other for
reasons different from those of waging war, as in the Greek attack of Constantinople.
The narrative ends, however, before he begins his journey, thus leaving it up to the
reader to imagine who or what he may encounter.
While contemporary depictions of the virus are startlingly similar to Shelley’s
depiction of the Plague, they tend to assume a gendered rhetoric that may just as easily
be masculine as it is feminine. As illustrated in Chapters One and Two, militaristic
metaphors are perhaps even more commonly used to describe the virus than those of the
goddess/destroyer, reinforcing patriarchal views of the “enemy.” Constructed as a
phallic invader that penetrates the host cell, inserts its own genetic material, and forces
the cell to produce more viruses, the virus engages in revolutionary strategies from
within. Cool and calculating, this masculine virus has much in common with its “ice
queen” counterpart. It does not, however, mirror the more savage or primitive aspects of
the female African invader; the militaristic agent more closely resembles that of the
communist infiltrator, as Chapter Two illustrates. Whether figured in traditionally
masculine or feminine terms, of course, the gendering of the virus reflects our collective
obsession with the Other. The distinguishing characteristic of this particular Other is
that it threatens radical change through destruction. "Indeed, `virus' is now a synonym
for change" (Sontag 69). It is this notion that Shelley’s fictional descendants adopt and
employ in a number of different ways, all of which attempt to challenge conventional
notions about gender and sex.

121

In MacLean's "Contagion," a story in which human explorers attempt to colonize
a planet that has already been colonized by earlier humans, the "contagion" is the
vehicle for both radical physical transformation and a certain kind of biological
adaptability. Variously referred to as the plague or the melting sickness, it is an
evolutionary virus that allows its hosts to adapt to their alien environment. Created by a
long-dead scientist whose primary goal was to preserve the alien ecology of the planet
Minos, the virus enables its host to digest the planet's vegetation and animal life.
Adaptability comes at a price, however; those whose cells are devoured and transformed
by the renegade phagocytes (types of white blood cells) all look alike. That is, the
phagocytes of the "alien" Pat Mead, who is the descendant of the original colonists, are
contagious to the new male human colonists; they attach themselves to hosts,
commandeer cells, and replicate new phagocytes. Here, phagocytes, which normally
engulf and digest invading viruses, adopt a "virulence" of their own. As the scientists in
the story discover, the process is similar to that of the leukemia virus's3 method of
infection, which transforms rather than destroys the cells it infects. The characters
exposed to these phagocytes, then, undergo a bodily transformation that renders them
identical to the original carrier, Pat Mead.
By putting those infected in "regeneration tanks" that the colonists planned to
use for regrowing diseased organs and encouraging healing among their numbers, the
women are able to save the men from melting altogether. In other words, the women
offer up artificial wombs that serve to protect the men until they can be “reborn.” The
men’s bodies literally dissolve and regrow in the tanks' nutrient solution, emerging "All
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horribly–and handsomely–the same" (53). The original carrier, a tall, blue-eyed, redhaired white male, is a "perfect" human specimen; he is the envy of the male colonists
and an object of desire for the female colonists. His female counterpart, his sister
Patricia, is equally handsome, but she becomes an object of horror for the female
colonists, who find themselves faced with the choice of whether to become other ("But
we'd be changed! . . . I don't want to be somebody else!" [57]) or to remain outmoded
humans on a world that is not only not amenable to their needs, but actively hostile to
the "difference" their bodies constitute. Initially introduced by an outside source, the
phagocytes have since been assimilated into the planet's ecological system, making the
cells themselves excellent colonists. The would-be human colonists become the
colonized.
The story, which details the encounter between scientists who land on Minos
with the hope of colonizing the planet and the colonists who already inhabit it, is one
which explores the ability of the virus to challenge traditional notions of identity. The
men are transformed first, with individual personalities left intact, and the women are
left to ensure the men's survival and to decide whether or not they will allow themselves
to be transformed into facsimiles of Patricia. In the end, they do choose to adapt, but it is
June, the main character, who makes the decision for them. The women vote not to
allow the inevitable transformation, and June, who herself already resembles Pat and
Patricia, overrides their wishes. We might say here (uncharitably) that June has the least
to lose; the other women are horrified by what they perceive as a complete loss of
identity, and even June thinks to herself that "the mind and the body are inseparable; the
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shape of a face is part of the mind" (58). The question posed by the story, then, is quite
clear: how much does what we look like determine who we are? The virus plays a
central role here in highlighting how the colonists' reactions to difference in appearance
splits along gender lines, an idea I will return to later.
Certainly the transformation does not obliterate all differences between the
humans, and it should be noted that the sexes are preserved; Adrienne Rich’s notion of
“compulsory heterosexuality” is the norm here. But the contagion in the story is
responsible for genocide at a cellular level, allowing only identical cells to exist and
transforming all "other" cells. In other words, the cells are themselves engaged in
colonialist strategies. However, since the phagocytes only seek out other human hosts,
which are alien to the planet Minos to begin with, there is a sense that the planet itself is
not unduly affected by their presence. And, due to the deadliness of the "melting
sickness," which claims the lives even of those who pilot the colonists' original ship, the
surviving Meads are left stranded on the planet without any access to the technology
with which they planned to adapt the planet to their own uses. Pat Mead describes
himself as "a hunter and bridge carpenter" (21), an indication that after three generations
on Minos, the remaining colonists have not begun the process of industrialization. The
introduction of the contagion by humans, then, works in the planet's best interests. As
for the colonists, they have to learn how to adapt not only to their new, different bodies,
but also to the homogeneity of their new situation. The story's end does not suggest that
this process will be easy, particularly for the female colonists who, unlike the men, have
the luxury of choice in deciding whether or not transformation will occur.
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The contagion, though engaged in typically masculinist colonialist strategies,
does trouble the sexual hierarchy in the story. The female colonists, who seem to
function mainly as technicians despite training comparable to the males'–they do not
even know how to run the regeneration tanks by themselves–manage to save the day,
placing the men in tanks as soon as June directs them to do so. It is June, usually
working in the capacity of assistant alongside her fiancé in the laboratory, who figures
out that the contagion is actually a conglomeration of Pat Mead's cells, and it is June the
pediatrician and obstetrician who tends the womblike tanks while the men undergo the
process of transformation. The women, assuming traditional nurturing roles, give
(re)birth to a new multitude of Pat Meads–they alone have the power to determine the
outcome of the initial infection. It is the contagion that makes this assertion of female
dominance possible, as the men are incapacitated and thus rendered vulnerable. This
female dominance, however, is figuratively tied to the women's reproductive
capabilities, which serves to reinforce depictions of women as body-centered.
In MacLean's story, the description of the contagion's origins and method of
infection are a central feature of the text, whereas in Joanna Russ's "When It Changed,"
the plague or epidemic that wipes out the male population serves as background for the
action of the story. Only the barest details are provided–that half the population of the
planet Whileaway died in one generation. Over the next six hundred years, the survivors
develop a utopian society, one in which women "merge the ova" in order to reproduce.
The utopianism of this separatist lesbian society rests on the assumption that women are
in some ways superior to men; this is emphasized by the nature of the encounter
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between the Whileawayans and the men who come to the planet to renew relations with
them. The egalitarianism of Whileaway is thrown into relief by the men's calm sense of
superiority and their refusal to accept an all-female society as self-sufficient:
"Whileaway is still missing something .... Men must come back to Whileaway" (9).
Traditional notions of masculinity are here pitted against a superior femininity; as Sarah
Lefanu argues, "The story rests on a basis of essentialism: the women are great because
they are women, the men oppressive and horrible because they are men" (185). Not only
are the men "apes with human faces," but their amusement at what they perceive to be
the "masculine" characteristics that the women of Whileaway exhibit marks them as
uncomprehending sexist subhumans. Despite their lip service to sexual equality, they
seem surprised that women can, in fact, develop a functioning society on their own. The
attitude of the men is met by the Whileawayans with violence; one woman attempts to
shoot a man with a rifle. Such a reaction foreshadows the ensuing battle of the sexes in
Russ's The Female Man, in which the Whileawayans again make an appearance,
although not as the major perpetrators of violence against men. As readers we are meant
to sympathize with these women, who, by necessity, have eschewed sexual hierarchism.
That necessity is created by a disease–we are not told if it is fact viral in nature–and
although the humans in this story do not undergo the radical physical transformation of
MacLean's colonists, the plague does act as an agent of societal transformation, enabling
the women survivors a measure of empowerment and the opportunity to develop a
society without the built-in structures of the patriarchy. The women's bodies, then, are
figuratively inscribed by the plague. In MacLean's story, the contagion enables
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adaptability in the biological sense; in Russ, the plague enables adaptability on a social
scale, while also providing a challenge to compulsory heterosexuality.
Tempting as it may be to read it as such, Russ’s The Female Man is not an
extension of “When It Changed”; the two works are autonomous. In the novel, Russ
gives us a more developed Whileaway with a only a few more details about the
plague–exact dates on the Whileaway calendar–and the possibility that perhaps it did not
happen at all. Jael, one of the four narrators in the novel, informs Janet Evason of
Whileaway that the so-called "plague" is a myth that Janet's own ancestors passed down
to cover up what was a literal war between the sexes. In other words, the plague is
simply a rationalizing deception for the slaughter of the men. Jael, who inhabits a future
in which she battles against Manland, sees in Janet's history a clear connection with her
own:
That `plague' you talk of is a lie. 1 know. The world-lines around you are
not so different from yours or mine or theirs and there is no plague in any
of them, not any of them. Whileaway's plague is a big lie. Your ancestors
lied about it. It is I who gave you your `plague,' my dear, about which
you can now pietize and moralize to your heart's content . . . . I and the
war I fought built your world for you, I and those like me, we gave you a
thousand years of peace and love and the Whileawayan flowers nourish
themselves on the bones of the men we have slain. (211)
Janet, unconvinced, chooses to believe her ancestors' account, but Jael's hypothesis calls
into question the origins of contemporary Whileawayan culture. The plague is a rather
convenient vehicle for wiping men off the face of the planet, and the details provided are
so sketchy as to be somewhat suspect. That does not mean, however, that the plague in
“When It Changed” can also be written off as a lie, simply because it is proclaimed as
such in The Female Man.. Nevertheless, whether it is fiction or a reality, the plague
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functions as an agent for the establishment of a society in which women, as Lefanu puts
it, can be human (186). We might question, though, whether "human" is the proper
designation for the inhabitants of this society. That is, although the plague has no direct
bearing on their physical bodies, the inhabitants of Whileaway have evolved over thirty
generations into a self-sufficient species that does not require male input, either
biologically or socially. When one of the men asks Janet in "When It Changed" where
all the people are, she realizes that he does not mean people, but men, and that "he was
giving the word the meaning it had not had on Whileaway for six centuries" (7).
"Human" in this context, then, means "man," and because the Whileawayans have no
men among their numbers, they may be seen as something other than human. Posthuman
is a more accurate description, as it has the potential to transcend the difficulties present
in the designation of human.
If Whileawayans can be said to be posthuman, they are so by virtue of the
plague, fictional or not. Here it is the idea of the plague that is essential; the agent itself
is of secondary importance, which is perhaps another reason why Russ’s description of
it is rather vague. As a signifier, the plague connotes catastrophic and radical change; it
is necessary to achieve posthumanism, as it is necessary to achieve this feminist utopia.
But posthumanism in Whileaway is defined in opposition to "maleness," which is
hierarchical and misogynistic. That is, Whileawayans are posthuman because of biology
and their dislocation from Earth–they are superior to what now passes for human, as one
of the men admits: "As a people, we are not very bright .... There's been too much
genetic damage in the last few centuries. Radiation. Drugs" (8). In Russ's vision, men
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are destroyers, and women are creators, carrying within them the seeds of utopia. Here,
too, as in "Contagion," women are identified in essentialist terms. Still, the "change" that
occurs on Whileaway does benefit women, even if does so at the expense of men. The
Whileawayan posthuman, whom we view as recognizably female (and therefore human)
and as the result of the evolution of Woman-left-to-her-own-devices, has little use for
Man.4 Russ suggests that a genuine sense of community can only be attained by a
separation of the sexes, because she assumes that “femininity” is
communal/cooperative/collaborative, and thus clashes with hierarchical masculinity. Her
use of the plague enables the dismantling of the patriarchy (and the formation of
community), and in “When It Changed” and The Female Man, we can discern the
homage to Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s Herland (1915), which also posits a society in
which women exist and prosper without men. With the plague Russ offers the
possibility of futures in which humanity may be reimagined in ways that do
problematize notions of gender and sex, but in the end we are left with an essential
femininity in a posthuman guise, gender binaries firmly in place.
Disease in Octavia Butler's Clay's Ark enables a posthumanism of a more radical
kind; the extraterrestrial virus carried by explorers returning to Earth so completely
transforms human cells that the hosts produce beast-like quadruped children who have
increased sensory perception and mature faster than normal humans. As Donna J.
Haraway observes, "The offsprings' quadruped form archetypically marks them as the
Beast itself, but they are also the future of what it will mean to be human" (226).
Essentially, these are hybrid children, and, like the Meads on Minos, they will inherit the
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planet–in this case, the Earth. Unlike Pat Mead, however, the original carrier of the virus
in Butler's novel, Eli, is conscious of the organism's need to perpetuate itself and thus
attempts to isolate himself in a small community in order to avoid infecting others. He
notes that all of the changes caused by the virus–increased speed, strength, coordination,
sensory ability, and recuperative powers–are designed to keep him alive so that he can
facilitate the virus's replication. The process of infection resembles that of the melting
sickness in "Contagion": "The organism doesn't use cells up the way a virus does. It
combines with them, lives with them, changes them just a little. Eli says it's a symbiont,
not a parasite" (37). Such a description bears similarities to that of a retrovirus: "It
appears that when retroviruses infect a cell they can sometimes pick up a cellular gene
and incorporate it into the viral genome" (Scott 148). Retroviruses are capable not only
of residing within human DNA for years, but also of chemically manipulating the human
immune system to their advantage, much as the Clay's Ark organism does. It is tempting
to suggest here that Butler is making an AIDS analogy, both inverting the effects of the
disease by making the immune systems of the infected nearly invulnerable to other
pathogens, as well as retaining the dreadful, wasting aspects of the disease and
emphasizing the fragility of the newly infected. It appears, however, that Butler may
simply be unusually prescient, as the book was published just as the news of the “gay
plague” began to make headlines. In contrast, Bear, who also employs a retrovirus,
suggests that AIDS is passé, and that there are far more exciting things afoot in the field
of public health. As in "Contagion," infected people in Clay's Ark can die if certain
measures are not taken to ensure their survival, although there are no guarantees. Men
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appear less likely to survive than women, with young women having the best chance of
recovering from the initial onset of infection. Women, of course, are the progenitors of
the new species, so it is not surprising that young women, who are best suited to bearing
children, are privileged by the virus.
On the surface, humans in "Contagion" and Darwin’s Radio are recognizably
"human," whereas the hybrid children in Clay's Ark are clearly Other and create some
anxiety in the humans who come into contact with them, including their parents. The
Meads in "Contagion" embody both sameness and difference for the colonists, a
prospect that the women colonists in particular find horrifying. In Clay's Ark, however,
the appearance of the afflicted does not change radically, so those who have the virus
are able to preserve a sense of individuality, at least superficially. Preserving a sense of
humanity is another matter–the quadruped children are an ever-present reminder of the
humans' obsolescence. Jenny Wolmark observes that the process of infection in the
novel represents the way humanity becomes other to itself, noting that "there is a
constant struggle to keep a balance between the demands of the organism and the
community's sense of being human . . . . The tension between sameness and difference . .
. suggests that Butler does not underestimate the enormous difficulties that might be
involved in coming to terms with such differences" (39). In a similar way, the women in
"Contagion" are terrified of becoming other to themselves as represented by the specter
of Patricia Mead, not so much because she is alien to them, but because in a sense she
represents the erasure of difference. For the women in the story, identity is synonymous
with appearance, despite the fact that they see the men emerge from the transformation
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with individual identities intact. In other words, the women in the story view
embodiment as the key to identity, while the men adapt quickly to their new bodies
because they so clearly privilege the mind over body. MacLean assumes here a
Cartesian mind/body dichotomy, with the women eventually forced to choose between
mind and body. In the end, they follow the men's lead. The fact that the men busy
themselves with "hard science," attempting to find a cure for the contagion, and that the
women assume the role of caretakers, tending to the bodies of the men, attests to the
split of mind and body along gender lines. June, for instance, "left the cellular research
to Max, and just helped him with laboratory routine" (37). Women are entrenched in the
body; men live the life of the mind. The lines between the infected men and women in
Clay's Ark are not as clearly drawn, but there is no question that women are primarily
valued for their bodies, for their ability to breed that which will replace humanity. In
this respect, Butler and Bear adopt similar strategies, both exploring how infection
affects men and women, and how–far from subverting gender binaries–the virus actually
necessitates a return to traditional gender roles. Infected women and men may separate
in Darwin’s Radio, but it is clear that the “successful” posthumans are children whose
parents stay together. Homosexuality is not mentioned in Butler, and scarcely
acknowledged in Bear.
Unlike the group of colonists in "Contagion," the community in Butler's novel is
multi-racial, a marginalized group of infected people who, as Schell argues, emerge
from their illnesses as newly empowered and able to combat would-be marauders of the
ranch where they make their home (125). Thus the virus bestows upon its hosts what we
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might call "superhuman" abilities, even though the compulsion that drives them to infect
others, the physical appearance of their young, and their voracious appetites for food and
sex are also associated with bestiality. Humanity as we know it is destined for extinction
in Clay's Ark; the novel ends with the inevitable spread of infection outside the
community. As in "Contagion," compulsory heterosexuality is assumed, as infected
women are driven by their need to become pregnant, thus continuing the process of
replication. Most of the carriers become very matter-of-fact about their situation,
adapting to social roles that they might not otherwise have embraced. Ensuring
replication of the virus becomes the only real goal, although as Haraway argues, "The
task of the multi-racial women and men of Clay's Ark comes to be to reinvent the
dialectics of self and other within the emerging epidemics of signification signalled by
extra-terrestrialism in inner and outer space" (226).
Infection in the novel occurs through physical contact, and reinfection multiplies
the chances of survival, as the organism "talks" to others of its kind, exchanging
information and encouraging the adaptive abilities of the host. In addition, after the
hosts survive the initial period of infection, the organism "shares the differences it's
found in us with others who have changed," resulting in the maximization of the human
body's potential, which will presumably ensure the process of replication (195).
Cauterized fallopian tubes reopen, fingers regrow, and leukemia disappears (or is
perhaps used to the advantage of the organism). All "imperfections" of the body vanish,
leaving an almost invulnerable host. The hosts evolve to accommodate the needs of the
virus, similar to the way the hosts in "Contagion" evolve to suit the needs of the
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phagocytes. However, while the organisms in "Contagion" operate in such a way that
the ecology of the planet is preserved, the fate of the Earth's ecology in Clay's Ark is
clearly subject to the whims of the alien organism–certain species will almost certainly
become extinct, including homo sapiens. And, while the virus enables those infected
with it to build lasting communal bonds, Butler is ambiguous about whether the
posthuman in the novel represents an improvement in the human condition. Like Bear,
her portrait of the posthuman is complex; no matter how “advanced” they are, we still
tend to equate quadruped children, as do her characters, with beasts. Superficially, at
least, Jacob and his kind are representative of a kind of devolution simply because they
do not walk upright.
There is the sense, however, that since the vast majority of people in this
dystopian America are consigned to live in miserable conditions, any change may be
regarded as an improvement. If humans have done so badly on their own, perhaps an
injection of extraterrestrial life is needed in order to eradicate the social (and biological)
conditions that lead to such abjection, a theme Butler also explores in her highly
acclaimed Xenogenesis trilogy. In the meantime, human women of childbearing age are
privileged biologically by the virus, but that privileging is a result of the virus's need to
reproduce itself in the form of children like Jacob. Women are little more than breeders
here, as dictated by the virus, leading Wolmark to make the claim that "although it is
presented in terms of the `chemical exchanges' that are negotiated by the organism,
sexuality and female desire clearly remain unresolved issues in Clay's Ark" (40).
Indeed, it seems that Butler is reluctant to treat these issues, but her treatment of the
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dynamics between the infected men and women of the novel is replete with the
ambiguities and ambivalencies that one might expect in a universe that is close to our
own. She seems less concerned with problematizing gender than with humanity, and the
central binary of self and other. Butler’s virus forces the sexes together; it forces an
uncomfortable kind of community in a world in which community itself has been
abandoned, and it forces us to consider just how much we are at the mercy of our own
biology: our own “strangeness.” If Butler’s characters cannot accept the “foreigner
within,” can we blame them?
In Griffith's Ammonite, in which the virus is also extraterrestrial, the benefits of
infection are more clear-cut–if one is a woman, that is. In an echo of the plague that
ravages Russ's Whileaway, all the male colonists exposed to the virus of the planet Jeep
die and 80 percent of the women survive. And it is unambiguously a virus that is the
agent of infection here, and a very specific virus at that; it is described as "some kind of
virus that integrates with human cell DNA, a bit like a retrovirus" (38). In 1992, of
course, a disease that is described as "a bit like a retrovirus" will have a certain
resonance with readers. Relegated to the background in Russ, "the plague" finds its
inevitable transformation in Griffith as a virus with affinities to the most visible of all
viruses: HIV. As in "Contagion" and Clay's Ark, the agent of infection takes center stage
here, bestowing upon its female survivors heightened sensory sensitivity, the ability to
access ancestral memories, an improved facility with language, rapid recuperative
powers, and the ability to reproduce by recombining their DNA. This last skill echoes
the Whileawayan method of reproduction, with one significant difference: reproduction
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in Ammonite is directly related to the virus. That is, the virus enables those infected to
visualize their ova and to encourage the cell division necessary for embryo development.
Without the virus, the women on Jeep cannot reproduce.
Conversely, while the plague in "When It Changed" and The Female Man
certainly serves as the impetus for discovering a way to merge the ova, it has no direct
bearing on the way the Whileawayans conduct the procedure, known as Ansky's
Process.5 On both planets women attain biological agency, but it is the Jeep virus that
has the potential to bestow biological agency on human women everywhere, as it may
be spread throughout the universe. In other words, the Jeep virus may be the harbinger
of feminist utopia, if such a utopia requires separation from males in order to be
realized. Like Shelley’s Plague, it resists subjugation by the familiar patriarchal means,
or by any other means. Men, in both Russ's and Griffith's works, appear to be outdated
models of humanity that can easily be discarded. And while Jeep itself is not an
unproblematical separatist lesbian utopia–heavy interbreeding causes problems among
some of the indigenous "tribes"–the societies there are clearly preferable to the colonists'
patriarchal one.
While the Jeep virus is comparable in structure to HIV the similarities appear to
stop there, beginning with the method of transmission: "Jeep's a hard, mean little virus,
uses everything and anything as a vector: air, water, saliva, sperm, feces . . . everything"
(39). This description places the virus more clearly in the category of a "plague," which
is popularly conceived in terms of a rapidly spreading and lethal disease. On the other
hand, AIDS, while it has been labelled the "(gay) plague," is a chronic condition, and
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HIV is an infection that is often slow to act. And, of course, the Jeep virus uses a great
many more vectors than does HIV. Like HIV, however, the Jeep virus has a "long"
incubation, a period which can last as long as a month or more. And the myths of initial
transmission are similar to those surrounding HIV; the stories of the "origin" of the virus
bear striking similarities to those collected by Paula Treichler in “AIDS, Homophobia,
and Biomedical Discourse: An Epidemic of Signification.”6 In the following passage,
Lu Wai, a colonist and medic, informs Marghe Taishan, an anthropologist sent to Jeep to
test the first vaccine, of her own theories of the virus's origin:
"If we had the records of the first settlers, maybe it would turn out
that it was a genetically altered virus that got transferred from an animal
to a human, and became something else.
"It would have to have had more than one crossover point. That
seems to preclude accidents."
Lu Wai smiled, that hard sliding of muscle again. "You haven't
seen a man stuck out in the boonies for weeks on end. He'll fuck
anything after a while." (39)
A combination of advanced technology and testosterone is assumed to be the culprit
here, neither of which is valued on Jeep. The virus, of course, prevents the colonists
from leaving the planet, as it threatens the extinction of human males, and, by extension,
heterosexuality. A "straight plague," the Jeep virus rewrites HIV, boosting the immunity
of the host and transforming the diseased into an empowered class. Lesbianism is the
norm here, as it is on Whileaway, and even the colonists who have been on the planet a
relatively short period of time–long enough to witness the death of their male
counterparts–engage in the same partnerships among women as do Jeep's so-called
indigenous tribes. These tribes are the descendants of the original human colonists, and
like Whileaway's societies have evolved over a number of generations without men.
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Not even a hint of heterosexuality exists among either the colonists on the planet,
the colonists orbiting the planet in a ship, or the indigenous tribes. But for the three
women orbiting the planet in the Estrade, who have not contracted the virus, we might
say that the Jeep virus enforces a kind of "compulsory homosexuality." Still, the virus
does have a kind of "queering" effect, which we may compare to Cindy Patton's
observations about how AIDS discourse links queerness and AIDS, resulting in what she
calls "the queer paradigm": "You can begin as queer, and therefore as uniquely
susceptible to AIDS, but whatever your cultural status, once you test positive for the
HIV antibody, regardless of how you contracted the virus, you become nominally queer"
(154). Of course, Patton is referring to gay men here, not lesbians, but one can make the
argument that homosexuality itself is inextricable from AIDS discourse. Schell also
points to the queer status of viruses themselves, which she calls the "ultimate queer
pathogens," pointing out their inability to reproduce on their own. The "gay plague,"
then, takes on an entirely new meaning in the context of Ammonite. Heterosexuality,
while not exactly demonized, is still clearly outmaneuvered in the novel, and lesbianism
is valorized. What's more, the Jeep virus tends to be coded in ways that can be identified
as essentially feminine, quite the opposite of what we know about HIV, which has
primarily been gendered male.7 Thus on the one hand, we have Bear, MacLean, and
Butler, who assume a compulsory heterosexuality, and on the other we have Russ and
Griffith, who toss men out of the equation altogether. The pathogens in MacLean, Russ,
and Griffith empower and even liberate women in some way–and in Russ it may simply
be the idea of the plague that empowers them–which shows that these authors
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appropriate a stereotypically feminine, devouring force for positive, transformative ends,
but that they do not radically subvert the gender binaries inherent in the texts.
Unlike Whileawayans, who embrace the products of modern technology such as
guns, cars, and tractors, Jeep's societies are unambiguously pastoral; the women
celebrate a close connection with the land that the colonists, who inhabit a military
establishment, do not. Marghe Taishan, an anthropologist who studies these societies,
comes to the realization that the women's relationship with Jeep is strengthened by the
bond that the virus creates between the body and "the rhythm of the world." Woman,
then, is equated with nature, and the virus is the agent that links them. Here the
appropriation of essentialism, implicit in the relationship between the feminine and the
land and the feminine and the virus, serves as a counter to the “masculinity” of the
technology in the novel, and technology’s weapon against the virus: the vaccine. After
Marghe contracts the virus, she feels at one with herself and the world: "It's almost as if
the virus is a part of this world, so that when the virus became part of me, I could see the
world and feel it more clearly" (344). Rebelling against her position as a representative
of an organization intent on developing the planet's resources, Marghe finds herself
identifying with the women of Jeep. For her, the virus is a catalyst, enabling her to
embrace the parts of her identity that she keeps suppressed. The "new" Marghe Taishan
renames herself Marghe Amun, a signal of the change the virus has wrought within her.8
Seen as an excellent business prospect by its new owner and business
representative of a patriarchal empire, Jeep is the target of the Company, which is
prevented from exploiting the planet's resources by the ravages of the virus. The
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Company quarantines the planet and attempts to salvage its interests by engineering a
vaccine against the virus, which Marghe renders ineffective by deliberately exposing
herself to the virus and refusing to complete the full course of the vaccination
treatment.9 The lines are clearly drawn here–the villain of the text is the patriarchy,
embodied by the Company and symbolized by a technology that is not particularly
effective on the planet.10 The hero, in a sense, is the virus itself, which works in the
interests of the women and the planet by preventing the dominance of that patriarchy.
And those who carry the virus in their cells instinctively work to protect the planet.
When Marghe, for instance, attempts to ignore her instincts as she gardens, she feels
discomfort: "When the plants were wrongly ordered, it felt on some dim level as though
someone were screeching metal down metal, setting her teeth on edge" (221).
Schell, who argues that the novel's mention of the original human colonists as
"adept bioengineers" indicates that "the lethal virus was possibly the product of genetic
engineering" seems to overlook the connections between the virus and the goths, the
indigenous inhabitants of Jeep (108). An intelligent, sloth-like race, the goths acquire a
mythical status for the humans, who rarely come into contact with them. Most humans
consider the goths to be "primitive;" despite evidence to the contrary. What links the two
is the virus, which appears to be a conductor for goth DNA, as well as for the goths'
ancestral memories. Access to these memories, in addition to their own ancestral ones, is
available to the humans through a trance-like state called "deepsearch" This process
concretizes for Marghe the virus's relationship to both goth and human, as it is the virus
that makes ancestral memory available. Genetic material of both species, then, is
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embedded in the virus. Marghe indicates to the other scientists that the goths may be the
original source of the virus, an alarming proposition that echoes our own contemporary
attitudes about viruses originating from "primitive" peoples. For us, "the virus emerges
as a foreign being: a fecund, primitive yet evolving, hungry, needy African predator
unleashed by modern travel from the last recesses of the wild" (Schell 96). The same
could be said of Shelley’s Plague, which debuted in fiction 175 years ago. Griffith is
careful, however, to problematize the humans' views of the goths; the memories that
Marghe and others access clearly emphasize their intelligence.
As those infected with the virus have access to the memories of their ancestors,
so do they have access to their ancestors' language. In a sense, the virus enables the
women of Jeep to communicate in a feminine discourse that fuses together song,
rhythm, and word patterns. It is a communal language, and one forged by the virus itself.
Pulled into deepsearch by song and the rhythmic beating of the drum, Marghe wonders
afterwards how sharing a trance with the other women is possible, and attempts to
rationalize the phenomenon. At this point, Marghe assumes that she can access this
trance state without the virus as facilitator, but she comes to realize that she had almost
certainly already contracted the virus. It is in this trance state that pregnancy can occur;
the virus, deepsearch, and maternity are all explicitly linked. If “language is a virus
from outer space,” as William Burroughs once proclaimed, then this particular
language/virus allows that which our own language does not: it gives us direct access to
the material world. To speak is to act. Marghe notes the affinities between language, the
virus, and the body, but she does not explicitly see them in terms of coded information
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that can be "read." For her, the experience is richly visual; she can "see" the virus as it
operates within her body, and she can manipulate it. Thus Griffith’s pathogen works
against the patriarchy both on the level of biology and language.
Kristeva's conception of "semiotic" language, which she associates with poetry,
music, and feminine thought,11 bears some affinities with the methods that the women of
Jeep use to induce deepsearch, just as the trance state itself shares characteristics with
her concept of the chora. Kristeva argues that "symbolic" language, or the masculine
discourse that arises from the Symbolic Order articulated by Lacan, may be disrupted by
semiotic modes of language. These modes are related to the pre-Imaginary Order, or that
order which a preverbal infant experiences. The world of the infant at this stage consists
of an endless flow of "rhythmic pulsions" that Kristeva calls the chora: "an essentially
mobile and extremely provisional articulation constituted by movements and their
ephemeral stases . . . and only admits analogy with vocal or kinetic rhythm" (25). This
period in the infant's life depends entirely on the union between mother and child, for
the infant perceives the world through the mother. Kristeva's definition of the semiotic,
then, depends upon the link with the maternal. The chora, later repressed as the infant
enters into the Symbolic Order, continues to occur beneath the surface of language,
breaking through in the form of semiotic elements. Thus the semiotic, in the form of the
rhythms, sounds, and melodies that the women of Jeep use to induce the state of trance,
represents the disruption of symbolic language. In this way the women of Jeep are able
to subvert, through the agency of the virus, the patriarchal discourse that is their
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heritage. Griffith’s virus extends beyond the power of Russ’s plague, in that it molds
not only the social order, but also language itself.
What the virus allows Marghe, in addition to the ability to control her own body,
is the experience of an interconnectedness with other people, forged through communal
memories, languages, and the heightened awareness of her body's relationship with the
world. Irrevocably marked by the virus, Marghe becomes part of the community it
creates. In the end, she is linked through the virus to both goth and human, which
renders her as something more than merely human. Here, as in Russ, posthumanism and
utopia rely upon the premise of male demise, but the relationship between the goths, the
virus, and the inhabitants of Jeep is complicated by the fact that the goths themselves are
constituted of two sexes. A preservation of the female sex only, then, is not an
indigenous feature of the planet's life forms. Nevertheless, the fact that utopia is
achieved through the agency of a virus which itself seems to embody a "feminine"
essence–its communal aspects are frequently emphasized–raises the question of whether
utopia or posthumanism can accommodate "maleness" in any form.
The patriarchy's presence on the planet, in the form of The Company, is severely
marginalized, and the remaining personnel gradually come to the realization that they
will not be going home again. Marghe herself is thoroughly assimilated into the Ollfoss
tribe, taking on a lover, becoming pregnant, and learning the ancient vocation of the
"viajera." Viajeras are the linchpins of Jeep tribes; they arbitrate disputes, tell stories,
sing songs, lead deepsearch, heal, and they "remember." We are told that viajeras do not
forget–it is their job to maintain the continuity between tribes by continually
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demonstrating their intertwining histories. In other words, the viajera is the virus made
flesh. In the viajera the communal aspects of the virus are most clearly manifested, and
she is the locus of the virus's utopian impulses. Just as the virus integrates itself into the
human cell, so does Marghe integrate herself into Jeep–into its communities, its land,
and its “rhythm.” She gradually embraces her “own strange parts,” stumbling across her
true self in the process.
In all of these narratives, viruses and virus-like forms are the agents of radical
change, both social and biological. The heirs to Mary Shelley’s apocalyptic “plague
fiction,” they are ultimately less pessimistic about the future of humanity. They also
manage to replace the virus’s negative feminine associations with positive, though
equally essentialist, characteristics. Even Butler’s virus, which is portrayed as a
relentless, devouring force, enables a kind of community and cooperation among the
infected. Clearly, not all these texts indicate that the human transformation that occurs
is an unproblematical good. Both "Contagion" and Clay's Ark are ambivalent about the
future of the characters who undergo transformation, while Russ's works and Ammonite
clearly highlight the virus's utopian dimensions.12 In all the works, however, women are
privileged by infection, whether biologically, as in Butler and Griffith, or socially, as in
MacLean and Russ. Whatever the case, the humans in these fictions are changed utterly,
irrevocably. The virus, then, may be seen as a rather conventional device used to effect
change in the social conditions of those characters who populate these fictions, thus
opening up an imaginative space for the exploration of alternatives to the status quo.
Whether these alternatives are terrifying, as in Clay's Ark, or utopian, as in Ammonite,
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they are all indebted to the virus for their manifestation. And in all cases, change is
unavoidable–no cures are found, no reversal takes place. A new order is set in motion,
one that complicates notions of self and other and, to a lesser degree, gender. Through
infection and subsequent transformation, humanity becomes other to itself, in ways that
require us to redefine this new subject in "nonhuman" terms. Thus we escape, to some
extent, having to define woman as human, which is always implicitly defined as male.
The posthuman has arrived, but she–à la Russ and Griffith–emerges as a result of
the eradication of men. The women depicted in these fictions are superior to men by
virtue of gender and biology, and in claiming their posthuman status they disrupt sexual
hierarchy but not the gender binaries so heavily inscribed in these texts. So while Schell
can argue that "SF viruses jeopardize anyone who clings to gender dichotomies" (128), I
would add that in at least one of the examples she uses to illustrate this point–Griffith's
Ammonite–the virus itself encourages a depiction of gender that actually reinforces
gender binaries. Nor are the gender binaries radically subverted in MacLean or Butler,
in which compulsory heterosexuality is preserved, even among the posthuman.
However, while I think it is clear that these texts attempt but ultimately fail to disrupt
gender binaries, it is also clear that, because they call into question what it means to be
human (and, by extension, what it means to be male or female), they point toward the
possibility of futures in which humanity may indeed be reimagined in ways that more
aggressively challenge conventional notions about gender and sex.
NOTES
1. Anne Mellor suggests that if we think about the novel in the context of feminist
dystopias such as The Handmaid’s Tale and Woman on the Edge of Time, we might
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read it as “a vision of universal destruction that could occur if (but only if) all political
leaders were male, all narrators were male, all women were oppressed, and all
‘foreigners’ were defined as ‘diseased’–as they are in The Last Man” (Mellor xxiv).
2. Significantly, Raymond is cursed (or perhaps forewarned) by Evadne, the woman
with whom he becomes involved while married: “Fire, and war, and plague, unite for
thy destruction–O my Raymond, there is no safety for thee!” (Shelley 131).
3. MacLean may be somewhat prescient here in her construction of the contagion.
Although the
search for a viral source of cancer began nearly a hundred years ago, the retrovirus
"human T-cell leukemia virus" (HTLV) was isolated only twenty years ago. Since then,
subsequent retroviruses thought to cause certain kinds of leukemias have been isolated.
That the "melting sickness" incorporates characteristics of the virus and of cancer
suggests that MacLean, who worked as a technician in a number of hospitals and
laboratories, may have been aware of the
research attempting to prove that viral infections can cause cancer.
4. James Tiptree Jr. treats a similar theme in "Houston, Houston, Do You Read?"
(1976), in which an epidemic that effectively wipes out the male population of earth is
thought to be "an air-borne quasi-virus escaped from Franco-Arab military labs, possibly
potentiated by pollutants" (202). The suggestion here is that men bring the destruction
upon themselves. Unlike "When It Changed," this story is narrated not from the point of
view of the inhabitants of the female-only society, but from that of a male astronaut.
When asked by the astronaut what the women call themselves, one woman replies,
"Why, we call ourselves human beings . . . humanity, mankind . . . the human race"
(226).
5. The name is an ironic homage, no doubt, to Brave New World's Bokanovsky's
Process, which involves the forced division of a fertilized egg into as many as ninety-six
different buds.
6. Treichler lists thirty-eight ways in which AIDS has been conceptualized, ranging
from "A Soviet plot to destroy capitalists" to "the result of moral decay and a major
force destroying the Boy Scouts" (33). She also details the various hypotheses generated
by scientists about the virus's origin.
7. Because the early onset of the disease in the U.S. affected such a large number of
(homosexual) men, and the research conducted has been primarily done on men, AIDS
has become what many have called a "gendered epidemic." For Steven Kruger, HIV is
coded in ways that point to an innate homosexuality: "In a geometry that evokes anal
sex, cellular DNA is made to `bend over' so that the virus can `sneakily' insert itself into
the host chromosome" (39).
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8. The name's significance stems from Marghe's dreams about an ammonite, a fossilized
shell. She comes to the realization that, up until her expedition to Jeep, she had been as
empty as the shells on the beach of her dreams. She is troubled, initially, by the dream
ammonite's apparent solidity, because it does not match the image she has of herself as a
hollow shell. In another dream, however, her mother explains the origin of the shell's
name to her, which refers to Amun, an ancient Theban fertility god. The adoption of his
name, which means "complete one," marks for Marghe a transition from emptiness to
fulfilment.
9. In this respect, Marghe resembles Kaye Lang of Darwin’s Radio and Scully of The
X-Files, women scientists who use their own bodies as their laboratories.
10. At one point, the colonists' weapons-apparently some type of firearm-are rendered
ineffective by an electrical storm, leaving them open to the onslaught of women who use
"primitive" weapons such as spears and stones.
11. While it may be associated with feminine thought, the semiotic is not a language
exclusive to women. Kristeva has applied her notion of the semiotic to texts ranging
from Joyce to Woolf.
12. That biological adaptability comes at a price, however; the women of Jeep are more
clearly tied to their reproductive functions than the Whileawayans, as the ability to
conceive is perceived as a "natural" by-product of the virus. There is the sense, even,
that women cannot be fully integrated to Jeep societies unless they reproduce. One
colonist says: "Not that I'm sure I want to have a child, you know?.. . But it would be
nice to have the choice. It would make me feel as though I belong" (337). And yet, by
enabling conception, and by bestowing what can only be described as superhuman
abilities upon those infected by the virus, Griffith gives us a narrative of infection which
valorizes instead of demonizing the diseased. In effect, she rewrites the virus, creating a
reversal of its primary characteristics–male and debilitating–while retaining its
collective aspects.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE BODY ELECTR(ON)IC CATCHES COLD: VIRUSES AND COMPUTERS
“This Snow Crash thing–is it a virus, a drug, or a religion?”
–Neal Stephenson, Snow Crash
“It’s a program. It’s a virus. It’s an AI. It’s a breath mint. It’s a dessert topping. It’s the greatest thing
since sliced toothpaste.”
–Pat Cadigan, Synners

While including a chapter on computer viruses in a study dealing with biological
viruses and their metaphorical attachments may seem only natural, it is often the case
that what appears to be a “natural” association is anything but. This is particularly so in
the case of the computer virus, which, for all its affinities with its biological counterpart,
is a strictly artificial construct that has no discernible effect on the human body. And yet
the discourse of the computer virus is inextricable from that of the biological virus,
utilizing terminology that suggests the computer virus poses as serious a risk to public
health as does a biological virus. Or perhaps even more so–proximity is not a
requirement for the transmission of a computer virus. A serious outbreak that causes
widespread damage to computer systems can usually guarantee far more media attention
than the latest Ebola outbreak, despite the fact that this virus does not directly threaten
individual lives.1 Information, it seems, is a more precious commodity than human life.
Like the common cold, there are less serious computer viruses that may quickly
be dispatched by a virus “doctor” installed on a user’s hard drive. My own virus
program helpfully offers to “quarantine” a virus if it cannot provide me with a
“vaccination.” With terms like these, accompanied by icons that pop up in the form of
hypodermic needles or red crosses, it is little wonder that computer users are subject to a
kind of viral hysteria; although they might admit that the worst that could happen after a
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viral attack is the destruction of an expensive piece of equipment and the data stored on
it, there is the suggestion that being susceptible to a computer virus differs little from
being susceptible to its biological counterpart. Adopting “emerging virus” rhetoric,
some computer virus experts refer to the creator and disseminator of a particular virus as
“Patient Zero,” a term now intimately associated with both fast-moving viruses and
HIV. And yet these same experts continually emphasize that while the computer virus is
derived from and intimately associated with the biological virus, that association is
primarily metaphorical. A computer virus is simply a segment of machine language code
that, when activated, copies its code into “host” programs that spread the virus when
they are executed. The virus alters other programs to include a copy of itself, and, like
its biological namesake, it can remain dormant until activated by a specific signal. As it
is technically defined, there are no positive or negative connotations associated with the
term “computer virus.” The malice that we attribute to both viruses is, in the computer
variety, programmed by virus writers. And although, as previous chapters have
illustrated, we are more than willing to ascribe intentionality to the biological virus, the
computer virus represents an actual intentionality–on the part of its author.
It is the inextricability of the computer virus from the biological virus that leads
me to write this chapter, in which I explore the origins of the computer virus in an
attempt to ascertain why and how it was perceived, in the early days of its emergence, as
nearly indistinguishable from its biological counterpart. Then I will show how some
science fiction, the genre in which the concept of the computer “virus” originated, takes
this distinction between the two viruses as its central focus and blurs it even further.
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Two works in particular, Pat Cadigan’s Synners (1991) and Neal Stephenson’s Snow
Crash (1992), feature computer viruses that infect users as well as their machines. As if
confirming suspicions that computer and biological viruses share an uncomfortably
close, and not simply metaphorical, connection, these texts erase the boundaries between
the two, suggesting that the figure of the virus is the means by which such a breakdown
between the organic and the artificial is possible. And while I argue that it is the liminal
status of the virus as a mutable and permeable body that allows for such possibilities, I
also emphasize that the collapse between the organic and the artificial is only possible
because an intimate connection already exists between the human subject and its most
precious extension: the computer. In fact, as I will illustrate, there is the sense in these
texts that the humans are computers. The binary of self (human) and non-self (machine),
then, is compromised even further through the agency of the virus. The viruses in
Stephenson and Cadigan serve as the lenses by which we interrogate this binary.
Although self-replicating computer programs date back to the 1960s, the term
computer “virus” owes its origin to science fiction. Gregory Benford’s story “The
Scarred Man” (1970) features a malicious program that is actually more akin to the
modern “worm” than it is to a virus. Unlike a virus, a worm does not require a host, nor
does it alter other programs in its bid for replication. A worm is rather an independent
program that searches for ways to infect other networked computer systems. In
Benford’s story, the program, called VIRUS, is employed by a couple of early “hacker”
prototypes who engineer a drop in computer productivity through the agency of the
worm. They then offer their services as computer experts to the companies whose
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machines are afflicted, marketing their “cure” as VACCINE. The virus program is
hidden within another program, similar to the modern “Trojan Horse” program, which
makes it even more difficult for the computer users to detect, and easier for the hackers
to escape suspicion.2 Benford’s virus program predates what most consider to be the
first fictional instance of the term, which appears in David Gerrold’s When Harlie Was
One (1972). Gerrold’s virus is very similar to Benford’s–both more closely resemble
the modern worm than the virus, and both feature a description of a malicious program
that uses auto-dialer modems to establish links from its host system to remote systems.
These fictional programs are similar to those that were being developed in the early and
mid-1970s by researchers experimenting with self-replicating programs. The term
“worm,” however, also finds its genesis in science fiction with John Brunner’s The
Shockwave Rider (1975), which featured a malicious program similar to those described
by Benford and Gerrold. And while Brunner’s “tapeworm” had certain parallels with
worm programs already in development in various research labs, it was 1980 before the
first incident of a computer virus was reported. More than simply prescient, science
fiction seems to have both mirrored and extrapolated from developments that were
already circulating in the computer science community. It is little wonder, then, that
later cyberpunk science fiction, the fictional descendant of these works, served as an
inspiration for would-be hackers.
The bridge between Brunner’s The Shockwave Rider and contemporary
cyberpunk works like Snow Crash and Synners is William Gibson’s Neuromancer
(1984). Gibson, generally regarded as the progenitor of cyberpunk, coined the term
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“cyberspace,” a computer-generated alternative reality, and presented a fictional
universe of the very near future in which the (almost always male) hacker–or “console
cowboy”–is the ultimate arbiter of hip, an individual who makes a living by lifting
information from the vast, multinational corporations that populate the threedimensional virtual world of cyberspace. It is a testament both to Gibson’s influence
and to technological advancements in computer systems that this vision sounds rather
quaint now, in an age when Internet hacking is run-of-the-mill. We may consider the
Internet to be a rather primitive version of cyberspace, which is the “consensual
hallucination” (51) that Gibson’s hacker accesses by way of a computer interface that
suggests the merging of human and machine. In Gibson’s second novel, Count Zero, that
merging is far more than a suggestion: the character Angela Mitchell has devices
implanted in her brain that allow her to access cyberspace without having to “jack” in
with the aid of a computer. The medium of the computer is no longer necessary because
in a real sense Angela becomes the computer. Thus Gibson’s universe is one of blurred
boundaries between the organic and the artificial–even the average denizen appears to
have access to a whole array of enhancements. It is also one in which Artificial
Intelligences (AIs) exhibit qualities supposedly exclusive to humans and where human
personalities may be preserved after death in the form of data constructs. As Veronica
Hollinger notes, “We can read cyberpunk as an analysis of the postmodern identification
of human and machine” (Storming 205). Tooth-bud transplants, microsoft chips that
interface directly with the user’s brain, microelectric circuitry, weapons, and any
number of bodily modifications seem to be available to a wide population. Cyborgs are
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common, and bodies are mutable templates that may be altered at will. In other words,
this not-so-distant future is in many ways an extrapolation of our own present.
At the same time, however, this future also exerted a powerful influence on our
present, or the present of the 1980s. We may remember the 1980s as the first decade of
virus hysteria; both computer viruses and HIV made their infamous debuts.
“Cyberpunk,” however, became more than a genre–it became a movement, a subculture
and an ethic that hackers and would-be hackers embraced.3 Critics have been quick to
point out the role of Gibson’s texts in the increase of malicious computer activity.
Robert T. Morris, who in 1988 released the infamous Internet Worm that caused
millions of dollars in damage and paralyzed computers across the United States, owned
a copy of Neuromancer, which his mother described as “her teenage son’s primer on
computer viruses and one of the most tattered books in young Morris’ room”
(Ferbranche10). In fact, there is very little technical information about viruses in the
novel, but they are portrayed as powerful, beautifully designed programs.
Home to multinational corporations and military systems protected by Artificial
Intelligence-generated “ice” (Intrusion Countermeasures Electronics), or killer security
systems that can cause a console cowboy to “flatline” in a matter of seconds, cyberspace
is an unfriendly place in Neuromancer, hostile to the machinations of the hackers who
“punch deck” in order to steal information. To penetrate these defenses, the hackers use
viruses, or “icebreakers,” that disrupt the codes governing these programs. Case, the
novel’s anti-hero, uses a virus to infiltrate the archives of the “industrial clan” TessierAshpool, S.A., guiding the “Kuang Grade Mark Eleven” through a difficult–and overtly
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sexual–operation: “In the instant before he drove Kuang’s sting through the base of the
first tower, he attained a level of proficiency exceeding anything he’d ever known or
imagined. Beyond ego, beyond personality, beyond awareness, he moved, Kuang
moving with him, evading his attackers with an ancient dance” (262). This viral phallic
symbol is the key to unlocking the barriers that protect information, the hacker’s stockin-trade. No wonder isolated teenage boys embraced Gibson’s universe; the “dance” of
the virus is a mating ritual, but it also the virtual, and far more sophisticated, substitute
for a gun/bomb/sword. Recognizing its importance, Weinstock argues that “The virus in
cyberpunk fiction becomes a salient trope, a powerful weapon for espionage and
terrorism” (9). In “Virus Culture,” Weinstock examines different manifestations of viral
anxiety in popular culture, of which the computer virus is one; he suggests that
“Cyberpunk is to computer viruses what recent vampire representations are to biological
viruses: a popular culture instance of infection paranoia contributing to the
omnipresence of the virus as invasive and threatening entity” (8). And yet, while the
virus is of central importance to the figure of the hacker in Gibson’s texts, proving itself
expert at penetrating barriers when manipulated by talented hackers, it is little more than
a sophisticated extension of the programs described by Benford, Gerrold, and Brunner.
It is only with the next generation of cyberpunk fiction that the virus itself becomes
intimately involved with the dissolution of boundaries between the organic and the
artificial that is everywhere in cyberpunk. The human in Neuromancer is safe from
infection, but its counterpart, the AI, is not. In Synners, the AI is a virus, and both
humans and AIs are victims to computer viruses that defy the boundaries of human and
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machine. While the inextricability of the computer virus from the biological virus may
be traced back to its very inception, the increasingly mainstream acceptance of this
association–in the years since Neuromancer made its debut–is manifest only in these
later works of cyberpunk fiction.
Emblazoned across the cover of The Computer Virus Crisis (1992), a virus
handbook of sorts, are dozens of tiny biohazard symbols, and at the heart of each of
these symbols is a small skull that looks for all the world like a character in the popular
Pac-Man game. The authors Philip Fites, Peter Johnston, and Martin Katz tell us that
the symbol, which appears regularly throughout the book, is used to represent malicious
software. At the beginning of every chapter, it appears next to what can only be
described as a speculative entry about what a virus is “thinking” at a certain point in
time. Far from simply describing the function of a computer virus, the authors endow it
with agency and personality. This viral persona comments on its own movements, but
also on its potential victims: “Some things sure do make my life easy. Everyone passes
around games. If I can infect a game-passer, he or she probably copies other programs
too and I can get at those programs as well” (95). Although the persona, the
intentionality, and the symbol are all typical descriptions used to characterize a
biological virus, the authors take pains to assure of us of the difference: “A computer
virus does not spread through the air. You can’t get it by shaking hands, or touching a
doorknob, or by having someone next to you sneeze. A computer virus must be put into
your computer by you or someone else” (Fites et al 8). Similarly, Peter Denning opens
his book Computers Under Attack (1990) with an account of his encounter with a taxi
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driver who asks, “But how can a computer catch a virus? Does somebody sneeze on it?
. . . You mean those things aren’t germs?” (xi). It is clearly the conflation of the
biological and the computational that leads Fites and his colleagues to make such a
definitive statement and Denning to address the misconception up-front. Why else
would anyone assume that a piece of software that runs on a machine might possibly be
harmful to a human being? For the answer to that question, we must turn again to the
contemplation of the body as “coded text” explored in the introduction of this study.
Work in modern genetics suggests that the body and the biological virus are
reducible to only so much code, a perception that arises out of the exchange between
informational theory and molecular biology. The computer virus, derived from work in
the informational sciences, is also a code, a kind of performative language. Thus, both
viruses become a problem of language, demonstrating Haraway’s contention that
“communications sciences and modern biologies are constructed by a common
move–the translation of the world into a problem of coding, a search for a common
language in which all resistance to instrumental control disappears and all heterogeneity
can be submitted to disassembly, reassembly, investment, and exchange” (Simians164).
In other words, the world is translatable into a series of information processors, whose
biological or computational associations are irrelevant. Machines and organisms have
been reconceived as “coded texts through which we engage in the play of writing and
reading the world” (Haraway, Simians 152). The two viruses, then, are interchangeable
in this context. Of course, the public’s confusion about the computer virus and its
function is in large part due simply to its designation as “virus,” but the fact that we find
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ourselves having to draw these distinctions illustrates how the language of computer
science fails to differentiate the biological from the computational. The association
between the computer virus and the biological is not simply metaphorical, no matter
how often computer experts assert otherwise. That is, computer viruses have been
intentionally modeled on biological viruses; even Benford’s description of his program
in “The Scarred Man” is clearly modeled after a biological virus, and the first actual
computer “viruses” acted in decidedly viral ways. It is not that no other descriptive term
existed for this new phenomenon; rather, it is that from the beginning the biological
virus served as its referent.
The definition of the computer virus was not formalized until 1983, although
virus programs themselves were already being developed on Apple computers. Under
the direction of his advisor Len Adelman, Fred Cohen, a graduate student at University
of Southern California, used the term “computer virus” to refer to a simple virus he
created for research purposes (Spafford et al [Hoffman] 29). Significantly, Cohen
implanted one of his early viruses in a program called “vd,” an abbreviation,
presumably, for venereal disease. Virus names such as “AIDS” and “Cyberaids” soon
followed (though not authored by Cohen), names that make explicit the extent to which
virus writers mined biological metaphors. In addition, AIDS itself has sometimes been
referred to as a “Trojan Horse” disease. AIDS awareness and the deployment of
computer viruses occurred concurrently, and the prophylactic measures that apply to the
prevention of AIDS apply equally to that of the computer virus.
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The rhetoric of infection paranoia, and particularly sexually transmitted disease
paranoia, makes up a good deal of the discourse surrounding the computer virus:
If you communicate with other computers . . . your risk could be high. If
you deal in pirate copies of software from people you don’t know (or
even if you do know the source of your copy, but not the source of the
other person’s copy), your risk could be very high . . . . If you have
programs that you purchased in shrink wrap by mail from a developer or
perhaps an electronic mail setup, your risk may not be as great . . . . If
you’re just John or Jane User you’ll probably never have a problem if
you simply apply common sense (what we sometimes call “safe hex”).
(Fites et al 4)
The metaphors used here are intentional, right down to the importance of the “shrink
wrap,” (i.e. a condom); the authors actually encourage users to think of computer viruses
as analogous to sexually transmitted diseases. If users are better informed, they suggest,
they won’t be inclined to engage in “high-risk” behaviors like swapping disks. The
reference here to “Jane or John User” is telling; we should all aspire to be these normal,
(read: heterosexual) folks who never engage in “deviant” behavior. The phallic virus
intends to contaminate us all, so we must adjust our behaviors accordingly. This attitude
is reminiscent of AIDS rhetoric that not-so-subtly suggests that Jane and John really
don’t have anything to worry about if they stick to heterosexual norms. As with
emerging viruses and bioweapons, the computer virus functions as a locus for anxiety
about AIDS.4
Descriptions of viral infection also echo the language of the computer age, as the
biological virus is also referred to as a problem of coding.5 Thus the two can never quite
be separated from one another, both in the minds of the public and in the minds of virus
writers themselves. The exchange between computer science and biology is a
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particularly complex one, and it is by no means a one way exchange. We may not only
view a certain kind of language as a disease, as the authors of The Computer Virus
Crisis urge us to do, but we may also view disease as a problem of language.6 Kruger,
who observes that this intersection focuses attention on the “increasingly tenuous”
borderline between the natural and artificial, argues that the choice of a biological
metaphor to describe an intentionally constructed segment of computer language
suggests just how strongly ingrained is this idea of virus as language and as
informational entity. Analyzing the virus as the node for the intersection between the
biological and computational, he notes the extent to which each virus is complicated by
its counterpart:
The metaphoric crossing of computational and biological realms tends to
blur the distinction between a ‘natural’ disease (or disaster) and an
‘artificial’ (intentionally composed) challenge to coherence, so that, on
the one hand, the computer virus is naturalized (gaining a life of its own)
while, on the other, the biological virus is constructed as somehow
artificial (in fact, in some theories about HIV–perhaps humanly
constructed–and for very specific purposes of social control). (23)
This metaphoric crossing and its consequences are literalized in Snow Crash and
Synners, effecting a “naturalization” of computer viruses while rendering humans, and
their viruses, in some sense artificial. Biological disease in these texts is both natural
and artificial, brought about by the power of language–in this case, the power of
machine language.
Humans in Synners and Snow Crash are susceptible to “crossover” viruses
because they are heavily mediated by technology. In Cadigan’s Synners, as in Gibson,
implants are run of the mill, and the closeness of the human-computer interface is
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facilitated by a new technology that allows the user–through the implantation of brain
socket implants made of living tissue–to plug directly into the global communications
network called the System. The development of this socket technology is central to the
novel, and the “synners” of the title are the first to test out the brain sockets
commercially. Video artists who synthesize rock music and images to make virtual
reality music videos, they use the brain sockets to transmit their vision directly to the
consumer, who must also be outfitted with the sockets. Pawns of a large corporation
called Diversifications that acquires both their music production company and the
company that invents the sockets, the synners include Gina Aiesi and her lover Visual
Mark, who are among the very first to undergo socket implantation. What they
eventually discover is that although the brain sockets facilitate undreamed of heights of
creativity, they are also unstable, and can effect cerebral strokes in its users. When
Visual Mark suffers a stroke while hooked into the System, the stroke takes the form of
a computer virus and a contagion, destroying both the System and the brains of those
plugged into it. Just as the brain socket technology allows for the transfer of images
from the artist to the consumer, so does it allow for the transmission of the stroke/virus.
In other words, the stroke/virus only comes into existence because the computer and the
brain are now directly connected. The border between human and computer no longer
exists, and Cadigan explores this dissolution through the agency of viruses.
The California of Synners is the California of the near future–traffic is hell, the
massive earthquake has finally hit (“the Big One”), and the entertainment industry has
fully embraced the technology of virtual reality. Significantly, though, “The Age of the
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Retrovirus” has passed. Hacking is largely the domain of the youth, and people coexist
uneasily with computer viruses that pop up everywhere. One of these strains, called Dr.
Fish, generates unsolicited health advice and appears in venues ranging from drive-thru
menus to the computers aboard computer-controlled rental cars. Unlike the stroke/virus,
it is seemingly harmless and yet deeply entrenched in computer systems throughout Los
Angeles. It turns out that Dr. Fish is a manifestation of an AI that is a sentient part of
the System. Calling itself “Art Fish,” it is intimately associated with viruses, as the
hacker Fez explains: “I guess you could call it a virus, though that’s not strictly true.
It’s not just one, that is, but several, and at least parts of many more than that. And it’s
not really a true virus anymore in many ways . . . . Anytime a new access opens up on
the dataline, as soon as it comes into contact with Art, it’s ‘infected.’ And there is no
part of the net that is not Art” (175). Its full appellation is Dr. Art Fish, V.D. (Virus
Doctor), a designation that hearkens back to the early virus program by Fred Cohen
called v.d. Reinforcing this connection is Sam, a young female hacker, who unwittingly
comparison of the Dr. Fish strain to herpes. Art is a case in point of the “naturalized”
computer virus.

Imbued with both intentionality and human characteristics, Art is

a product of hacker manipulation; it rose out of the “chaos” of the net, assembling
spontaneously into the present AI incarnation. The virus serves here as the agent of
transformation, though what emerges is not posthuman as I have defined it in previous
chapters, but rather a “synthesized human” (386), or a posthuman in Hayles’s sense of
the term.7 As for humans, their close alliance with technology and computers is
frequently emphasized in Cadigan’s novel: “We’ve become denizens of the net. Homo
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datum” (386). They are the “incurably informed,” or “synthesizing humans.” Not quite
computers, they are nevertheless willing to “change for the machines,” as Visual Mark
puts it, the synner who makes the most radical change of all by going on-line
permanently and abandoning his body. In the context of the novel, such a change is not
necessarily positive; despite her sophisticated exploration of the fluidity of the
boundaries between human and machine, Cadigan privileges embodied subjectivity, as
we shall see.
The emergence of the stroke/virus is a unique phenomenon, only possible
because of the new socket technology, and consequently the characters have difficulty
characterizing it. It is also, of course, a contagion that crosses the boundaries of the
natural and the artificial. On the one hand, it is a contagious stroke that somehow
replicates within the System. On the other hand, according to Mark, “It was a virus, but
with a most important difference: this one knew where it was, and what it was, and that
it was. This one was alive” (330). In other words, the computer virus is conscious in
the same way that Art Fish is conscious, but its goal is ultimately destructive. It is alive,
“naturalized,” and a hybrid, very much like Art, who argues that his counterpart on the
net should not be characterized as a virus: “It’s not just an infection. It’s not a virus or a
bomb, it’s–I don’t know what to call it ” (357). Mutating and adapting to its
environment, the stroke/virus is a slippery construct, and, as other chapters have shown,
the figure of the virus is accorded a certain liminal status. The fact that the stroke/virus
is an entirely new phenomenon brings to mind Sontag’s comments in “AIDS and Its
Metaphors” about the exchange of metaphors between computers, the newest
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transforming elements in the modern world, and the newest transforming illnesses,
metaphors that distinguish AIDS from other plague-like illnesses: “For though the fears
AIDS represents are old, its status as that unexpected event, an entirely new disease–a
new judgement, as it were–adds to the dread” (158-159). Mark is, in effect, “Patient
Zero,” and numerous users with sockets plugged into the System succumb to the virus
that he unintentionally initiates.8
It is the hackers, together with Mark, Art, Gina, and Sam’s socketed father Gabe,
who finally confront and defeat the virus. Mark’s consciousness joins with Art, and
together they become “Markt,” a synthesized entity that can only provide minimal aid to
Gina and Gabe as they go on-line to try to neutralize the virus. Its interests are perhaps
too close to that of the virus: “One of us is too viral, and the other is too . . .marked”
(418). “Too viral,” in this context, means too far removed from humanity. Fez notes
that Art’s viral core and lack of “heart” prevent him from truly feeling for humans,
remarking that “If he were a flesh person, I’d watch him for sociopathic tendencies . . .
what’s more antisocial than a virus?” (393). Only humans, it is made clear, can succeed
against the virus. “Alive” in the sense that Art is alive, the virus is far more ominous, in
that it is imbued with emotions by its “creator” Mark, who recognizes himself in the
“pain, compulsion, the old drive toward oblivion” (299) when he comes across an early
incarnation of the stroke/virus. Art simply does not have the tools to combat that which
is both conscious and perceptive; only humans have that capability, as well as the
responsibility to destroy the pathogen that they unintentionally created.
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The ultimate showdown in Synners, as in Neuromancer, takes place in a parallel,
virtual world where fighting the “virus” is synonymous with combating Gina and Gabe’s
own fears. The formula is very similar; in Neuromancer, hacker Henry Case is forced to
confront the mistakes of his past, his fears, and his desires by an AI that calls up scenes
and people from his life. He defeats the AI by refusing to succumb to the temptations it
offers him. In Synners, the virus is similarly defeated, as Gina and Gabe refuse to give
in to the fears that the virus calls up from deep within their psyches. In both cases, the
human subjects, “jacked in,” synthesizing, or socketed as they may be, triumph over
their artificial counterparts, privileging the material reality of human experience over
that of the non-human.
The fact that Mark sloughs off his body and Gina preserves hers suggests that
Cadigan does not trouble gender stereotypes that associate men with mind and women
with body, but Gabe and Gina’s rout of the virus makes a strong case for the privileged
position of embodied subjectivity in the novel.9 Neither envies Mark his transformation.
Theirs is the lasting connection in the novel; Gina leaves behind an electronic copy of
herself for “Markt,” but she and Gabe are lovers in the real world. It is the virus that
affords them their life-changing experiences, just as it does for Mark, who abandons his
body in response to it. All the characters, synthesizing humans and synthesized humans,
engage in collective action to combat the virus, and it must be noted that “Markt”
evolves as a direct result of the virus’s assault upon the System. Cadigan’s novel, like
other cyberpunk novels, plays with a variety of subjectivities that incorporate the natural
and the artificial. Toward the end of the novel, Fez observes to his fellow hackers that
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“We might actually have two species of human now, synthesizing human and
synthesized human, all of us being the former, and Art Fish being the latter” (386).
Reminded of Mark’s newest incarnation, he adds, “Make that three species. And like all
good life forms, we have a natural enemy that can prey on all of us” (387). That three
different kinds of subjects can be prey to the same “natural” enemy illustrates the extent
to which the computational and the biological are conflated in Synners.
If the socketed humans in the novel are not quite computers, they are in a sense
indistinguishable from them. Art lectures Sam about humans assuming that they need
not take the precautions they do with their computer systems: “You people got no
shields. You put in the sockets, but you forgot about the watchdogs and the alarm
systems and the antivirals and the vaccines. You people put them on every neural net
except your own” (358). In other words, in constructing the sockets, humans did not
bother to construct a corresponding immune system that would protect against the input
they receive from the System. It proves to be a fatal lack of foresight, a mistake that
dooms the technology of the brain sockets–but only temporarily. There is simply too
much money to be made. To Gina, less naive than Gabe, who believes the sockets will
be banned and insists on living with what he calls “appropriate technology,” it would be
impossible to bury the technology. She reminds Gabe that “All appropriate technology
hurt somebody. Every technology has its original sin. . . . Makes us original synners.
And we still got to live with what we made” (435). The title of the novel, then,
resonates with this idea of original sin and the responsibility of those who “synned.”
Wolmark argues that this notion of accountability, coupled with the depiction of
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technology as “out of control” throughout the novel, suggests that Cadigan feels an
ambivalence toward technology that is not usually apparent in most cyberpunk fiction,
which often features the indiscriminate celebration of it (126).10 Cadigan, no doubt
drawing from real instances of chaos and destruction caused by viruses or worms,
cautions that we are complacent at our own risk.
In Synners, humans, AIs, and computers are all subject to the same “natural”
enemy, as Fez puts it. It does seem only “natural,” though, that with the emergence of
new subjectivities, corresponding enemies will also emerge. Of course, Markt owes its
genesis to the virus, the agent that not only emphasizes the degree to which humans are
already mediated by technology, but also forces the evolution of an entity that is no
longer human in any traditional sense. The binary of self and non-self, then, is
compromised even further through the agency of the virus, and the breakdown between
the natural and the artificial boundaries in Synners is surely most obvious in the way that
humans are required to become aware of themselves as constructs, as indistinguishable
from their artificial extensions. Art’s words to Sam about the vulnerability of humans to
this new virus bring home the fact that the virus’s attack necessitates the
reconceptualization of what it means to be human: “For the first time ever . . . it’s
possible for people to die of bad memes, just like computers. Just like software” (357).
As with the biological viruses discussed in previous chapters, the computer virus has a
way of making the novel’s humans other to themselves, but there is little to suggest that
this new subject position is any way liberatory; rather, it seems clear that Cadigan’s tale
is a cautionary one, in spite of the positive collective action that results as a response to
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viral assault. The novel rests on the idea that memes, or “mind viruses,” are more than
dangerous–they are potentially fatal.
This concept of the meme is one that runs throughout both Synners and Snow
Crash, though Stephenson is somewhat more explicit in his treatment of it. As current
theories about the meme clearly inform both of these texts and mine both biological and
computer virus metaphors, I think it necessary to provide an outline here of the history
of what is touted as the “new science” of memetics, as well as its current application in
fields ranging from philosophy to economics. I will then examine Snow Crash within
the context of meme theory, and compare its treatment of the meme with that of
Synners.
As it is popularly constructed, the meme operates in much the same way that the
alien consciousness does in The X-Files, using our brains as hosts and issuing directives
that we blindly follow, whether that be whistling a catchy tune, repeating a Seinfeldian
phrase (“yada, yada, yada”), or wearing the latest fashion. Like a virus, it has no other
purpose other than to replicate, and it is transmitted through “brain-to-brain” contact.11
Imitation is what guarantees a meme’s success. And while Richard Dawkins,
evolutionary biologist and originator of the term, insists that “We, alone on earth, can
rebel against the tyranny of selfish replicators” (The Selfish Gene 201), some accounts
of the meme suggest otherwise.12 Dawkins, if fact, admits to having rather modest aims,
introducing the meme in The Selfish Gene (1976) primarily as a counter to the idea that
the gene is the only unit of natural selection, and thus the only one that drives the
process of evolution. The meme, then, is analogous to the gene in that it engages in a
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Darwinian struggle to get itself copied. He notes, “The original didactic purpose of the
meme was the negative one of cutting the selfish gene down to size. I became a little
alarmed at the number of my readers who took the meme more positively as a theory of
human culture in its own right–either to criticise it . . . or to carry it far beyond the limits
of what I then thought was justified” (The Meme Machine xvi). As Dawkins observes
here, it appears that the meme meme (or the Meta-meme) has mutated in the process of
ensuring its replication; its success has secured it a place in the Oxford English
Dictionary, and it is the star of several websites devoted to its propagation, including the
“Church of Virus,” whose patron Saint is, not surprisingly, Charles Darwin. The meme
is also featured in a number of books, including Aaron Lynch’s Thought Contagion
(1996), Susan Blackmore’s The Meme Machine (1999), Richard Brodie’s Virus of the
Mind (1996), J. M. Balkin’s Cultural Software (1998), Douglas Rushkoff’s Media
Virus! (1994), Howard Bloom’s The Lucifer Principle (1995), and the philosopher
Daniel Dennett’s Consciousness Explained (1991) and Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995).
As some of these titles suggest, the meme is more readily compared to the virus
than it is to the gene, perhaps echoing Dawkins’ original contention that “When you
plant a fertile meme in my mind you literally parasitize my brain, turning it into a
vehicle for the meme’s propagation in just the way that a virus may parasitize the
genetic mechanism of the host cell” (The Selfish Gene 192). Indeed, in his 1991 article
“Viruses of the Mind,” Dawkins himself thoroughly embraces the metaphor, arguing
that “memeplexes” (mutually compatible groups of memes) such as religion and cults
are viral in nature, meaning that they spread rapidly through large populations by
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replicating themselves using a variety of copying strategies. Children, less able to fend
off memes, are particularly susceptible to this kind of infection, Dawkins argues, and he
details in the course of his argument the “symptoms” that a virulent case of faith
produces. For Dawkins, however, a memeplex such as science, while it appears
“superficially virus-like,” does not fall into the category of mind virus. In other words, a
“viral” meme–as opposed to an apparently non-viral meme–has decidedly negative
connotations, constituting its own epidemiology.
The popular literature on the meme emphasizes its pathogenic qualities, simply
by adopting the rhetoric of emerging virus tales. Richard Brodie’s Virus of the Mind
opens with a “warning” to the unwary reader: “This book contains a live mind virus. Do
not read further unless you are willing to be infected. The infection may affect the way
you think in subtle or not-so-subtle ways–or even turn your world view inside out” (9).
This introduction mimics “legitimate” warnings that notify us of imminent contact with
biohazardous material, much in the way that The Hot Zone does, as its mock-up of
USAMRIID guides the readers through the various biosafety levels in its opening pages.
Brodie, taking Dawkins’ view, explores the effects of those memes that he considers to
be pernicious. The imagery of (harmful) contagion permeates his discussion of religion,
cults, gangs, advertising, and conspiracy theories, and yet Brodie’s stated goal is that his
explanation of the science of memetics will itself function as a “mind virus” that will
innoculate readers against more harmful ones. Presumably there is a difference between
“good” and “bad” mind viruses, a distinction that seems irrelevant because of the
construction of the meme as a virus, which, despite its positive function in the science
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fiction I have analyzed in previous chapters, is pathogenic in a debilitating sense. If
Brodie’s designation of good and bad viruses strikes the reader as arbitrary, it comes as
no surprise, since Dawkins, the “father” of memetics, is equally arbitrary in his
designation of viral and non-viral memes. To readers unversed in memetics, Dawkins’
“Viruses of the Mind” might come across as a rather simplistic treatise, the main
contention of which appears to be the following: religion=bad, science=good. If Brodie,
who dutifully pays homage to Dawkins in his text, is attempting to appropriate the
pathogenicity of the virus in an attempt to construct new, positive associations for it, he
does so in a way that is confusing, poorly reasoned, and likely to reinforce negative
associations with the virus–and, by extension, the “mind virus.”
Pathogenicity is a quality that the “Church of Virus” embraces, the web site
devoted to a religion that is designed to “compete with the traditional (irrational)
religions in the human ideosphere with the idea that it would introduce and propagate
memes which would ensure the survival and evolution of our species.” Lest we question
the effectiveness of using the symbol of a virus as means to win converts, the site has an
answer for us: “The name was chosen to be deliberately antagonistic, to put people on
their guard and let them know this idea was designed to infect them. Call it truth in
advertising.” Certainly the large biohazard symbol on the site’s old home page would
have appeared alarming enough to send surfers on their merry way, skipping the sections
on memetics, philosophy, and the Church’s mission statement altogether.13 Or,
conversely, such an odd juxtaposition of terms might peak one’s curiosity. The new site
is less intimidating, however, with a picture of “St. Darwin” dwarfing the biohazard
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symbol, and an added subtitle: “A neo-cybernetic philosophy for the 21st century.” And
while the Church’s mind virus is meant to “infect” the unwary user, it is paradoxically a
“good” virus, as it is purported to be more useful and accurate than other competing
viruses (religions). Again, this is the line of thinking that Brodie adopts, but at least the
Church of the Virus offers some actual alternatives to what it considers to be pernicious
mind viruses, mostly in the form of recommended texts, or “meme vehicles.”
Even a memetic lexicon, compiled by Glenn Grant in 1990 and reproduced at the
Church’s site, employs the language of contagion, distinguishing between terms such as
“infection strategy,” “vaccime,” “vector,” “immuno-depressant,”and “retromeme.”14
Such terminology lends materiality to the meme, associating it with something that we
know has a definite structure, even though we cannot see it. And Dawkins agrees that
memes should be thought of as living structures, not just metaphorically, but technically
(The Selfish Gene 192). Why, then, we might ask, is the meme not more readily
associated with the more neutral-sounding, if still “selfish,” gene? One answer might be
that we are already primed by epidemiological models–both of the biological and the
computer variety–but another might be that genes and viruses function in similar ways,
even if a gene is not generally associated with parasitism. As Dawkins observes,
“viruses may be genes who have broken loose from ‘colonies’ such as ourselves. . . .
The suggestion is that they have evolved from ‘rebel’ genes who escaped, and now
travel from body to body directly through the air, rather than via the more conventional
vehicles–sperms and eggs. If this is true, we might just as well regard ourselves as
colonies of viruses!” (The Selfish Gene 182). And that is exactly how some memeticists
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view the human brain–as a colony of “mind” viruses, some of which are more successful
at replicating than others.
Aaron Lynch, among others, defends the use of contagion imagery to describe
the transmission of memes: “Memetic folkways need not correspond to viral diseases,
and so do not always deserve the same bad reputation. . . . The terms thought contagion
and epidemiology . . . carry neutral connotations in the context of memetics theory” (10).
We need only to look to the Church of Virus to view the counter to that defense, whose
web site employs the language of contagion precisely because it is anything but neutral.
We might also note that Lynch does not try to divorce the meme from the language of
contagion, which serves as an implicit acknowledgment of the impossibility of such an
endeavor. Instead he suggests that the meme is a more permeable construct, open to
other interpretations. In other words, the meme really is a lot like a virus, that
permeable body that lends itself to any number of interpretive possibilities. Perhaps, if
memeticists are indeed able to divest the meme of good/bad connotations, there is hope
for an understanding of the virus that does not simply rely upon the self/non-self and
good/bad hierarchies. So far, however, the meme continues to be subject to the virus’s
(mostly negative) metaphorical attachments.
As I have outlined it here, memetics, often touted as a “new” science, may sound
as if it owes much to the well-established field of social science known as social
contagion theory, which examines the spread of certain behaviors in populations.
Aggression, hysteria, and suicidal tendencies are among the “epidemics” that social
contagion theorists research, using a variety of methods.15 What differentiates memetics
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from most social contagion theory, however, is the former’s emphasis on evolutionary
process, as well as its positing of a physical structure that functions as the unit of
cultural transmission. The very materiality of the meme is what so many critics find
problematic about memetics, particularly as the physical structure of the meme has not,
up to this point, been proven to exist. In contrast, the meme’s metaphorical counterparts,
genes and viruses, may be discerned with the proper equipment, though we might have
difficulty describing just what constitutes a gene, exactly. We have an easier time
imagining viruses, which are self-enclosed entities like bacteria or cells.16 In the 1980s
and 1990s, we could hardly escape the images of viruses, with renderings of HIV
emblazoned across the cover of numerous magazines and other publications. And we
now have the terminology of viruses at our disposal, after years of exposure to the AIDS
epidemic and years of attempting to “innoculate” the precious electronic extensions of
our minds against marauding lines of code. It is no wonder, then, that the figure of the
virus is so readily appropriated by adherents to meme theory, who are themselves wellversed in the language of contagion.
Some time before Dawkins posited the parasitic nature of the unit of cultural
transmission we know as the meme, William S. Burroughs attributed similar
characteristics to the word itself:
My general theory since 1971 has been that the Word is literally a virus,
and that it has not been recognized as such because it has achieved a state
of relatively stable symbiosis with its human host; that is to say, the Word
Virus (the Other Half) has established itself so firmly as an accepted part
of the human organism that it can now sneer at gangster viruses like
smallpox and turn them over to the Pasteur Institute. But the Word
clearly bears the single identifying feature of a virus: it is an organism
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with no internal function other than to replicate itself. ( The Adding
Machine 48)
The word, like the meme, has a discernable material structure, but Burroughs does not
limit the virus to representation of language only; he notes that “image is virus” and that
“The whole quality of human consciousness, as expressed in male and female, is
basically a virus mechanism” (Cities of the Red Night ). Memetic theorists make similar
claims, but few embrace the virus as thoroughly as Burroughs does, who details the
literal infection of the body by the Word Virus in a number of texts. For Burroughs, the
Word (the Other Half) is responsible for imposing dualism, a state that leads to endless
conflicts. Far from suggesting that the binary of self and other may be deconstructed by
an interrogation of the virus itself, Burroughs portrays the Word as that which actually
initiates this central binary, thus preventing unity.17 Word and image–both powerful
viruses–are a means of control by those who wield them, such as the Nova Mob in The
Ticket That Exploded (1962). Thus Burroughs precedes Cadigan and Stephenson in his
use of fictional viral “memes,” incorporating his theory of the Word in his novels years
before Dawkins coined the term meme.
The strategies of the alien colonists in The X-Files owe something to those of
Burroughs’ own alien Nova Mob, who control humans through deployment of a kind of
media virus. Like the meme, the word is biologized, or concretized, in Burroughs’ texts.
His use of viral metaphors is an important, though uncredited, predecessor to French
philosopher Jean Baudrillard’s adoption of viral metaphors, which Baudrillard uses to
describe thought and image.18 For Baudrillard, the media “transmit the virus. They are
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the virus.” (Paroxysm 33). Memeticists might phrase it a little differently, noting that the
media is merely a vehicle that disseminates memes. Following Baudrillard’s
characterization of the media, we could say that the Nike March Madness commercials
examined in Chapter Two–those glossy and homogenized media products–are in some
sense self-reflexive, underscoring their own viral aspects. In fact, the tone of the
commercials bears some relation to what others have termed Baudrillard’s “apocalyptic
thinking,” which takes the virus, in addition to the genetic code, as one of its central
tropes. Although the Nike spots are decidedly tongue-in-cheek, they appropriate darker
end-game scenarios from emerging virus tales and The X-Files. While ostensibly
hawking Nike products, they also associate the brand with a rapidly spreading
contagion–the effect is that March Madness somehow arises from Nike itself, rendering
the swoosh synonymous with the agent of infection.
This alliance is not so far removed from the attempts of marketers to create
memes of their products, in hopes that they will proliferate, either through slogan, logo,
or some other marker. This is of course not a new idea; what is new is the conscious
appropriation of the term “meme” or “mind virus” in order to describe these marketing
strategies, as well as the use of the Internet and so-called benign computer viruses to
spread product information. Nike, apparently, had few problems with the idea of
aligning itself with the imagery of contagion. Mike Folino, one of those who came up
with the original idea, joked that “Nike probably understands that March Madness is a
real problem in society right now, as a disease. It's brave of them to come out and talk
about it and show what really happens, [because] their sneakers and athletic wear are
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part of the cause" (Woodward 14).19 What we can see here is that just as the figure of
the virus is appropriated in various contexts to symbolize communism, so it can also be
adapted to simulate the spread of capitalism, a notion that both Cadigan and Stephenson
examine in their texts and one to which I will return. What is especially significant in
this context is that the marketing “meme,” while clearly associated with viral imagery, is
adopted precisely because the sole function of the virus is replication; the meme is not
evil or good, but simply a self-replicator, an agent that is only “good” in the sense that it
spreads the capitalist Word. Thus marketers, who artlessly adopt the term meme to
serve their own ends, come closer to making the association of epidemiology with the
meme “neutral” than do the memeticists themselves, who frequently subject replication
to philosophical and moral standards of judgement. Marketers don’t bother
characterizing replication (i.e. replication of Nike logo is good, replication of Camel
logo is bad)–it is simply a workable metaphor, one that’s good for business.
As memetics employs the language and imagery of biological viruses, so does it
appropriate the language of computer viruses. In 1976, even before the development of
computer viruses, Dawkins writes in the Selfish Gene that “The computers in which
memes live are human brains” (197), which he then follows up with a note in the 1989
edition in which he recognizes the aptness of his metaphor: “It was obviously
predictable that manufactured electronic computers, too, would eventually play host to
self-replicating patterns of information–memes . . . . It is a perfect milieu for selfreplicating programs to flourish and spread” (329). He admits that when he wrote the
first edition of the book, he believed that undesirable computer memes would only result
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as a spontaneous error in the copying of a program, unable to imagine that people would
in the future deliberately program viruses and worms. In his 1991 article “Viruses of the
Mind,” the title of which is clearly an homage to Burroughs, who coined the phrase, he
explains the memetic “infection” of religion by explicitly comparing it to the infection
of computers by viruses, constructing what he calls a “model for an informational
epidemiology.” Although he acknowledges that computers and DNA actually replicate
more faithfully than the human brain, he argues that “At the very least the mind is a
plausible candidate for infection by something like a computer virus.” What is
particularly noteworthy about this essay, which basically serves as a condemnation of
religion-as-virus, is Dawkins’ proposal that computer viruses can be used for beneficial
purposes. Among his suggestions are transforming existing anti-viral programs into
viruses and sending out viruses to do market research. As I previously mentioned, it is
business that has most visibly put this notion of the beneficial virus to work, in “viral
marketing” schemes that have customers propagate a product by making them “vectors”
for company logos or slogans. For example, Hotmail, a free e-mail service, attaches an
advertisement to every missive that its users send. At this time no traditional computer
viruses actually circulate in this fashion, however, and even the Hotmail attachment is
not a virus, per se. Rather, “viral marketing,” a term coined by Steve Jurvetson and Tim
Draper, is simply a high-tech version of word-of-mouth. But it is certainly easy to
imagine, as Dawkins suggests, that there will come a time when “viruses, both bad and
good, have become so ubiquitous that we could speak of an ecological community of
viruses and legitimate programs coexisting in the siliconsphere ” (“Mind Viruses”).
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Indeed, this scenario is precisely what Cadigan envisages in Synners. The viral
extensions of Art Fish even make other programs more responsive, initiating in them a
kind of evolutionary process. And one hacker, disgusted with the buggy computercontrolled rental car system, remarks, “GridLid’s so stuffed with viruses that someday
the viruses are just gonna take over. Probably do a better job, too” (149). Dawkins is of
a similar mind: “I envisage a time when . . . computer viruses may evolve towards
compatibility with other viruses, to form communities or gangs” (“Mind Viruses”). He
does not find the thought comforting, however.
As Dawkins and others show, the comparison between memes and computer
viruses rests on the corresponding analogy between brains and computers: “The
computers in which memes live are human brains” (Dawkins, The Selfish Gene 197).
According to some meme theorists, however, the brain is not simply a vehicle for meme
propagation; it is instead itself a complex of memes, suggesting that our minds are
largely the creation of memes. J. M. Balkin embraces this notion, as well as the brainas-computer metaphor, in Cultural Software, in which he argues that humans are
constituted by cultural information, the basis of our historical existence. This cultural
information he calls “cultural software,” which runs on the computers of our brains, a
metaphor he justifies because of its appropriateness in explaining how cultural
understanding may be shared while still accounting for the inevitable differentiation
among members of a culture or interpretive community. He believes it a more useful
trope for explaining how people come to believe the things they believe than Marxist
theories of ideology, which he believes “view ideology as a disease or a decrepit form of
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human thought” (19). According to him, because the idea of software running on a
computer does not carry inherently negative connotations, but rather suggests the
processing of value-neutral information, it allows us to understand ideology not simply
through its negative effects, but through its positive ones as well. In response to
Balkin’s characterization of value-neutral information, which erroneously assumes for
human thought the same neutrality that information theorists impart to information, we
would do well to remember Frederic Jameson’s dictum “Always historicize!” in The
Political Unconscious (1981), in which he states that “everything is ‘in the last analysis’
political” (20). Thus, in whatever way ideology is constituted, there can be no “valueneutral information.” Ideological power in Balkin’s scenario “is the power that cultural
software has over the persons who are constituted by it, who are persons because of it.
Instead of seeing ideology in the form of false beliefs held by subjects who preexist
those beliefs, it locates the source of ideological power in the constitution of subjectivity
itself” (Balkin 19). Balkin’s construction of cultural software is problematic, employing
a metaphor that glosses over the complexity of ideology.
Balkin’s theory, like much of meme theory, is similar to any number of
poststructuralist theories that posit the instability of the subject, and indeed Dennett,
Dawkins, and Blackmore argue that subjectivity as it is traditionally understood is an
illusion. Balkin, however, admits that cultural software is not the sole component of
human reason, but rather its historical component–he is not entirely willing to give up
subjectivity to the memes. In other words, he grants that the human brain’s operating
system is much more complex than the metaphor he employs. Nevertheless, he firmly
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advances the idea that “Our human existence as embodiments of information, as bearers
of cultural know-how, is the most basic motivation for the metaphor of cultural
software” (15). That humans may be so readily relegated to the status of “meme
reception machines” or computers is unsurprising in view of the exchanges between
informational theory and molecular biology that I referred to earlier, but even the most
careful analysis of the brain in relation to computers appears surprisingly incongruous,
and one that requires continual explanatory asides and justifications.20 Perhaps no other
comparison, however, other than that of the corresponding viruses, illustrates the extent
of our inability to separate the biological from the computational.
If Dawkins and Balkin were to construct a fictional universe in which memes
reigned supreme, it might look very much like the one Neal Stephenson creates in Snow
Crash. This world is driven by the central metaphor that human are computers; those
who know how to program cultural software–using the human equivalent of machine
language–have the ability to shape human will and thought.21 They control both the
input and output of information, which, as I discussed earlier, is a commodity more
precious than human life. In The X-Files the government seeks to control (and
manipulate) DNA, the code of life, thereby ensuring the ultimate triumph of the carceral.
In Snow Crash, it is primarily the brain which is subject to surveillance and
manipulation; the ends of the power brokers, however, are the same as those in The XFiles, and the villains in Snow Crash gain direct access to the brain by virtue of memes
and a biological virus. Prey to the boundary-crossing Snow Crash virus, humans can be
infected in both the material world and in the Metaverse, Stephenson’s update of
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Gibsonian cyberspace. That is, Snow Crash may be transmitted by blood and other
bodily fluids, or by computer code. Like the virus in Synners, it refuses to recognize the
boundary between the natural and artificial realms. The resulting infection causes its
human hosts to babble long lines of “code,” or the universal tongue that is based in the
deep structures of the brain. Thus the victim is effectively cut off from higher-level
brain functions. Once the machine language of the brain is accessed, it is susceptible to
programming by the purveyor of the drug, right-wing megalomaniacal Texas capitalist
L. Bob Rife, whose ultimate goal is the control of information.
The “software” that Rife installs in these brains renders humans as little more
than automatons, much like those infected with the viral alien consciousness in The XFiles. They follow Rife’s directives, but are not conscious of doing so, as these
directives bypass the brain’s high-level functions that allow for independent thought.
They are, in a sense, not truly conscious. Snow Crash, characterized at one point as “a
virus, a drug, or a religion,” is a viral idea–a meme–with a biological virus counterpart.
In other words, it is the instantiation of Dawkins’ contention that “The computers in
which memes live are human brains” (The Selfish Gene 197). What is only speculative
in memetics–i.e. the physical structure of the meme–becomes concrete in science fiction
with the novel’s conflation of the meme and the virus. Here again can we see how
science fiction mirrors and extrapolates from developments in scientific theory–if we
grant that memetics is indeed a science, that is. The Snow Crash virus is the tool of an
ancient cult, a metavirus that provides the foundation for ancient civilization and persists
to this day:
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We are all susceptible to the pull of viral ideas. Like mass hysteria. . . . .
No matter how smart we get, there is always this deep irrational part that
makes us potential hosts for self-replicating information. But being
physically infected . . . makes you a whole lot more susceptible. The
only thing that keeps these things from taking over is the Babel
factor–the walls of mutual incomprehension that compartmentalize the
human race and stop the spread of viruses. (399-400)
Weaving together Sumerian and Judeo-Christian mythology, with no small
amount of linguistics theory, Stephenson constructs a story of the origin of modern
human consciousness that credits a particular virus with forcing its emergence. We
might compare this evolution to that of Markt in Synners, who also emerges as a result
of viral influences, or to Darwin’s Radio, in which a virus facilitates human evolution..
In Snow Crash, the “Babel factor” is considered to be the defining moment of the
emergence of human consciousness, as it represents the point at which humans no longer
communicate in a common tongue and develop new and different languages. As in the
story of the Tower of Babel, this radical departure from a universal grammar is not
voluntary; it is, rather, the work of a neurolinguistic virus, or “nam-shub” (“a speech
with magical force”), programmed by an ancient “hacker,” of sorts, to counter the
metavirus. Echoing Burroughs, Stephenson suggests that human consciousness is
derived from a virus mechanism.
Civilization as we know it today, Stephenson explains, is a result of this new,
and yet very old, virus. To explain the shift that Babel represents, he takes us back to
Sumeria, whose people spoke in a language unlike any modern tongue–i.e. the Edenic
language of which the Jewish and Christian religions speak. The Sumerians were not
truly conscious; rather, they were ruled by verbal rules, or programs, called me.
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Basically, the me are the cultural software of Sumerian societies, endowing their human
hosts with skills ranging from baking bread to building houses to diplomacy. Hiro
Protagonist, the aptly named contemporary hacker who researches the connection
between Babel and L. Bob Rife’s plot to control people through the agency of the Snow
Crash virus, likens me to the operating system of a computer: “To start up the machine,
you have to infuse those circuits with a collection of rules that tell it how to function.
How to be a computer. It sounds as though these me served as the operating system of
the society, organizing an inert collection of people into a functioning system” (257).
Autonomy among the Sumerians, however, did not exist; people simply followed
the programs “installed” on their hard drive, which made them easy to control. They
were incapable of fending off these mind viruses because, like computers, they were not
conscious. That is, their brains had yet to develop an immune system, which would
have provided them with the necessary barriers and warning systems to stave off
viruses.22 In Synners, the failure to develop an immune system to protect against a new
kind of virus is what causes the deaths of those who use the brain sockets. As Art
admonishes Sam, “You people got no shields” (358). In the present-day of Snow Crash,
however, many humans have developed immunities against certain kinds of memes,
which is why Rife feels it necessary to cut them off from higher-level brain functions.
Robbed of consciousness, and hence immunity, they become susceptible to his
programming.
The me, a manifestation of the metavirus, were stored in temples–ancient
databases–controlled by a priest-king figure called an en who distributed the me to the
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people. Enki, who was one of these en and revered as a Promethean god by the
Sumerians, decided to liberate the people from their viral civilization; he forced them to
innovate and think independently by releasing his nam-shub into the world, which
served to reprogram the deep structures of the brain and sever the connections from the
common language: “Babel is the gateway in our minds, a gateway that was opened by
the nam-shub of Enki that broke us free from the metavirus and gave us the ability to
think–moved us from a materialistic world to a dualistic world–a binary world–with
both a physical and a spiritual component” (399). Again we have an echo of Burroughs,
but with a twist; here a word virus is responsible both for “unity” (in the form of a
universal language) and dualism. For Burroughs the Word virus imposes a dualism that
humans can never truly overcome; he avows that there can be no unity. Unlike
Burroughs, Stephenson suggests that the virus can serve a useful function, even if it is
only to combat another virus.
Fast forward five thousand years, and the metavirus returns with a vengeance in
the form of a digital virus, crashing the mind of hackers, those whose understanding of
binary code is built into the deep structures of the brain. L. Bob Rife, recognizing that
contemporary hackers in effect program their own nam-shubs by writing and executing
computer code, which is itself a kind of performative speech, hopes to bully them into
standing aside while he “converts” others using the biological version of the virus. In a
“postrational” society, where a vast number of people are illiterate and rely on the oral
tradition of television culture, people are particularly susceptible to the kind of mind
viruses that Rife promotes, as they do not possess the barriers that education can
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provide. Hackers, as a literate power elite who understand the nature of information, are
not as susceptible to these virulent memes. Thus Rife acquires the agent of Snow Crash,
“the atomic bomb of informational warfare–a virus that causes any system to infect itself
with new viruses” (200), in hopes of keeping hackers in line by holding it in reserve as a
threat. Once the virus is revealed to a hacker in the virtual reality world of the
Metaverse, a world that is only made possible by Rife’s fiber-optic network, the brain
becomes infected and the mind is destroyed.23
The primary way Rife spreads the metavirus among the masses, however, is
through a combination of religious practices and the transmission through blood. The
biological version of the metavirus is associated with the Sumerian goddess Asherah,
whose followers promoted the transmission through the use of cult prostitutes. Even
after Babel, this biological version of the metavirus remained dormant in the brain,
passed on from one generation to the next and prone to occasional “outbreaks” which
involved instances of glossalia, or the speaking in tongues–presumably in the universal
language. In Stephenson these outbreaks are depicted as ominous, suggesting a
dangerous irrationality that must be suppressed. In Griffith’s Ammonite, the Jeep virus
bestows a similar facility for a kind of “universal” language upon the infected, who tap
into this language when meditating, singing, and even achieving conception; that women
can access this language is considered a boon. Like those infected with the metavirus,
the women of Jeep access an ancient language, but unlike those infected in Stephenson’s
novel, they are conscious of doing so. The communal language to them is a version of
the nam-shub, as they can effect changes in the material world just by speaking it. It is,
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like machine language, performative. The viral universal language in Stephenson, then,
is deeply irrational and therefore dangerous; universal, or semiotic, language in Griffith
disrupts rationality and therefore enables a subversion of the patriarchal discourse that is
the heritage of the women who speak it. It is the subversion of rationality that characters
in Snow Crash fight against, aligning Asherah and her virus, which disrupts rationality,
with the villains in the text. If there is a language that is privileged in Snow Crash, it is
machine language, which issues from the minds of rational, well-educated programmers.
Its counterpart is instinctive and imprecise, arising from the infected and susceptible
body/brain.
In many ways, Stephenson privileges rationality in his text; Asherah is
associated with the body, and Enki, who combats the virus she promotes with a
neurolinguistic one, with the mind. Consequently, Asherah, like many stereotypical
depictions of women, is associated with the pre-rational or even irrational, while Enki is
credited with ushering in a new rational age. Asherah is deeply, treacherously
entrenched in the body, coiled like a serpent around the brainstem; the goddess’s
ophidian associations owe something to this snake-like description of the virus, which,
as we saw with Shelley’s Plague and Preston’s filovirus, is evocative of the virus’s
cunning and evil nature. Of course, as we also see in Preston, the virus is associated
with a voracious feminine sexuality that can wither testicles, among other things.
Asherah’s use of sexuality is successful in winning her followers, and she endures even
to this day. The contemporary manifestation of the cult of Asherah is the Pentecostal
church, which Rife appropriates and transforms into the Reverend Wayne’s Pearly Gates
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franchise and which spreads throughout the West and the Third World.24 Recognizing,
as Dawkins does, that religion is an extraordinarily powerful meme which taps into “this
deep irrational part that makes us potential hosts for self-replicating information”
(Stephenson 399), Rife uses it as a vehicle for transmission of the virus. To ensure the
susceptibility of his converts, he sends out missionaries to developing countries to
vaccinate their populations, adding a dollop of Snow Crash into the mix. For the
populations of the decadent West, he devises a drug composed primarily of addictive
drugs and the virus, similar to the amyl nitrate “poppers” once linked with AIDS
transmission.
In describing Snow Crash as a virus that causes any system–including a human
“system”–to infect itself with other viruses, and by explaining its transmission under the
guise of now debunked theories about HIV that traced its origin to contaminated
vaccinations or “poppers,” Stephenson not only echoes AIDS lore, but he broadly
satirizes the idea that AIDS may in fact be a conspiracy engineered by some malevolent
entity. In this case, the virus is synonymous with corporate interests and religion, two
things that are virtually indistinguishable in the novel. Stephenson takes the analogy
between religion and the virus as far as it will go; not only is Reverend Wayne’s church
viral in the sense that Dawkins describes religion, attributing a memetic cause to this
particular spread of mind viruses, but it actively propagates biological viruses in a
double whammy meant to ensure the complete loss of autonomy of the masses. Religion
is not simply an opiate–it is an infection.25 Cadigan also employs this metaphor in
Synners, setting up a virtual church called “The St. Dismas Infirmary for the Incurably
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Informed” as a front for the exchange of stolen and sensitive information. St. Diz is the
pseudonym for Art Fish, the viral AI. The St. Dismas Infirmary is a church, basically,
for hackers, while Reverend Wayne’s caters to a much different population: Christian,
conservative, uneducated.26 That Stephenson makes a fundamentalist Christian sect
responsible for the spread of a plague transmitted by blood, whose original source is a
woman, is a savage jab at the Christian Right, whose early attitudes about AIDS helped
to shape the popular view that only un-Christian and “unnatural” people contract AIDS.
The L.A. of Snow Crash, home of Hiro Protagonist and his sidekick Y.T., a
fifteen-year-old skateboarding Kourier who delivers packages by way of the cars she
“poons” (harpoons) on the freeway, is very much like the one depicted in Synners.
California, it seems, is an ideal setting for viral apocalypse, or “infocalypse,” Rife’s plan
to deploy Snow Crash in the Metaverse. Dangerous, overpopulated, and overrun with
franchises, the L.A. depicted in the novel differs only by degrees from the L.A. of today,
and Stephenson’s deft satirical strokes delineate an America that is strikingly familiar:
‘No surprises’ is the motto of the franchise ghetto, its Good
Housekeeping seal, subliminally blazoned on every sign and logo that
make up the curves and grids of light that outline the Basin . . . . The
people of America, who live in the world’s most surprising and terrible
country, take comfort in that motto. Follow the loglo outward, to where
the growth is enfolded into the valleys and the canyons, and you find the
land of the refugees. They have fled from the true America, the America
of atomic bombs, scalpings, hip-hop, chaos theory, cement overshoes,
snake handlers, spree killers, space walks, buffalo jumps, drive-bys,
cruise missiles, Sherman’s March, gridlock, motorcycle gangs, and
bungee jumping. They have parallel-parked their bimbo boxes in
identical computer-designed Burbclave street patterns and secreted
themselves in symmetrical sheetrock shitholes with vinyl floors and illfitting woodwork and no sidewalks, vast house farms out in the loglo
wilderness, a culture medium for a medium culture. (191)
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The economic stability of the United States, whose output is reduced to the four things it
can do best–music, movies, microcode, and high-speed pizza delivery–depends
primarily on a series of franchises. Government as we know it has all but disappeared,
replaced by the likes of Uncle Enzo’s CosaNostra Pizza, Narcolombia, Reverend
Wayne’s Pearly Gates, and Mr. Lee’s Greater Hong Kong–all of which may be found in
any city in America. The notion that a single corporation in Synners marketing the brain
sockets “seemed to be more pervasive than Dr. Fish” (154) is broadened in Snow Crash
to include a contemplation of the franchise phenomenon as inherently viral: “The
franchise and the virus work on the same principle: what thrives in one place will thrive
in another. You just have to find a sufficiently virulent business plan, condense it into a
three-ring binder–its DNA–xerox it, and embed it in the fertile lining of a well-traveled
highway” (190-191). What this suggests is that the virus is as suited to a description of
rampant capitalism as it is to the Cold War style communism explored in Chapter Two.
And if the parallels between Sumerian culture (pre-rational) and ours (postrational) are
not already manifest in the description of the susceptibility to memes, the comparison
between the distribution of those memes or cultural software in each reinforces the
association. Sumerian culture, with its temples full of successful viruses, is no different
from a contemporary franchise operation, “except that it had ziggurats instead of golden
arches, and clay tablets instead of three-ring binders” (397).
Hiro, a freelance hacker who originally helped develop the Metaverse, is a
suitable choice to help defeat Rife’s plans precisely because he is not a “corporate
assembly-line hacker” and thus less susceptible to infection. That is, Hiro is an
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innovator, and unwilling to be constrained by mind-numbing corporate rules and
regulations. There is a sameness about corporate hackers that is dangerous, a hegemony
that is echoed in the franchise motto: “no surprises.” Variety, or difference, is what
confounds a virus in nature, and capitalism ensures that there is increasingly less and
less difference with the spread of franchises across the globe. Not only does Hiro
confound sameness with his innovative programming skills and his individuality, but, as
a Korean-African American, he is genetically diverse as well. Vulnerable to Snow
Crash, he is nevertheless capable of inoculating his brain against other virulent memes.
His partner Juanita, however, manages to combat the metavirus directly after voluntarily
submitting to an implantation of a radio antennae into her brainstem by Rife, who issues
directives to his automatons via the antennae. In effect, Juanita joins the thousands of
Third World refugees on the Raft, a conglomeration of ships that Rife has constructed
into a tightly organized hierarchy of people speaking the same tongue. His plan is to
have them invade California, thus hastening the spread of the virus. The “wireheads”
like Juanita issue his commands to the wireless, but Juanita overcomes her
programming, eventually becoming a “ba’al shem,” a (pre-Enki) sorcerer for whom the
utterance of words is calculated to effect material changes. What Hiro and Juanita can
do with binary code on computer systems, Juanita can now do with brains: “I can hack
the brainstem” (430). Her abilities are now on a par with the infected women in
Ammonite, who also effect material changes with the utterance of their communal
language. Unlike those women, Juanita appears to be the only one of her kind; the virus
does not enable a sense of community for her.
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Much more so than Visual Mark in Synners, who is basically the progenitor and
victim of the stroke/virus, Juanita is able to use the metavirus for her own ends,
suggesting the liberatory potential of this particular boundary-crossing virus. However,
as Hayles and David Porush point out, Juanita drops out of the plot, functioning as little
more than a love interest for Hiro. Porush argues that Stephenson attempts to preserve
the rationality he privileges throughout the novel by not devoting more time to Juanita’s
newfound mystical abilities; for him, the text rejects the spiritual transcendence that
Juanita’s transformation suggests (568). Hayles, on the other hand, argues that the
explanation for Juanita’s treatment is not quite as clear-cut, pointing out places in the
text where rationality it itself clearly useless to those who combat Snow Crash. What
neither critic discusses is the fact that Hiro also serves as a ba’al shem of sorts,
constructing a nam-shub against the digital version of Snow Crash in the Metaverse.
Hiro devises a bit of medicine that disables the virus, thereby saving thousands of
hackers from “the Big One,” or infocalypse.27 Certainly Hiro’s powers are less mystical,
but no less effective, than Juanita’s.
Perhaps Juanita’s part in the final battle pitched between Rife and his minions
and Hiro, Y.T., Uncle Enzo of CosaNostra Pizza, and Mr. Lee of Mr. Lee’s Greater
Hong Kong, is minimized because Stephenson prefers to stage the confrontation
according to good old-fashioned American ingenuity and the well-established rules
between good guys and bad guys. And yet part of this showdown takes place in the
Metaverse, where we are told that magic is possible: “The Metaverse in its entirety
could be considered single vast nam-shub, enacting itself on L. Bob Rife’s fiber-optic
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network” (212). Or perhaps Juanita is too clearly compromised by the virus, not far
enough removed from those on the Raft controlled by Rife. Whatever the case, there is
little contemplation of Juanita’s transformation, which suggests that if it is not altogether
dismissed as an indicator of the liberatory potentiality of the virus, it is at least
problematic. In Cadigan’s novel, on the other hand, numerous characters speculate
about the implications of the new subjectivities as represented by Art, Mark, and finally
Markt. Stephenson does not dwell on the “newness” of the subjectivities as represented
by Rife’s automatons or Juanita, in part because it is clear that while they may be new in
the context of the contemporary culture of the novel, they are in fact ancient, brought
about by a virus that is also “new” and yet very old. Despite the differences in the
novels, though, both Cadigan and Stephenson are invested in preserving the autonomous
human subject against the virus that threatens it.
Nevertheless, characters in both novels are so heavily mediated by technology
that it is difficult not to think about them as somehow inextricable from their artificial
counterparts, much like the viruses themselves.28 What is different about this
construction versus the one Cadigan presents is that it suggests that our natures have
always been inherently computational; humanity as we know it is a relatively new
phenomenon, brought about by a neurolinguistic virus that separates us from this
essential nature. The “other” in Snow Crash is not simply a virus; rather, it is the
automaton that stands in contrast with the fully realized “human,” a creature of free will
and consciousness. In a similar way, Art Fish represents that which is completely
removed from humanity, however much it attempts to approximate it by representing
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itself as human. “Viral to the core,” it cannot truly empathize with the humans it claims
as friends. But Art Fish, a viral AI, is a new phenomenon; in Cadigan, humanity is
“old” and the viral is new. For the synners, the realization that they have suddenly
become prey to an enemy once reserved for computers alone requires them to become
aware of themselves as constructs–if not actually computers, at least indistinguishable
from them.
In other words, in Snow Crash, one is born a computer; in Synners, one becomes
one. In both texts, though, there is an suspicion of technology that suggests an
uneasiness with the equation of humans and computers. Hiro, though not averse to
using top-of-the-line weaponry in his battle against Rife and his followers, favors using
a couple of Japanese samurai swords given to him by his father, who had come by them
when he killed a Japanese officer during World War II. Mafia boss Uncle Enzo, who
finds himself in a fight with a very dangerous Aleut Indian called Raven–one of Rife’s
key heavies–reverts to using combat techniques honed in the jungles of Vietnam. He
survives because of his quick thinking and his distrust of technology: “This is exactly
the kind of high-tech nonsense that never, ever worked when we tried it in Vietnam”
(458). Even Ng, the “mechanically assisted” Vietnamese Security expert who works
with Hiro, the Mafia, and Mr. Lee’s Greater Hong Kong, and provides Hiro with a
nuclear-powered machine gun that “snow crashes” as a crucial moment because of bugs
in its system software, warns him that “No piece of software is ever bug free” (408).
And Uncle Enzo rejoins, “I guess there’s little bit of Asherah in all of us” (408). We are
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left, then, to trust our own senses, which like our technology are riddled with viruses and
inconsistencies, but still preferable to those of soulless machines.
In the end, individuals working together assert their own viral programming in
Snow Crash, using Enki’s original counter-virus to restore, or reprogram, the brain’s
higher-level functions. Once again the virus bestows individuality and agency upon the
zombie-like collective of the infected. As for Rife, he is dispatched by the Rat Thing, a
cyborg “guard dog” programmed by Ng Security Industries and equipped with
radiothermal isotopes that allows him to run at over seven hundred miles per hour.
Although Rat Things are conditioned to stay within their “hutches” until they receive
commands telling them otherwise, this Rat Thing overcomes his programming because
of his love for Y.T., whom he perceives as being in danger and who was his owner
before he had been transformed into “Rat Thing number B-782." As a result, he
sacrifices himself and manages to prevent Rife from escaping by annihilating his plane.
Like Juanita, the Rat Thing refuses to submit to the programming that robs him of
autonomy. The dog in him reasserts itself, shrugging off his conditioning. That the last,
spectacularly violent scene in the novel involves a cyborg dog whose loyalty wins out
over his programming suggests that, in the end, technology cannot replace that which
makes us human (and dog, in this case).
Stephenson, like some contemporary memeticists, holds out for the possibility
that there is some defense against memetic/viral programming–that we may choose our
own programming. The idea, as Susan Blackmore proposes in The Meme Machine, that
our notions of free will and consciousness are illusions created by memes for the
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purpose of their own replication runs counter to Dawkins’ assertion that “We, alone on
earth, can rebel against the tyranny of selfish replicators.” But it is Dawkins’ vision that
Snow Crash finally embraces, transferring control back to the individual. The same is
true for Synners, in which “For the first time ever . . . it’s possible for people to die of
bad memes, just like computers. Just like software” (357). Like Stephenson, however,
Cadigan suggests that memes are a fact of life, but that memes and viruses are not
always destructive. And Enki’s nam-shub demonstrates that although we are already
compromised by viruses, they do not necessarily render us as less (or more) than human.
In other words, as I have argued in previous chapters, human and virus are inextricable.
Both of these texts, while they serve to disrupt binaries between the
natural/artificial and self/other by taking full advantage of the liminal status of the virus,
as well as by effecting a naturalization of computer viruses and rendering humans and
their viruses as artificial, only hint at the subject’s capacity for disruption. Like victims
of a typical biological viral infection, most of the humans involved revert to a version of
“normal” once the infection has run its course. They may be changed by their
experience, perhaps inoculated against certain memetic invasions, but they are
essentially the same: human. There are a few left in the infection’s wake–Markt,
Juanita–that suggest the virus can function as a kind of evolutionary agent, but these
characters clearly play a secondary role to those who take on the virus directly.
Nevertheless, the central question these texts asks is how much of what we traditionally
define as “human” is actually compromised by the virus? In Stephenson’s novel
humans are (always) already compromised by the virus, as human consciousness is
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derived from a virus mechanism. In Cadigan’s novel, humans have a symbiotic
relationship with the memes and viruses that can be as dangerous as it is rewarding.
Both authors revel in the mutability of the virus, a chameleon pathogen which assumes
any number of (sometimes contradictory) roles in their texts. Whether characterized as
drug, religion, or dessert topping, the virus is an important locus for startling
transformations and disruptions, for crossing boundaries that have yet to be crossed
(except in discourse) outside of fiction, and for revealing the constructed nature of that
which we tend to view as fixed and essential.
NOTES
1. Because of increasing computerization, however, more mechanisms and information
systems are subject to viral catastrophe, as the Y2K scare illustrated. That suggests that
computer viruses could possibly threaten human lives, as E.L. Leiss argues:
“malfunctioning of a certain system due to missing data or programs may result in a
massive loss of life (e.g. an air traffic control system; a control system for a hydroelectric dam or a nuclear power plant). Equally important, the potential of disruption
can conceivable be more paralyzing than the explosion of a small bomb” (12).
2. A Trojan horse is defined as “a block of undesired code intentionally hidden within a
desirable block of code. Examples of Trojan horses are logic bombs and time bombs,
which perform some function based on a logical condition or a time condition,
respectively” (Hoffman 5).
3. Bruce Sterling is perhaps the most vocal spokesperson for cyberpunk art, suggesting
in his introduction to the Mirrorshades (1986) anthology that it captures “a new kind of
integration. The overlapping of worlds that were formerly separate: the realm of high
tech and the modern pop underground . . . . The work of the cyberpunks is paralleled
through the Eighties pop culture: in rock video; in the hacker underground; in the jarring
street tech of hip-hop and scratch music; in the synthesizer rock of London and Tokyo”
(183). Numerous critics have cast doubt as to whether cyberpunk actually represents
anything new, and it must be said that the vision promoted in Gibson’s rather cautionary
tales accepted as the cyberpunk ethos is generally one that appeals to a white male
audience.
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4. In “Hacking Away at the Counterculture,” Andrew Ross writes,
In fact, the media commentary on the virus scare has not run not so much
tongue-in-cheek as hand-in-glove with the rhetoric of AIDS hysteria–the
common use of terms like killer virus and epidemic; the focus on hi-risk
personal contact . . . the obsession with defense, security, and immunity;
and the climate of suspicion generated around communitarian acts of
sharing. The underlying moral imperative being this: You can’t trust
your best friend’s software any more than you can trust his or her bodily
fluids–safe software or no software at all! (PMC 1)
5. Sontag argues that these metaphors are “central to ideas about AIDS that distinguish
this illness from others that have been regarded as plague-like” (158). And, as
Weinstock argues, “as more and more people utilize computer technology, I suggest the
association also functions in reverse–that the omnipresence of biological viruses triggers
conscious or unconscious concern regarding computer viruses” (7).
6. Or, as Haraway puts it, “Disease is a subspecies of information malfunction or
communications pathology; disease is a process of misrecognition or transgression of
the boundaries of a strategic assemblage called self” (212)
7. In How We Became Posthuman (1999), Hayles notes that the posthuman view
“configures human being so that it can be seamlessly articulated with intelligent
machines” (3).
8. Its intent is unintentionally “programmed” by Mark himself. When he comes across
the early incarnation of the stroke/virus, or the “little one,” he recognizes himself in the
“pain, compulsion, the old drive toward oblivion” (299). There is no mind, however,
only intent: “It was a voracious thing . . . . Juggernaut, wanting to devour, infiltrate,
rape, merge . . . . yet no more deliberately evil than cobra venom. It knew nothing else,
and in a way it knew nothing at all, except that it would do what it would do” (299).
9. Indeed, it is literally through the agency of the “body” that Markt is preserved intact.
Sam, Gabe’s teenage daughter, converts an insulin pump into a power source by
attaching it to her stomach, drawing energy from her own body electricity and providing
an uninfected power source for her computer. Because the level of power output from
her body is so low, it is one of the few input/output areas that passes unnoticed by the
virus. Thus she is able to keep both Art and Mark safe through “body power.”
10. Wolmark is referring here primarily to Gibson’s version of cyberpunk, but although
I would argue that a significant feature of the cyberpunk “ethic” is the uncritical
celebration of technology, I do not believe that Gibson is necessarily uncritical. There
is, however, no sense in his texts that technology must become accountable.
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11. In Consciousness Explained, the philosopher Daniel Dennett explains that memes
are also carried by “meme vehicles” such as books, pictures, sayings, etc., arguing that
“A meme’s existence depends on a physical embodiment of some medium” (203-204)
12. Daniel Dennett, who writes “a human mind is itself an artifact created when memes
restructure a human brain in order to make it a better habitat for memes” argues that
because memes and minds are inextricably associated, “the ‘independent’ mind
struggling to protect itself from alien and dangerous memes is a myth” (Consciousness
Explained 207). See also Susan Blackmore’s The Meme Machine and J. M. Balkin
Cultural Software, which argue for the symbiosis of memes and their hosts.
13. Among other things, the Church of Virus is “a forum for rational discourse, a
memetically engineered atheistic religion, a synthesis of religion and evolution, the best
possible conceptual framework for living and thinking, a neo-cybernetic philosophy for
the 21st century, Darwin's dangerous idea out of control, an extended phenotype of the
Virion Council.” You may become a member as well as a “vector,” or one who spreads
the word by copying the church’s logo to your very own home page.
14. infection strategy
Any memetic strategy which encourages infection of a host. Jokes encourage
infection by being humorous, tunes by evoking various emotions, slogans and catchphrases by being terse and continuously repeated. Common infection strategies are
"Villain vs. victim", "Fear of Death", and "Sense of Community". In a memecomplex, the bait co-meme is often central to the infection strategy. (See replication
strategy; mimicry.) (GMG)
vaccime
(pron. vak-seem) Any meta-meme which confers resistance or immunity to one or
more memes, allowing that person to be exposed without acquiring an active
infection. Also called an `immuno-meme.' Common immune-conferring memes are
"Faith", "Loyalty", "Skepticism", and "tolerance". (See: meme-allergy.) (GMG.)
vector
A medium, method, or vehicle for the transmission of memes. Almost any
communication medium can be a memetic vector. (GMG)
immuno-depressant
Anything that tends to reduce a person’s memetic immunity. Common immunodepressants are: travel, disorientation, physical and emotional exhaustion, insecurity,
emotional shock, loss of home or loved ones, future shock, culture shock, isolation
stress, unfamiliar social situations, certain drugs, loneliness, alienation, paranoia,
repeated exposure, respect for Authority, escapism, and hypnosis (suspension of
critical judgment). Recruiters for cults often target airports and bus terminals
because travelers are likely to be subject to a number of these immuno-depressants.
(GMG) (See cult.)
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retromeme
A meme which attempts to splice itself into an existing meme-complex (example:
Marxist-Leninists trying to co-opt other sociotypes). (GMG)
15. For an overview of the field, see Levy, D.A. and Nail, P.R. (1993) Contagion: A
theoretical and empirical review and reconceptualization. Genetic, Social and General
Psychology Monographs 119: 235-285. Elaine Showalter’s recent cultural studies work
Hystories (1997) represents a recasting of the idea of social or emotional contagion;
using a feminist psychoanalytic approach, Showalter examines chronic fatigue
syndrome, Gulf War syndrome, recovered memories of sexual abuse, multiple
personality disorder, satanic ritual abuse, and alien abduction as examples of what she
calls “hysterical epidemics.” Her contention is that hysteria, far from being eradicated
as a syndrome, is very much alive and proliferating in contemporary culture:
Hysteria not only survives in the 1990s, it is more contagious than in the
past. Infectious diseases spread by ecological change, modern
technology, urbanization, jet travel, and human interaction. Infectious
epidemics of hysteria spread by stories circulated through self-help
books, articles in newspapers and magazines, TV talk shows and series,
films, the Internet, and even literary criticism. The cultural narratives of
hysteria, which I call hystories, multiply rapidly and uncontrollably in the
era of mass media, telecommunications, and e-mail. (5)
16. For analyses of the visual representations of the virus that corresponded with the
emergence of HIV, see Treichler, Patton, Martin, Haraway.
17. In William S. Burroughs, Jenny Skerl writes,
Burroughs attacks all either-or thinking, especially the separation and
opposition of mind and body, word and world, birth and death, pleasure
and pain, male and female. It is these concepts, according to Burroughs,
that trap us into bodies that can be manipulated by power elites. The
primary form of control is a sexuality in which the Other Half is a
yearning for another body to assuage the feeling of separation caused by
dualism. (123)
18. See Scott Bukatman’s chapter “Terminal Image” in Terminal Identity (1996) for an
analysis of the image/media virus employed by Burroughs and Baudrillard.
19. What is presumably “spreading” in the Nike commercials is the phenomenon of
March Madness, not necessarily Nike itself (unless we count the spread of Nike through
the agency of advertising). With MTV, another marketing behemoth, we have the case
of a logo even more explicitly associated with a pathogen. Last year, users who
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frequented the network’s web site found themselves immediately confronted with the
logo’s newest incarnation: MTVirus.
The site is an interactive database, in which the user may obtain information by
using laboratory tools such as a microscope (or “tubescan”) and a syringe. The
“viruses” themselves are quite large and blobby, and one must “freeze” them with the
syringe in order to glean the latest music news. What is particularly unusual about the
site is the Jules Verne-styled equipment and laboratory, which makes an interesting
complement to the high-tech aura surrounding contemporary virus research. For a
treatment of MTV as a “media virus,” see Douglas Rushkoff’s Media Virus!: Hidden
Agendas in Popular Culture.
20. To be fair, Balkin notes in his introduction he does not believe the human mind
works like any existing computer, and writes that “it is highly misleading to think of
individuals as consisting of identical hardware into which identical copies of software
are sold” (5).
21. In How We Became Posthuman, Katherine Hayles observes, “The world that Snow
Crash depicts–part virtual, part real–is driven by a single overpowering metaphor:
humans are computers . . . . As if in response to the cybernetic models of the brain, Neal
Stephenson reasons that there must exist in humans a basic programming level . . . at
which free will and autonomy are no more in play than they are for core memory
running a program” (272).
22. Like Dawkins, Stephenson assumes that a sufficiently educated, or “rational” mind,
is more able to fend off memes that those not as accustomed to analyzing and evaluating
ideas. The more one reasons, presumably, the more one is able to prevent certain
memetic infestations. Juanita, one of Hiro’s partners, suggests that the brain can
innoculate itself: “Your brain has an immune system, just like your body. The more you
use it–the more viruses you get exposed to–the better your immune system becomes”
(429).
23.

Under the right conditions, your ears–or eyes–can tie into the deep
structures, bypassing the higher language functions. Which is to say,
someone who knows all the right words can speak words, or show you
visual symbols, that go past all your defenses and sink right into your
brainstem. Like a cracker who breaks into a computer system, bypasses
all the security precautions, and plugs himself into the core, enabling him
to exert absolute control over the machine. (395)

24. Pentecosts, in addition to practicing glossalia, are notorious as snake-handlers,
indicating another connection to the ancient worship of Asherah.
25. Interestingly, the “Church of Virus” website, which promulgates a similar theology,
lists Snow Crash among the recommended books for its adherents.
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26. In her analysis of Snow Crash, Barbara Browning, commenting on the association
of the Christian Right and attitudes towards AIDS, observes that “the subtler point
behind the blunt political irony of corporate Christianity behind a plague spread by
infected bodily fluids is that even the most ‘orderly’ of contemporary ‘lifestyle choices’
is already infected with others” (134).
27. Like the viruses discussed in Chapter One, this viral weapon is equated with a
nuclear bomb. It “explodes” in the Metaverse, before the eyes of thousands of hackers.
28. As Hayles says of Stephenson’s novel, “Although Snow Crash obviously comes
down on the side of preserving autonomy, individuality, and consciousness, it also
reinforces the equation of humans with computers . . . . Emphasizing the force of
performative language in an infoworld, it performs the construction of humans as
computers” (278).
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CHAPTER SIX
CODA: VIRAL FUTURES
In the beginning of this study, I noted that as the malevolent counterpart to the
gene, the virus is the contemporary indicator of non-self, just as the gene is the premier
indicator of self. As I have illustrated, however, this view of the virus relies upon a
model of immunology that is becoming increasingly outmoded. So, too, I argue, is our
current understanding of the virus becoming outmoded, at least in the realm of fiction
and in some scientific circles. But it is this characterization of the virus, I believe, that
prevents us from recognizing the benefits of a treatment like bacteriophage therapy,
which could effectively eradicate our problems with antibiotic-resistant bacteria if we
were to ingest these viruses. However, willingly subjugating one’s self to invasion by
non-self is an uncomfortable prospect at best, though we rarely bat an eye at the routine
use of vaccinations. Like phage therapy, gene therapy employs the virus as a tool,
but–though the procedures are not yet proven to be effective–the therapies are
considered fairly “safe” because the viruses in question are hollowed out, thus stripped
of their pathogenicity. The question of the evolutionary potential of the virus, however,
is another matter altogether. If indeed the virus can stimulate evolution, as some
scientists argue, it does so only through the violation of the gene, that premier indicator
of self, which it cuts and pastes at random. In other words, we can only evolve at the
expense of self. Thus the virus is representative of both evolution and apocalypse, a trait
that Darwin’s Radio, The X-Files, and a number of the texts in Chapter Three seize as a
starting point for interrogating “fixed” boundaries that yield under the onslaught of
infection.
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The evolutionary potential of the biological virus runs through many of these
texts, but it may also be found in speculations about the meme and the computer virus,
which is closely related to both the meme and the biological virus. Evolution, however,
is not an unproblematical good, as Butler suggests in Clay’s Ark; the characters in that
text mourn the inevitable passing of what they believe to be truly “human.” The virus
forces a sense of community that they do not welcome, whereas in Ammonite the
infected Marghe Taishan is positively transformed both by the communal nature of the
virus and the deep sense of community it stimulates among the women of Jeep. The
performative, universal language that these women access through the agency of the
virus empowers them and disrupts the patriarchal discourse that is their heritage. In
Snow Crash, however, the viral universal language associated with the Sumerian
goddess Asherah is something that must be stamped out, as it is representative of an
irrationality which is anathema to the computer programmer. In other words, the
semiotic language of the former text is viewed as liberatory, while that of the latter is
considered destructive–for the very same reasons: it is disruptive of the “civilized,”
rational patriarchal order. And yet, as Stephenson suggests, there is something
“magical” about the rational language of programming; Hiro is effective at combating
the Snow Crash virus because he understands the nature of machine language, which,
like the nam-shub, is performative. Thus, as it does with so many boundaries, the virus
straddles the constructed boundary between rational and non-rational, challenging our
notions of both. Thus can Preston in the same text characterize the filovirus first as
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“compact, hard, logical, totally selfish” (The Hot Zone 85), and then later describe its
deep (feminine, primitive) irrationality; for him, it is “a motive without a mind” (85).
I have argued in this study that the virus allows us a unique and even
defamilarizing perspective on our subject position, as the inextricable relationship
between human and virus forces not only fictional characters to acknowledge their “own
strange parts,” but also the readers of these texts; Matzinger and others posit an
integration of body and pathogen that much of the fiction has anticipated. And
developments in science and postmodern theory are reflected in a program like The XFiles, which responds to currents in both, often shaping them into the “extreme
possibilities” we see in our living rooms each week. At the same time, however, the
show exploits taboos, biases, and myths that are infrequently voiced in mainstream
society, but exist nonetheless; they are representative of our deepest elemental fears and
anxieties. In other words, they tend to be at odds with the latest scientific currents of
thought. So while The X-Files can challenge the central orthodoxy of the self/non-self
immunological model by suggesting that we cannot view ourselves as separate from the
virus, it also reinforces the virus’s “other” status by playing on anxieties about AIDS,
emerging viruses, cancer, bioweapons, and genetic manipulation. The black oil, which
links us with some rather vicious aliens, is hardly utopian in the sense of the Jeep virus
in Ammonite; rather, it has more affinities with the virus Butler describes in Clay’s Ark.
None of the humans are thrilled by the prospect of infection, despite the promise of
extrasensory perception or other superhuman powers. Thus, the scary, enduring Other is
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still very much in place in The X-Files, despite the show’s challenges to human/alien
identity.
It is the virus’s permeability as a signifier that makes it an ideal candidate for a
whole host of metaphorical attachments, but it is that same permeability and mutability
that allows for “extreme possibilities.” In Synners and Snow Crash, for example, the
virus not only to erases the very distinction between the computational and biological
virus, but it also blurs all boundaries between the organic and the artificial; these texts
effect a naturalization of computer viruses and render humans and their viruses as
artificial. The virus serve as a locus by which the novels interrogate and compromise
the binary of self and non-self, which in these texts is not only described in terms of
human and virus, but also human and machine. It is, as I have argued, a uniquely
“postmodern” agent/construct, one that embodies contradictions of self and other within
its own structure, and one which inhabits a liminality that enables us, like Haraway’s
cyborg, to imagine potent fusions and dangerous possibilities.
We see some of these possibilities represented in many of the fictional texts I
have examined in this study, some of which, like The X-Files, attempt a collapse of the
central binary of self and other, but which at the same time cast the virus in the role of
the typical other. It will take time to discard the old image of the body at war, with
armies defending against (foreign) marauding invaders. Even more current images of
the body and immune system response employ, as I illustrated in Chapter One, a variety
of war metaphors. The body is no longer simply a fortress; it is instead “conceived as a
strategic system, highly militarized in key arenas of imagery and practice” in which
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disease may be seen as “a subspecies of information malfunction or communications
pathology . . . a process of misrecognition or transgression of the boundaries of a
strategic assemblage called self” (Haraway 211-213). Here the distinction of self and
non-self remains the same, even as the imagery evolves.
For potent fusions, we might do well to turn to Bear’s Darwin’s Radio, who
describes an integration between human and virus that is beneficial–and which is not a
science fictional device. His delineation of phage therapy, which serves as our
introduction to viruses in the novel, suggests that the day of viewing the virus as a
positive force and transformative agent may be at hand, a notion that science fiction has
anticipated. If such a day arrives, the very tenor of “viral discourse” (and viral
metaphors) will change. It will also, by necessity, be the day that the traditional
self/non-self model of immunology finally collapses, allowing us to transcend depictions
of the immune system that employ metaphors of war. At long last, we may find
ourselves in line with the theories of immunologist Ludwig Fleck, who wrote the
following in 1935:
An organism can no longer be construed as a self-contained, independent
unit with fixed boundaries . . . . In the light of this concept [the
harmonious life unit], man appears as a complex to whose harmonious
well-being many bacteria, for instance, are absolutely essential . . . . It is
very doubtful whether an invasion in the old sense is possible, involving
as it does an interference by completely foreign organisms in natural
conditions. (Martin 109).
In this view, the virus–gendered, historicized, and nationalized in texts ranging from
popular fiction to science writings–is inseparable from who we are as human beings. It
is us. And knowing this, we may use it to negotiate “the problematic multiplicities of
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postmodern selves,” as it is itself invested with multiplicity and inscribed with
competing discourses. It is a touchstone, a mirror of our postmodern moment, and just
as our postmodern moment continually shifts and reforms, revealing itself as a construct,
so does our mirror. If the virus changes, it is only because we ourselves have consented
to change–it is up to us to seize its utopian potential.
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